Leo Alexander Jones

Executed At 7:09 Am on March 24, 1998 The State of Florida executed yet another innocent man. Leo Alexander Jones was pronounced dead at 7:11 Am.

Mr. Jones was a Muslim, and in keeping, was in good spirits and displayed tremendous strength and courage under unimaginable circumstances, during his finally hours. His concern was only for his family. His final words were the Shahadah, "Ashaduan la ilaha illa Allah wa ashaduanna Muhammadan Rasool Allah" ( I bear witness that there is no God but Allah and I bear witness that Muhammad is the messanger of Allah)

It was decided to let this web page stand, as a reminder, first to Leo Jones and second to be a thorn in the side of 'Justice' misapplied. This man was innocent and we will not let them forget until the truth is made known to the public. The Florida Supreme Court decision produced two scathing dessenting votes from Justice's Anstead and Shaw that epitomize the flaws in this case.

Please read the following :

ANSTEAD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

This is a troubling case because it presents a serious issue of guilt and innocence. It is troubling not because the State did not present sufficient and substantial evidence of Jones' guilt at his trial (it did), or because there is any validity to Jones' claim that he was tried by a biased judge. (There is no validity to such claim). Rather, it is troubling because of the sheer volume of evidence present in the record that another person committed the murder, and, yet, none of this evidence was heard by the jury that tried and convicted Jones. Surely it defies common sense, as well as the holding in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), to hold that at a trial conducted to determine the truth about this most egregious of crimes carrying the ultimate penalty, extensive evidence of another person's guilt as well as evidence of police misconduct would not be admissible as substantive evidence of innocence. The analysis in the majority opinion takes each of the separate pieces of evidence that another person committed this crime, and attempts, largely by speculation, to discount the credibility and reliability of each, item by item. However, I believe that controlling United States Supreme Court decisions compel us to consider this evidence together, and, when that is done, it compels a conclusion that this evidence should be considered as substantive evidence and that a new trial should be conducted in which a jury should be given the opportunity to properly evaluate the credibility and weight of such evidence. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995). There is just too much here to be ignored, and we are the only forum available to say so. It is because of the existence of this evidence, although in far lesser amount, that we mandated an evidentiary hearing in this case in 1991. See Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1991).

POLICE CORRUPTION A separate but important aspect of this case concerns the testimony of Officer Cleveland Smith who has come forward only upon his retirement from the police force, to inform the court of a corrupt culture that prevailed in the police force at the time of this murder, and that specifically implicated two key police officer witnesses in this case. The State concedes the impeccable record of Officer Smith and makes no attempt to challenge his credibility in this regard. Hence, Officer Smith's damning testimony about the police culture and the officer witnesses in this case cannot be brushed aside lightly. We should be very concerned that such a culture existed at the time, and that Officer Smith was so intimidated by this culture that he would not come forward until he had retired and safely secured his pension.2 Rather than challenging Smith's testimony, the State concedes that these officers may have been the bad actors described by Smith and indeed, that they were ousted from the police force years ago. In terms of the case before us, Smith's testimony is important evidence that these particular police officer witnesses were intent on making a case against Jones at any price. At a bare minimum, this testimony constitutes important impeachment evidence against two of the State's most important witnesses. In addition to Officer Smith, another witness whose credibility is not challenged by the State, Bill White, an Assistant Public Defender, presented testimony of police misconduct in this case. EVIDENCE OF SCHOFIELD'S GUILT The most important issue before us concerns the admissibility of the enormous amount of evidence that has been disclosed since Jones' trial indicating that Glen Schofield actually committed the murder.3 I cannot accept the majority's restrictive interpretation of Chambers and the majority's conclusion that the evidence of Schofield's guilt cannot be considered as substantive evidence in Jones' defense.4 In Chambers, a case remarkably similar to this and also involving the shooting death of a police officer, the Supreme Court held that an accused's fundamental right to present evidence in his own behalf required a state court to admit the testimony of several witnesses that a third party had made oral confessions of guilt to the same crime. The Supreme Court emphasized that "[t]he sheer number of independent confessions provided additional corroboration for each." In explaining its decision, the Supreme Court declared: The hearsay statements involved in this case were originally made and subsequently offered at trial under circumstances that provided considerable assurance of their reliability. First, each of McDonald's confessions was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the murder had occurred. Second, each one was corroborated by some other evidence in the case-- McDonald's sworn confession, the testimony of an eyewitness to the shooting, the testimony that McDonald was seen with a gun immediately after the shooting, and proof of his prior ownership of a .22-caliber revolver and subsequent purchase of a new weapon. The sheer number of independent confessions provided additional corroboration for each. Third, whatever may be the parameters of the penal-interest rationale, each confession here was in a very real sense self-incriminatory and unquestionably against interest. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 2082, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1971); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S., at 89, 91 S. Ct., at 219. McDonald stood to benefit nothing by disclosing his role in the shooting to any of his three friends and he must have been aware of the possibility that disclosure would lead to criminal prosecution. Indeed, after telling Turner of his involvement, he subsequently urged Turner not to "mess him up." Finally, if there was any question about the truthfulness of the extrajudicial statements, McDonald was present in the courtroom and was under oath. He could have been cross-examined by the State, and his demeanor and responses weighed by the jury. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970). The availability of McDonald significantly distinguishes this case from the prior Mississippi precedent, Brown v. State, supra, and from the Donnelly-type situation, since in both cases the declarant was unavailable at the time of trial. 410 U.S. at 300-01 (footnote omitted). This case is very similar to Chambers, if not stronger on its facts. All of the "hot button" factors considered by the Court in Chambers are implicated, and, of course, we have the additional factor of the misconduct of the important police witnesses, a factor not present in Chambers. Further, here we have many times the number of confessions by the third party as was involved in Chambers. There is an almost endless list of witnesses to whom Schofield has confessed. In addition to the numerous confessions, there is extensive evidence of Schofield's guilt established by various witnesses who saw him at the scene of the murder. The overwhelming volume of this evidence clearly serves to corroborate its individual components. And, as in Chambers, Schofield was actually called as a witness and subject to examination by both sides in the most recent evidentiary hearing. True, some of the witnesses to whom Schofield confessed are convicted felons and prison inmates whose credibility will have to be closely scrutinized. However, we cannot ignore the fact that the State routinely relies on "jailhouse confessions" to secure convictions in criminal cases, including many murder cases. Obviously, the State would have a powerful case against Schofield with the evidence that has been presented against him in this case.5 As in Chambers, we cannot ignore "the sheer number" of witnesses and evidence that has now been accumulated and presented implicating Schofield. That evidence now, in fact, far exceeds the evidence considered by the Supreme Court in Chambers. Under these circumstances, we cannot simply ignore the observation of the United States Supreme Court: [W]here constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. Finally, and that word has special meaning here, Chambers was not a death penalty case. This is.

SHAW, J., dissenting.

Newly discovered evidence in the form of testimony by recently retired police officer Cleveland Smith shows that at the time Leo Jones was taken into custody in 1981 two critical witnesses against him, fellow officers to Smith in the Duval County Sheriff’s Office, routinely engaged in illegal and brutal tactics that now place in question the validity of Jones’ confession. Other newly discovered evidence in the form of testimony by numerous eyewitnesses and jailhouse confidants implicates another person, Glen Schofield, in the killing of Officer Szafranski. Based on the cumulative weight of this evidence, the integrity of the fact-finding process is called into question and in my opinion a new trial is required.

I. OFFICER SMITH’S TESTIMONY At the evidentiary hearing below, Officer Smith testified that he worked as a patrolman for the Duval County Sheriff’s Office in Jacksonville, Florida, for twenty-four years and recently retired in good standing. He testified extensively concerning the actions of Officer Lynwood Mundy, who was among the first officers on the scene at Jones’ apartment after the shooting. Officer Smith explained: Q. What did -- what did Officer Mundy tell you about Leo Jones? A. We, we talked about it several times. He told me that he kicked in a door and that he just started beating people. He says his intention was to kill somebody, and that another officer stopped him from doing it. Q. Did he indicate who he intended to kill? A. He said whoever was inside the building. Officer Smith stated that Mundy routinely fabricated charges and misrepresented facts on police reports: Q. Did you have occasion to actually patrol with Officer Mundy? A. Yes, sir. . . . . Q. To your knowledge, did Officer Mundy make up charges? A. Yes, sir, he did. Q. Did you refuse to sign reports because Officer Mundy had misrepresented the facts? A. Yes, sir, I did. To explain Mundy’s penchant for violence, Officer Smith related the details of a prior arrest in an unrelated case: A. There was a robbery at the Trailways Bus Station one night, and several of us responded to the call. By the time I arrived, they had-- an officer had one of the suspects in the rear of a police car. Officer Mundy pulled up. He got out of his car, walked over to the back of the other police car, opened the door, started questioning the suspect. The suspect wouldn’t give him any answers. Officer Mundy then closed the door, went to the trunk of his vehicle, got out a pair of vise grips [i.e., large pliers]. Officer Mundy then came back to the police car, opened the rear of the car, told the suspect to place his legs outside the vehicle while he was still seated. When the suspect did, Officer Mundy grabbed his genitals with the vice grips, and made him tell everything he [i.e., Mundy] wanted him to tell him. When Officer Smith was asked what prompted him to come forward after all these years, he explained: A. To be honest with you, I never kept up with the trial. What happened was, I was reading the paper in September, and I read in the paper where Mr. Jones stated that Lynwood Mundy beat a confession out of him. He said the confession was beaten out of him. And the time I read it, I said, it’s true, Lynwood beat the confession out of him, because I had never heard that before [i.e., Jones’ allegation that he had been beaten]. . . . . . . . THE COURT: How can you say it’s true? THE WITNESS: It was the stories that Lynwood had been telling me. Just prior to the present crime, officers had specifically been ordered to target Leo Jones: A. And it was brought up at roll call that an officer had had a fight, a very serious fight, and that the suspect involved was a Mr. Jones. We were told to do everything in our power to put Leo Jones in jail. When asked why he had not come forward before, Officer Smith was straightforward: "Well, I’ll be honest with you: I wanted my pension." After he testified that Mundy had tried to implicate him in criminal activity (by getting him to lie on police reports), Officer Smith was asked why he had never turned Mundy in to Internal Affairs: Q. Okay. Then if he was trying to implicate you in a crime, why didn’t you ever come to me or somebody else in our office and say you need to know about this man? A. Because I didn’t’ trust anybody. Q. Are you saying you didn’t trust me? A. I didn’t trust anybody. Q. Why didn’t you submit--why didn’t you give confidential affidavits to Internal Affairs when they were trying to fire Lynwood Mundy? A. When I went to Internal once about a police officer pistol-whipping an 11-year-old kid. By the time the investigation was over, I was told I didn’t see what I thought I saw and if I didn’t keep my mouth shut, that I could have serious problems. Mundy’s tactics were common knowledge at the department--and in fact were viewed by other officers as a resource: A. Everybody knows -- it was common knowledge that Officer Mundy was like a hit man on the police department. . . . . A. The point I’m trying to make is that Officer Mundy has certain leeways that he was allowed. He was allowed certain things that go on. In fact, he was called to certain problems in order to beat suspects up. Officer Smith related Mundy’s account of his actions when he entered Jones’ apartment: A. Well, I asked him [i.e., Mundy], I said, "What happened?" He says, "Man, you should have seen it." He says, "Man, I just went and I kicked the door open." He says, "There was this guy in there and I just started beating him and beating him and beating him." I said, "Beating who?" He said, "A guy we put in jail." I said, "How did you know that was the one?" He said, "Man, we didn’t care who we got. We were going to get somebody." In discussing Mundy’s reputation on the force, Officer Smith explained that Mundy was recognized as "an enforcer": Q. And in the course of cross-examination, you were asked about Lynwood Mundy’s reputation. What exactly was Mundy’s reputation? A. Mundy was an enforcer. Plain and simple. That’s what he was. If somebody had somebody that was giving them a hard time--you hear it all the time on the radio, "I need Officer Mundy." And everyone knew what it meant. Officer Mundy was going to kick somebody’s butt. Officer Eason, the officer who obtained Jones’ confession hours after the crime, also had a dubious record: Q. And what was Hugh Eason’s reputation? A. He was a rapist, possible murderer. . . . . A. An extortionist. In conclusion, Officer Smith recapitulated his account of Officer Mundy’s actions on the scene: A. Well, like I say, he told me the story several times, and each time he would add a little more and a little more, and it all basically stayed the same. It was basically the same story: That he kicked that door down and that he just started beating people. He didn’t care who he was beating; he just started beating people. . . . . Q. And did he indicate that he knew that it was Leo Jones as the individual he was beating? A. To be honest with you, I don’t think he really cared who he was beating, as long as he was beating somebody. II. TESTIMONY IMPLICATING SCHOFIELD During the course of the present and prior evidentiary hearings, Leo Jones introduced the testimony of numerous eyewitnesses who implicated Jones’ roommate, Glen Schofield, in the crime. Two witnesses, Daniel Cole and Sharon Denise Reed, testified at the 1992 hearing that shortly after hearing gunshots they saw Schofield running from the scene with a rifle. Reed’s mother, Martha Bell, testified that Reed related this information to her the next morning. Jones presented three additional eyewitnesses at the present hearing, Roy "Shorty" Williams, James Corbett, and Dwayne Hagans, who placed Schofield at the scene with a rifle or weapon. Jones also presented the testimony of numerous persons to whom Schofield confessed to the murder. One of Schofield’s former girlfriends, Patricia Owens, testified at the 1992 hearing that Schofield told her that he killed the officer, and this testimony was echoed by three inmates, Frank Pittro, Franklin Delano Prince, and Donald Perry. Jones presented four additional inmates at the most recent hearing, Louis Reed, Carnell Grayer, Jasper Ray Kirtsey, and Dwayne Hagans, who testified that Schofield told them he killed Officer Szafranski. III. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW In reviewing a trial court’s order following an evidentiary hearing on a claim of newly discovered evidence, our task on appeal is twofold: We must review the record to determine (1) whether the court applied the right rule of law, and (2) whether competent substantial evidence supports its ruling: In reviewing a trial court’s application of the [relevant] law to a rule 3.850 motion following an evidentiary hearing, this Court applies the following standard of review: As long as the trial court’s findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, "this Court will not ’substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact, likewise of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight to be given to the evidence by the trial court.’" Blanco v. State, 702 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1997) (quoting Demps v. State, 462 So. 2d 1074, 1075 (Fla. 1984)). The proper rule of law for determining whether proffered evidence qualifies as "newly discovered" evidence was set forth in Hallman v. State, 371 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1979): The facts upon which the petition is based must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that defendant or his counsel could not have known them by the use of diligence. Id. at 485. The standard for determining whether newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial was established in Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991): Thus, we hold that henceforth, in order to provide relief, the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. Id. at 915. IV. NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE Applying the above standards to the present case, the record fails to show that the trial court applied the right rule of law in its order denying rule 3.850 relief, or that competent substantial evidence supports its ruling. While Officer Smith’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing comprises nearly sixty pages of record transcript, the trial court devoted just three sentences to the matter. The court’s ruling is terse, cryptic, and factually inaccurate: The testimony of Cleveland Smith primarily dealt with Officers Mundy and Eason. Their role in this case was before the jury and the Florida Supreme Court. The further fact that Officer Mundy said he wanted to put Jones in jail adds nothing to detract from the proof offered at trial.[6] In the proceeding below, the defense presented Officer Smith’s testimony as Brady material7 and yet the trial court failed to evaluate the evidence under any legal standard. Further, the record contains no competent substantial evidence to support its summary dismissal of the testimony. The trial court’s order denying relief thus is defective. Rather than assessing Officer Smith’s testimony as Brady material, this Court should evaluate the testimony as newly discovered evidence. Based on the present record, the testimony meets both prongs of the Hallman and Jones tests. First, the testimony qualifies as "newly discovered" evidence under Hallman because the testimony was "unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial," and the "defendant or his counsel could not have known [it] by the use of diligence." 371 So. 2d at 485. Given the tenor and content of Smith’s statements, the testimony could not have been discovered with diligence until he came forward in 1997 after his pension was secure. The testimony also satisfies the second prong of the newly discovered evidence standard in Jones, i.e., the testimony "would probably produce an acquittal on retrial." 591 So. 2d at 915. Eleven hours after he was taken into custody, Jones signed a brief four-sentence confession written by Officer Eason: L.J. I, Leo Jones have been given my rights and I fully understand them and am making this statement on my own free will. I have given Det. Eason permission to write this statement for me. I, Leo Jones on 23 May 81 took a rifle out of the front room of my apartment and went down the back stairs and walked to the front empty apartment and shot the policeman through the front window of the apartment. I then ran back upstairs and hid the gun or rifle and then the police came. L.J. Jones v. State, 440 So. 2d 570, 573 (Fla. 1983). The confession was the cornerstone of the State’s case at trial. See Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 913 (Fla. 1991) ("At trial, the State relied heavily upon the confession."). This confession would probably be inadmissible at a new trial as explained below. V. THE CONFESSION This Court recently reaffirmed the abiding standard in Florida for determining the admissibility of a defendant’s confession--the defendant must be "uninfluenced by fear": [B]ecause of the tremendous weight accorded confessions by our courts and the significant potential for compulsion--both psychological and physical--in obtaining such statements, a main focus of Florida confession law has always been on guarding against one thing--coercion. We defined the abiding standard for determining the admissibility of a confession nearly a century and a half ago: To render a confession voluntary and admissible as evidence, the mind of the accused should at the time be free to act, uninfluenced by fear or hope. To exclude it as testimony, it is not necessary that any direct promises or threats be made to the accused. It is sufficient, if the attending circumstances, or declaration of those present, be calculated to delude the prisoner as to his true position, and exert an improper and undue influence over his mind. Simon v. State, 5 Fla. 285, 296 (1853). The test thus is one of voluntariness, or free will, which is to be determined by an examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession. Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 964 (Fla. 1992) (emphasis added and omitted). Under the above standard, Jones’ confession would probably be suppressed at a new trial in light of Officer Smith’s testimony. The fact that Jones was in the apartment when the door was kicked in by police and the occupants were set upon by Officer Mundy--a rogue cop who was intent not on capturing but killing them--is sufficient by itself to create an atmosphere of coercion that could not be dispelled in a matter of hours. The occupants of the apartment were dealing with--according to Officer Smith--a pathological officer who was intent on beating them to death, an officer who was known as "a hit man" or "an enforcer," an officer who had extracted a confession via pliers to the testicles, and an officer who had fabricated charges and falsified reports. Mundy was later fired from the police force in disgrace. Further, the confrontation at the apartment took place in a climate where officers openly called on the radio for the services of "a hit man" or "an enforcer" in order "to beat suspects up," and where an officer pistol-whipped an eleven year-old child with impunity. The confession itself was signed at the Police Memorial Building eleven hours after the melee at the apartment and was extracted by one of the officers who had been present at the apartment, Officer Eason. Eason was described by Officer Smith, a fellow officer, as "a rapist, possible murderer . . . [and] extortionist." Eason too was later fired from the force. On this record, a reasonable person in Jones’ position would have been not merely fearful, but terrified--for days, weeks, or even months after the incident. Both Jones and Hammonds testified at the suppression hearing and trial in 1981 (long before Officer Smith came forward in 1997) that they had been beaten by police at the scene and at the Police Memorial Building. Jones stated that he was beaten at the scene, on the way to the station, upon arrival at the station, and then was taken to a room upstairs where he was kneed in the groin and struck in the testicles with a pipe. He stated that he signed the confession only because he was in fear for his life. This statement is consistent with the testimony of Officer Smith: "[Mundy] says his intention was to kill somebody . . . ." Hammonds testified that he gave a statement implicating Jones because he was in fear of the police, that officers had beaten him and threatened his life. Hammonds stated that he saw Officers Mundy and Roberts beating Jones at the station while Jones was handcuffed and unresisting. Dr. Pack, who examined Jones at the hospital four or five hours after the crime, testified that Jones had a bruised face, lacerated and bleeding ear, and swollen lip.8 Bill White, the Chief Assistant Public Defender in Jacksonville, testified at the present evidentiary hearing that Officer Eason (the officer who took Jones’ confession) told him in the 1980s that on the night of the murder he, Eason, had to pull Mundy off Jones to stop Mundy from beating him. This testimony fits perfectly with Officer Smith’s account: Q. What did -- what did Officer Mundy tell you about Leo Jones? A. We, we talked about it several times. He told me that he kicked in a door and that he just started beating people. He says his intention was to kill somebody, and that another officer stopped him from doing it. I am unable to conclude--based on the present record--that Jones’ confession was "uninfluenced by fear."9 If the confession were suppressed, the record evidence remaining would probably be insufficient to sustain a conviction against Jones.10 In fact, the remaining evidence would be more consistent with Schofield’s guilt than with Jones’ guilt.11 Even if the confession were not suppressed, Jones would probably be acquitted on retrial--again, based on the present record--in light of Officer Smith’s testimony and the copious testimony implicating Schofield in the killing. Most of that testimony would be admissible either for substantive purposes or to impeach the testimony of Schofield and Officers Mundy and Eason.

VI. CONCLUSION The trial court’s order denying the rule 3.850 motion is fatally flawed--the trial court did not apply the right rule of law in addressing Officer Smith’s testimony and its ruling is not supported by competent substantial evidence. Officer Smith’s testimony--as well as much of the eyewitness and inmate testimony implicating Schofield--meets both prongs of the Hallman and Jones tests for newly discovered evidence and thus warrants a new trial. A new trial is required in the present case so that both sides can present all admissible evidence. An impartial judge and a jury of twelve Florida citizens should be given an opportunity to evaluate this evidence and base its decision upon the total picture rather than upon an incomplete representation. Regardless of the outcome, the cause of justice--i.e., the search for the truth--can only profit: The very essence of judicial trial is a search for the truth of the controversy. When the truth is discovered, the pattern for dispensing justice is obvious. All that we are importuned to do at this time is to open the way for the trial court to examine and correct its record with reference to a vital fact not known to the court when the judgment of conviction was entered. Due process and equal protection are governed by rule of Court, the criteria by which it is determined being fairness, reasonableness and justice.

Ex parte Welles, 53 So. 2d 708, 711 (Fla. 1951).

I would reverse the trial court’s order denying rule 3.850 relief and order a new trial. The collateral process in Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is a constitutional safety net designed above all to prevent the execution of an innocent man or woman. The present case is a classic example of that safety net working properly--up to the present point. Although Jones was tried and convicted in 1981, much of the present evidence did not--could not--come to light until now, more than a decade later--after Officer Smith and Schofield’s accusers came forward. This evidence vastly implicates Schofield and casts serious doubt on Jones’ guilt. The case that stands against Leo Jones today is a horse of a different color from that which was considered by the jury in 1981. "[F]airness, reasonableness and justice"--and indeed, the integrity of Florida’s capital sentencing scheme--dictate that a jury consider the complete case.

The following is an exerp from Mr. Jones' appeal, filed and heard before the Florida Supreme Court on February 24, 1998 which produced the scathing dessenting votes previously stated.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE Mr. Jones was convicted of first-degree murder in the circuit court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Duval County, and sentenced to death. This Court affirmed on direct appeal. Jones v. State, 440 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1983). Mr. Jones filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court on February 1, 1985, and was denied on June 13, 1985. Jones v. Wainwright, 473 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1985). On October 8, 1985, Mr. Jones filed a Rule 3.850 motion. After an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Jones' claim that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance, the motion was denied. The denial was affirmed by this Court. Jones v. State, 528 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 1988). On September 12, 1988, the Governor signed a death warrant, setting Mr. Jones' execution for November 14, 1988. Mr. Jones filed his second state habeas petition. Mr. Jones' state habeas petition was denied on November 10, 1988. Jones v. Dugger, 533 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1988). On November 14, 1988, Mr. Jones filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The District Court issued a stay of execution. Mr. Jones' federal habeas petition was denied on June 28, 1989, and affirmed on appeal. Jones v. Dugger, 928 F.2d 1020 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 875 (1991). The Governor signed a second death warrant on October 16, 1991, setting Mr. Jones' execution for November 13, 1991. Mr. Jones filed his second Rule 3.850 motion on November 8, 1991; the motion was denied on November 10th. This Court entered a stay of execution, reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Jones' newly discovered evidence of innocence claim. Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1991). The circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing in September 1992 and denied relief on December 11, 1992. The denial was affirmed on appeal. Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1996). Certiorari was denied on February 24, 1997. Jones v. Florida, 117 S. Ct. 1088 (1997). On March 11, 1997, Governor Chiles signed Mr. Jones' third death warrant designating April 10 through April 17, 1997, as the warrant week. Mr. Jones' execution was scheduled for April 15, 1997. On April 3, 1997, Mr. Jones filed a petition in this Court seeking to invoke this Court's all writs jurisdiction, claiming that execution in Florida's electric chair constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. On April 10, 1997, this Court stayed Mr. Jones' execution and ordered an evidentiary hearing in circuit court. Jones v. Butterworth, 691 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1997). Following a hearing that was held from April 15 through April 18, 1997, the circuit court denied Mr. Jones' claim. On April 21, 1997, this Court stayed Mr. Jones' execution pending further notice and scheduled oral arguments on Mr. Jones' appeal from the circuit court ruling. On May 22, 1997, this Court relinquished jurisdiction and ordered a supplemental hearing on Mr. Jones' claim that execution in Florida's electric chair constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Jones v. Butterworth, 695 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1997). The circuit court held a hearing from July 9 through July 15, 1997. On July 18, 1997, the circuit court denied Mr. Jones' claim. After oral arguments before this Court on September 8, 1997, this Court affirmed. Jones v. Butterworth, 701 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1997). Mr. Jones filed a petition for writ of certiorari on January 20, 1998. On September 8, 1997, Mr. Jones filed his third Rule 3.850 motion and a motion to disqualify the trial judge, A.C. Soud, from presiding over any further proceedings in this case. In the 3.850, Mr. Jones raised claims based on Judge Soud's failure to disclose his prior representation of Mr. Jones and based upon a newly discovered eyewitness who exonerated Mr. Jones and implicated Glenn Schofield. Both motions were denied on October 8, 1997. On October 31, 1997, Governor Chiles rescheduled Mr. Jones' execution for March 24, 1998. On November 10, 1997, this Court disqualified Judge Soud and ordered that any further proceedings be conducted by Senior Judge Clarence T. Johnson. This Court also scheduled oral argument for February 6, 1998, and directed that any proceedings in the circuit court be expedited. The circuit court held a hearing from December 15 through December 18, 1997. During the hearing, Mr. Jones was permitted to orally amend the 3.850 with a Brady claim based upon Cleveland Smith's testimony. Relief was denied on December 31, 1997. This appeal follows. Oral argument in this case has was heard February 24, 1998. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS Leo Jones is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted and sentenced to death. The evidence discovered since his trial establishes that Officer Szafranski was killed by another man, namely Glenn Schofield. Mr. Jones has presented testimony that Mr. Schofield has confessed to killing Officer Szafranski on twelve separate occasions. These confessions are corroborated by the testimony of five witnesses who saw Mr. Schofield on the night of the shooting. Their testimony further incriminates him as the man who killed Officer Szafranski.On September 8, 1997, Mr. Jones filed his third Rule 3.850 motion presenting more newly discovered evidence of his innocence. During the evidentiary hearing, he was permitted to orally amend the 3.850 with a newly discovered Brady claim based on the testimony of Cleveland Smith. All of the new evidence is consistent with that presented at both the 1986 and 1992 evidentiary hearings and provides additional support for the admission of Mr. Schofield's hearsay confessions as substantive evidence. This motion to vacate also included a judicial bias claim based on newly discovered evidence that Judge Soud had represented Mr. Jones in 1969, that he failed to make the appropriate disclosure in 1981, and that, as a result, Mr. Jones was denied his right to a fair trial. At the December 1997 hearing, Mr. Jones presented witnesses who testified that, in the years since Mr. Jones' conviction, Mr. Schofield has confessed to Officer Szafranski's murder.1 Mr. Jones also presented previously unavailable witnesses who saw Mr. Schofield on the night of Officer Szafranski's death whose testimony lends additional support to Mr. Jones' argument that he is innocent of this crime. One of these witnesses, Roy Williams, aka "Shorty," is the only known eyewitness to Officer Szafranski's murder. Mr. Jones also presented Cleveland Smith, a retired Jacksonville police officer, who testified that about a week prior to the Szafranski shooting the police who patrolled the area where Officer Szafranski was shot were instructed to do everything in their power to get Jones in jail. Former Deputy Smith also testified that Officer Mundy, the arresting officer, bragged for years about beating the confession out of Mr. Jones and that he entered Mr. Jones' apartment with the intent of killing whomever he found inside. Mr. Jones also presented the testimony of Chief Assistant Public Defender Bill White, who testified that Detective Hugh "Eason had witnessed L.F. Mundy beating Leo Jones and had to pull him off. He also told me if I ever told anyone that, that he would deny it if he took the stand." (H. 1143). At a 1991 hearing concerning Mr. Jones' motion to vacate and request for a stay of execution, the State admitted that the evidence then available, if presented to a jury, "might create a debatable question" about Mr. Jones' guilt (Transcript of November 10, 1991, Hearing, p. 59). The evidence supporting Mr. Jones' innocence now does more than "create a debatable question" or even a reasonable doubt. This evidence definitively proves that Mr. Jones is innocent and that he is facing imminent execution for a crime he did not commit. BACKGROUND Mr. Jones was convicted and sentenced to death for the May 23, 1981, murder of Jacksonville police officer Thomas Szafranski. The murder occurred in Jacksonville at the intersection of Sixth and Davis Streets at about 1:00 a.m.2 Officer Szafranski was driving the third of a trio of police cars leaving a hostage situation near Fifth and Lee Streets (R. 708-09). The police were travelling east on Sixth toward Davis where they planned to turn left and travel north toward University Hospital (R. 709-10). Numerous police officers converged on the scene immediately after the shooting (R. 739); however, they were unable to find any eyewitnesses to the shooting. Some people in the area directed the police to a building immediately south of the Sixth and Davis intersection (R. 743). Other witnesses testified at the trial that the shot originated from the vacant lot just north of that building (R. 1162, 1172, 1193 Police, led by Officer Mundy, began searching the building, and, in an upstairs apartment, they found Mr. Jones and his cousin Bobby Hammonds, who were taken into custody and transported to thePolice Memorial Building shortly after one a.m. Mr. Hammonds told the police that he and Mr. Jones hadnothing to do with the shooting, while Mr. Jones remained silent (R. 1104-05; 1093-94).4 Between five and six a.m., Mr. Jones and Mr. Hammonds were taken to University Hospital for treatment of injuries sustained while in police custody (R. 1095). Detective Eason testified that Mr. Jones had only "slight injuries" and that he was taken to the hospital only as a "precautionary measure" (R. 1095). Detective Eason described Mr. Jones' injuries: "Leo Jones had an ear -- some blood trickling from his ear, or it had dried up. He had a bruise on his head and I want to say that he had a busted lip, but I don't remember exactly. It was bruised or something." (R. 1103). However, according to the treating physician, Mr. Jones was at the hospital for an hour and a half and received a full physical examination as well as x-rays (R. 1299, 1305). Officer Mundy testified that Mr. Jones' injuries were inflicted at his apartment when he resisted arrest; however, the testimony on this subject fails to account for injuries serious enough to warrant x-rays four to five hours later. Officer Mundy testified that while he was in the apartment, he heard "scuffling" and noticed Mr. Jones fighting with Officers Butler and Torrible (R. 792).5 Officer Torrible testified that he did not recall Officer Mundy hitting Mr. Jones; he explained that "[i]t wasn't much of a scuffle, it was -- he [Jones] was immediately subdued." (R. 980-81).6 Officer Butler did not testify. H. Randolph Fallin had been retained by Leroy Clark, Mr. Jones' brother, to represent Mr. Jones. Mr. Fallin contacted Detective Frank Japour at approximately five a.m. to inform the police that he represented Mr. Jones and that his client should not be questioned outside his presence (Transcript of 1986 Evidentiary Hearing, pp. 203-04). While they indicated to Mr. Fallin that they understood his request, the police ignored it and continued to question Mr. Jones (Id.). Mr. Fallin arrived at the police station at about nine a.m. but was denied access to Mr. Jones until after the confession had been signed at about noon, after almost eleven hours in police custody (Id. at 205). That confession, which was written by Detective Hugh Eason, contains no details of the crime and indicates that the shots were fired from either "a gun or rifle" (R.1098-1101).7 The only evidence against Mr. Jones at trial was his presence in the Davis Street apartment, the presence of guns in the apartment, Bobby Hammonds' testimony which had previously and has subsequently been recanted,8 and Mr. Jones' confession which he later retracted. Mr. Hammonds testified that Mr. Jones left the apartment carrying a rifle shortly after one a.m., that he heard a shot ten or fifteen minutes later, and that Mr. Jones returned to the apartment still carrying a rifle (R. 914-18). In his closing statement, the StateAttorney referred to Mr. Hammonds' testimony as "the strongest testimony we've got." (R. 1459).9 The State presented evidence to support its theory about Mr. Jones' motive in shooting Officer Szafranski. For example, Officer Ritchey testified that he was present on May 16, 1981, when Mr. Jones was arrested for making an illegal left turn and heard him make threats against the police: "[h]e stated he was tired of the police hassling him, that the police weren't the only ones that had guns and that he was going to shoot him a mother-fucking pig." (R. 1142, 1150). Mr. Jones was not charged with making threats against the police that night, and the police reports detailing the arrest make no mention of any threats allegedly made by Mr. Jones (Id.). The only evidence of this statement, aside from the arresting officer's testimony, is an internal police memorandum from Officer Ritchey to Detective Eason that is dated May 23, 1981, a full week after the incident allegedly occurred.10 This memo states only that "Jones made numerous threats about getting even with the police." Clearly, this memorandum was written after Officer Szafranski's shooting and Mr. Jones' arrest in order to create highly prejudicial motive evidence against Mr. Jones. In addition, during Detective Eason's testimony regarding the questioning of Mr. Jones on May 23, 1981, he attributed the following statement to Mr. Jones: "I'm tired of being fucked with. I go to the store and I'm fucked with, I go down the street, I'm fucked with, my friends are fucked with, my family is fucked with, and I'm tired of policemen fucking with me and I decided I'd kill a policeman and that's why I did it." (R. 1101). Detective Eason did not write this statement in his notes, or even include it in the confession he wrote for Mr. Jones to sign, because he "did not see any need to at that time." (R. 1119).11 The State also presented evidence implicating Mr. Jones in another shooting at a police officer at the same location one week earlier. Officer Mundy testified about the May 18, 1981, shooting at Officer Scott Carter whose car was hit at the same intersection where Officer Szafranski later died (R. 880-81). Because he was not hit, Officer Carter did not stop his car in the intersection, so the triangulation that was later done was unreliable because the police could only estimate the car's location when the shots were fired (R. 859). Officer Mundy testified that he did a triangulation and determined that the shot that hit Officer Carter's car originated in the vacant apartment across from the intersection (R. 881). Although Judge Soud conceded that "maybe [the triangulation calculations] weren't all that accurate," he admitted the testimony to explain why Officer Mundy immediately went to that apartment building when he arrived at the scene of Officer Szafranski's shooting (R. 862-63).12 Significantly, Officer Mundy's own drawings of the triangulation of the bullet that hit Officer Carter's car pinpoint the building next to the one in which Mr. Jones lived, contrary to his testimony at Mr. Jones' trial that the bullet came from the vacant apartment in Mr. Jones' building. Officer Mundy never entered Mr. Jones' building on the occasion of Officer Carter's shooting and he was not listed as a suspect in police notes.13 The State presented a two-sentence confession that Eason testified he obtained from Leo Jones. This confession was admitted over the defense objection that Leo Jones had been beaten and had signed the confession in fear for his life (R. 1097). Officer Mundy and Detective Eason testified that Jones was not beaten, that his injuries were minor and were a result of Jones attempting to flee (R. 1095). Leo Jones testified at trial and explained that he had been beaten and signed the confession out of fear for his life (R. 1237, 1245). Mr. Jones testified that the guns in his apartment belonged to Glenn Schofield (R. 1214). Mr. Hammonds testified at trial that Mr. Schofield was in Mr. Jones' apartment that night and that he left shortly after midnight; Mr. Hammonds testified that Mr. Schofield left by the front door leading directly onto the porch and that he was carrying a gun (R. 914-15).14 Ballistics tests could not link the bullet recovered from the scene with any of the guns in Mr. Jones' apartment (R. 1048). The results of the neutron activation test performed on Mr. Jones' hands to determine whether he had recently fired a gun were negative (R. 1074-75). A witness who lived on the first floor of the next apartment building testified that he heard running through the alley between the two buildings immediately after the shots were fired, implying that Officer Szafranski's killer fled the scene (R. 1193). Glenn Schofield was a suspect in Officer Szafranski's murder from the beginning. Mr. Hammonds and Mr. Jones both testified that Mr. Schofield had been in the apartment that night, and this testimony was unrefuted. On May 24, 1981, Detective Eason began looking for Mr. Schofield. His notes indicate that he made the following effort: The writer ran an N.C.I.C. Check on the subject GlenSchofield on 5-25-81 and found that he was wanted for Violation of Probation. The writer obtained photographs of the suspect and had a Police Bulletin with the description of the suspectand information in regards to this writer wanting to talk with the suspect concerning the shooting of Officer Szafranski distributed throughout the Sheriff's Office and through the State of Florida. Significantly, Detective Eason made these efforts to find Mr. Schofield after Mr. Jones had signed a confession that did not even mention Mr. Schofield, and he continued to investigate Mr. Schofield as a suspect even after the grand jury indicted Mr. Jones. Mr. Schofield gave two different alibis: he told Detective Eason in 1981 that he was with his girlfriend Patricia Ferrell and he told Lou Eliopulos, an investigator for Mr. Jones' clemency attorney, in 1984 that he was with Marion Manning and "Shorty." Ms. Ferrell, now Owens, testified in 1992 that Mr. Schofield was not with her that night but that he later asked her to provide an alibi for him and that he later confessed to Officer Szafranski's murder. Ms. Manning has confirmed that she was with Mr. Schofield and "Shorty" on the night of the murder, but her testimony incriminates rather than exonerates Mr. Schofield. And Roy "Shorty" Williams has testified that Mr. Schofield was there with the rifle at the time of the shooting. Mr. Schofield has now been incriminated by all of his alibi witnesses. THE EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS Mr. Jones has filed three Rule 3.850 motions and has had three evidentiary hearings. Proper analysis of Mr. Jones' current 3.850 requires consideration of all the evidence cumulatively. That evidence includes twelve independent confessions by Mr. Schofield that he killed Officer Szafranski, as well as five witnesses who saw him on the night of the murder. The scope of the first hearing in 1986 was limited to trial counsel's ineffectiveness; however, important witnesses testified then. Their testimony must be considered now.15 In 1992, Mr. Jones' witnesses testified about Mr. Schofield's activity on the night of Officer Szafranski's death and his numerous confessions in the years since Mr. Jones' conviction. Again in 1997, Mr. Jones presented newly discovered evidence of his innocence, including an eyewitness who saw Mr. Schofield shoot Officer Szafranski, additional witnesses who saw Mr. Schofield on the night of the crime, and inmates to whom Mr. Schofield has confessed. In addition, Mr. Jones presented the testimony of Cleveland Smith, a retired Jacksonville police officer, who testified that Officer Mundy, the arresting officer, bragged about beating the confession out of Mr. Jones. In addition, Mr. Smith testified that shortly before Mr. Jones' arrest, the police who patrolled the Davis Street area had been instructed to do everything in their power to get Mr. Jones in prison. Mr. Smith also explained that Mundy was known to have falsified police reports and beaten confessions out of other suspects. Mr. Smith was also proffered with reference to his knowledge of Detective Eason. Bill White, the Chief Assistant Public Defender in Jacksonville, testified to his conversation with Detective Eason after Eason was forced out of the Sheriff's Department over an alleged conspiracy to commit murder. Bill White testified that Eason told him that he, Eason, had to pull Mundy off Leo Jones, but that if he, Eason, were ever asked under oath, he would deny making such an admission to Mr. White. Finally, Mr. Jones presented Alberta Brown who testified about Judge Soud's representation of Mr. Jones in 1968 and her involvement in the bribery of the judge who reduced Mr. Jones' sentence. When considered cumulatively, as required by this Court's opinion in State v. Gunsby, this evidence presents a compelling argument for Mr. Jones' innocence and establishes that if this evidence had been available at his trial the outcome would have been different. Counsel for Mr. Jones called Mr. Schofield as his first witness at the 1997 hearing. Mr. Schofield invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and requested that he be assigned an attorney (H.141-42). After consulting with Charles Willmott, Mr. Schofield testified on December 16, 1997. Glenn Schofield admitted in 1997, as he had in 1981 and 1984, that he was in the Davis Street area on the night of Officer Szafranski's death. On June 2, 1981, he was interviewed by Detective Hugh Eason whose homicidecontinuation report reveals that Mr. Schofield provided the following information: Sc[h]ofield stated that he was at the house of Leo Alexander Jones on the night of the shooting and he had gone over to transact some business. He stated that he was a drug dealer for Jones and that they had exchanged some drugs and money on the night of May 22, 1981, but he had left before the shooting occurred. He stated that he had overheard Leo Jones talking about "being fucked with by the Police" and that he was going to "waste a Policeman." He stated this statement was heard approximately a week before the Policeman was shot and he was talking to a black male by the name of Stanley. (Def. Exh. 7). At the 1997 hearing, Mr. Schofield had no memory of talking with anyone from the Duval County Sheriff's Department while he was in the hospital following his arrest in St. Johns County (H. 545, 548). During the course of his testimony, he would periodically deny ever talking to the police about the Szafranski shooting, but then clarify that the police possibly talked to him during their investigation (H. 606-07). Mr. Schofield initially claimed that he could not remember ever telling the police that he was at Mr. Jones' apartment on the night of the shooting (H. 547). However, his later testimony directly contradicts this professed lack of memory: "I talked with a police officer. They wanted to know why I was at Leo Jones' apartment and I told them I was there. I was there to pick up some heroin and that's why I was there." (H. 608). Mr. Schofield's testimony was also inconsistent regarding whether he had given the police a sworn statement or ever confessed to being a drug dealer. Mr. Schofield initially claimed that he had no memory of Detective Eason asking him to give a sworn statement (H. 549). Mr. Schofield also denied that he would ever tell the police he was a drug dealer (H. 547, 592). However, when confronted with Detective Eason's report indicating that he had in fact made this admission, Mr. Schofield testified that he had told Eason that he was picking up heroin at Mr. Jones' apartment but only because he "was under oath. Had to tell them the truth." (H. 608). Mr. Schofield's explanation of the circumstances of this sworn statement contradicts his earlier testimony that he had no memory of Detective Eason's request for a sworn statement: Q Earlier this morning you indicated that you would never have told the police that you were dealing drugs? A- I said I would never tell them under oath. Q -You just now said you would tell them under oath? A -That's right. I told them under oath. But I wouldn't tell them without being under oath, just volunteer I'm dealing drugs. But under oath, yeah, I'll tell them the truth if I'm under oath. Q -So, you're saying that the police officer put you under oath and you told him you were dealing drugs? A -What you mean? You said -- the stenographer was there. The lady was there with the same thing. Q -You remember that? A -Yeah, she was there. That was under oath. That's the only way you can be under oath. Q -And you remember giving a statement with the stenographer present under oath? A -Yes. (H. 609-10). Mr. Schofield testified that he gave someone from the Duval County Sheriff's Office a sworn statement before a stenographer when he was transported back to Jacksonville after attempting to escape from the St. Johns County Hospital (H. 609-10). Counsel for Mr. Jones has never received a sworn statement from Mr. Schofield, and Assistant State Attorney Angela Corey Lee told the court and counsel that no such statement exists (H. 638). Obviously, Glenn Schofield's testimony was false in this regard. Mr. Schofield's testimony is also rebutted by Detective Eason's report which indicates that Mr. Schofield did in fact "volunteer" that he was a drug dealer and that he was not under oath when he provided this incriminating information (Def. Exh. 7).16 Despite the entry in Detective Eason's report indicating that when he was questioned about the murder Mr. Schofield attempted to incriminate Mr. Jones, Mr. Schofield denied ever telling the police that he had heard Mr. Jones say he was going to kill a police officer (H. 592). In fact, Mr. Schofield testified that this conversation never took place: "Once again, me and Leo have never talked or had a conversation about killing no police officer, about no police officer at all." (H. 611). Mr. Schofield also testified that he knew nothing about Officer Szafranski's murder and that he never talked to the police without first talking to his lawyer (H. 549). He insisted that if the police ever questioned him about the case, he would simply say that he knew nothing (H. 607). All of this testimony is contradicted by Detective Eason's report. Detective Eason's report indicates that he and Detective Ralph Moneyhun returned to the St. Johns County Hospital on June 3, 1981, to interview Mr. Schofield again.17 The report states that Mr. Schofield "gave Ralph Moneyhun the same information that he had given me concerning the shooting at 4th and Davis." However, Mr. Schofield also provided additional information concerning his own activity on the night of the shooting: The writer also received information from Glen Sc[h]ofield that his girlfriend's name was Patricia Ferrell and the following numbers are numbers that we could possibly get in touch with her in case we needed her in the investigation at a later date: xxx-xxxx - this is the telephone number of Glen Sc[h]ofield's sister who lives at xxxx xxxxx Street, apartment xxx, xxx-xxxx - this is the number of Glen Sc[h]ofield's step-mother and father, xxx-xxxx - this is the number of Pat Ferrell's father's house at xxx xxx Street. (Def. Exh. 7). Mr. Schofield testified that he told the police he was with Ms. Ferrell on the night of Officer Szafranski's death; he also testified that it was possible that he gave the police Ms. Ferrell's phone number so that his alibi could be verified (H. 545-46). However, Patricia Ferrell (then Owens) testified in 1992 that Mr. Schofield was not with her on the night of Officer Szafranski's death. In fact, her testimony reveals that Mr. Schofield tried to establish a false alibi for that night in anticipation of questioning by the police. Ms. Owens saw Mr. Schofield on the morning of May 24, 1981. She testified: A -When he walked in, he said, Pat, if anybody want to know where I was, tell them I was with you. This is what he said. Q -And did you say anything to him? A -Yes. . . . Q -And then what did you say to him? A- I had asked him about the police officer. This is what I asked him. Q -And what did he say? A -And he said that do I think that he was going to say anything to go to prison for the rest of his life. This is what he said to me. Q -In response to your inquiry about the police officer? A -Yes. (Transcript of 1992 Evidentiary Hearing, pp. 215-16). Ms. Owens explained that "[f]rom when he left and while I did not see him, he wanted me to say that he was with me. This is what he meant." (Id. at 217). Mr. Schofield denied telling Ms. Owens to say that he was with her on the night of the murder and also denied that he ever talked to her about the Szafranski murder (H. 591, 603). Detective Eason's report indicates that on June 4, 1981, he spoke with Assistant State Attorney Ralph Greene about the interviews with Mr. Schofield and that Mr. Greene instructed him to get a sworn statement from Mr. Schofield (Def. Exh. 7). Detective Eason's entry for June 9, 1981, indicates that he attempted to do so: The writer, along with Stenographer, Harriet Cohen, returned to St. Johns County Hospital in an attempt to get a sworn statement from Glen Sc[h]ofield, but his attorney Greg Williams, talked with this writer over the telephone and advised that his client Sc[h]ofield was not going to give this writer a sworn statement on this date, but would get back with me on a later date. (Id.). Later that day, Detective Eason made the final entry in the homicide continuation report: Due to the circumstances surrounding this case and the fact that the suspect, Leo Alexander Jones, has been apprehended and arrested and charged with the murder of Officer Szafranski, this writer suggests that this case be cleared by arrest. (Id.). Also later on the same day that the police requested a sworn statement, Mr. Schofield attempted to escape from the St. Johns County Hospital.18 In 1997, Mr. Schofield claimed that he could not recall whether he tried to escape on the same day that he refused to give a sworn statement to Detective Eason (H. 531). However, the records establish that only hours after he was asked for a sworn statement, Glenn Schofield, while under arrest, fled the hospital. While in 1981 Mr. Schofield relied on Patricia Ferrell as his alibi when he was interviewed by thepolice, he provided a different alibi when he was interviewed in 1984 by an investigator working for Mr. Jones' clemency attorney. Lou Eliopulos testified that he interviewed Mr. Schofield in 1984 because through his investigation he realized that Mr. Schofield was "a prominent player as a possible suspect in theshooting." (H. 922). Mr. Eliopulos described Mr. Schofield as both reluctant and curious about the interview and very concerned that his name not become involved in Mr. Jones' case (H. 930-31). Mr.Schofield gave Mr. Eliopulos the names of two alibi witnesses: "Marion -- Marion, which he referred to her as Marilyn -- Manning, is her last name. He also gave me the name of `Shorty.'" (H. 925). Mr. Schofieldprovided no other identifying information for Shorty (Id.). Mr. Schofield told Mr. Eliopulos that hefrequently used Ms. Manning to rent cars for him and that on the night of Officer Szafranski's death, he waswith her and Shorty in a rental car (H. 926). During the interview, Mr. Schofield stated that on the night ofthe murder he was in Callahan's Bar with Ms. Manning and Shorty at about 11:00 p.m. or midnight and that they all left together in Ms. Manning's rental car to go to another bar (H. 937-38). Mr. Schofield indicated that he heard sirens while he was in the Davis Street area and that he thought it was in response to the hostage situation on Lee Street (H. 938). Mr. Schofield denied being in the Davis Street area at the time ofOfficer Szafranski's shooting (H. 936). During the interview with Mr. Eliopulos, Mr. Schofield initially denied ever speaking with Detective Eason about the Szafranski murder, but near the conclusion of their meeting, he admitted that he had been interviewed at St. Johns County Hospital (H. 927, 935). Mr. Schofield also told Mr. Eliopulos that he had testified before the grand jury although he was hospitalized in St. Johns County having been shot during an escape attempt the day before (H. 935). Mr. Schofield also initially denied ever being in Mr. Jones' apartment, but then admitted that on one occasion he had gone to Mr. Jones' apartment to buy heroin (H. 931, 933). However, in contrast to what he told the police in 1981, Mr. Schofield told Mr. Eliopulos that he was not in Mr. Jones' apartment on the night of the Szafranski shooting (H. 934). Finally, although he was relying on her as his alibi witness, Mr. Schofield told Mr. Eliopulos that Ms. Manning is a liar (H.953). Mr. Eliopulos testified that Mr. Schofield probably told him this in relation to the information Ms. Manning had already provided that incriminated Mr. Schofield in Officer Szafranski's death (H. 955). At the 1997 hearing, Mr. Schofield denied that he ever spoke to Mr. Eliopulos and could not recall ever being interviewed by an attorney or investigator representing Mr. Jones (H. 546). However, his testimony combined elements from his 1981 alibi to the police and his 1984 alibi given to Mr. Eliopulos. He was at Mr. Jones' apartment between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. on May 22, 1981; he went to pick up some heroin after making a deal with Mr. Jones' brother; and he took Ms. Manning with him because she knew where Mr. Jones lived (H. 535-36). Mr. Schofield testified that he was with Ms. Manning in a rental car (H. 618). After leaving Mr. Jones' apartment, Mr. Schofield and Ms. Manning picked up his friend Roy "Shorty" Williams and then went to Ms. Manning's apartment (H. 534, 541).19 Mr. Schofield, Ms. Manning, and Mr. Williams later went to a nightclub, but Mr. Williams stayed outside because he was too young to get in (H. 542). Sometime before daybreak, Mr. Schofield went to the apartment that he shared with Patricia, whose last name he referred to as both Reese and Ferrell (H. 540, 545). Mr. Schofield summarized his activity on the night of Officer Szafranski's death: After I went by there [Mr. Jones' apartment] and picked the heroin up, me and Marilyn went back to her apartment and we bagged it up and we went out there to the crab people's house. We stayed out there almost until the crab people's house closed. I think they closed about 2:00 o'clock or 3:00 o'clock. From there we left and went to her apartment. Me and her laid up during that time and before daybreak I went home so I can be with my woman. (H. 539-40). Other witnesses presented by Mr. Jones confirm that Mr. Schofield was in the Davis Street area on the night of Officer Szafranski's death. However, while Mr. Schofield testified that he left the Davis Street area in the early evening, Ms. Manning and Mr. Williams have both testified that they were still in the area with Mr. Schofield when Officer Szafranski was killed. Ms. Manning testified in 198620 that she had left Mr. Schofield in the Davis Street area while she went to a shopping center; they planned to meet back in that area to go out to a nightclub (Transcript of 1986 Evidentiary Hearing, pp. 113-14). However, when she returned to the intersection of Fourth and Davis Streets, Mr. Schofield was not yet ready to leave (Id. at 114). She drove around for awhile looking for his brother and then returned to look for Mr. Schofield: After we couldn't find him, we came back up Davis Street and we was looking for Glenn. That's when all the polices was down there on Sixth and Davis. They weren't there before we left, but when we came back to pick up Glenn to go to the club, said by the time we got back he would be ready. When we got back, his friend was there, but we couldn't find him and so he rushed and jumped in the car and said Glenn was around the corner, so I kept circling the block and circling the block, but I never did see Glenn until about -- I guess about five or six minutes later he came from in back of Lee Street and I was down there on Third and Davis. I had come -- kept going around and round. By the time I got to Third and Davis, he jumped in the back seat of the car. (Id. at 115). Ms. Manning testified that Mr. Schofield had been running and that when he jumped into her car, "[h]e told me to hit the expressway." (Id.) Ms. Manning, Mr. Schofield, and his friend who was already in the car then went to a nightclub (Id.). According to Ms. Manning, Mr. Schofield "wasn't the same" and was acting "nervous" (Id. at 116-17). Alberta Brown also testified in 1986 that Ms. Manning had told her in 1981 that she picked up Schofield on the night of the murder and that he had a rifle with him (Id. at 344). Ms. Manning's testimony clearly indicates that Mr. Schofield was still in the Davis Street area when Officer Szafranski was shot and that immediately after the shooting, as the police converged on the Sixth and Davis intersection, he was attempting to flee the area. Roy Williams, whom Mr. Schofield identified as "Shorty," the friend he was with on the night of Officer Szafranski's death, provided testimony consistent with Ms. Manning's that further incriminates Mr.Schofield. Mr. Williams testified that he was "partners" with Glenn Schofield in 1981 and that he often stayed with Mr. Schofield at the Emerson Arms apartments (H. 285, 327).21 On the night of Officer Szafranski's death, Mr. Williams was with Mr. Schofield and Ms. Manning: 22 Q -Did you see a rental car with your own eyes that night? A- Oh, yes, ma'am. Q -Okay. Where did you see that car? A- It came up there on Fourth and Davis, Sixth and Davis. Q -Where did it stop? A -It had stopped to the juke joint up there. Q -To a juke joint? A -Yes, ma'am. Q -And that's when you first saw Glenn Schofield get out of this car? A -Yes, ma'am. . . . Q -All right. How long would you say he was at the juke joint? A -I don't know. Q -Well, Mr. Williams, you remember that you were there with another woman, right? A -Yes, ma'am. Me and the woman standing outside. I wasn't in any juke joint, now. I didn't say I was in no juke joint. I was standing outside. We were standing outside for a good little while. (H. 317-18). Mr. Williams also testified that Ms. Manning had told him the car she and Mr. Schofield were driving was a rental car (H. 317).23 After being at the "juke joint" with Mr. Schofield, Mr. Williams walked along Davis Street while Mr. Schofield took the back street, probably Lee Street (H. 314). The next time Mr. Williams saw Mr. Schofield, he was kneeling by Mr. Jones' building with a rifle as Mr. Williams watched from across the street where he stood with a female friend (H. 286, 313, 318).24 Mr. Williams testified: Q -Okay. Now, you indicated you saw Mr. Schofield with a gun? A -Yes, sir. Q -Where exactly was he at? A -Standing on the side of the apartment, bending down. . . . Q -Okay. What happened after you saw Glenn kneeling down with -- was it a rifle? A -Yes, sir. Q With the rifle? A Yes, sir. Q What happened next? A I just heard some gunfire, and that's it. Q Did you see a police car go by? A Yes, sir. Q And is that when you heard the shot? A Yes, sir. (H. 287-89; see also 449-50). Mr. Williams also testified that Officer Szafranski's car was stopped, that his dome light was on, and that he was writing a report when he was shot (H. 299, 435-37). Randy Fallin, Mr. Jones' trial attorney, testified th