IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

Comes now Appellant, Charles Finney, Pro Se, and hereby replies to CCRC-Middle Region’s Response to my Pro Se Motion to Dismiss Post Conviction Counsel of CCRC-Middle Region Due to Conflict of Interest and to Appoint CCRC-North or CCRC-South as Replacement Counsel.

In Mr. Kiley’s response, he states that my attorneys at trial, Barbara Pittman and Richard Escobar, were both private attorneys. When attorney Thomas E. Meyers of the Public Defender’s Office was removed from my case after almost one year, Ms. Barbara Pittman and Mr. Richard Escobar were assigned as his replacements. These replacement attorneys were assigned from a registry, which by any name, is still public defense, not private. More importantly, the newly assigned attorneys were forced to rely on the investigation previously done by the public defender’s office. Mr. Kiley’s lack of awareness that the public defender’s office had represented me for over a year, and that the inadequacy of that office’s investigation on my behalf is at issue, would seemingly prove the point: Mr. Jennings has installed as my attorney someone who, either by design or by neglect, will whitewash the failings of the public defender’s office in my case. There is a conflict of interest at work here.

Mr. Escobar and Ms. Pittman were forced to use the less than adequate investigation provided by Mr. Meyers and Robert Moody since Judge Sexton made it known that she would not allow for any additional time or money to be spent on my case. Ms. Pittman was known for her willingness to work with the State’s Attorney’s office, and she conspired with the State to null the sexual battery in the murder case, giving the State the ability to suppress the elements of the sexual battery issue. This would have been to my benefit, proving innocence. The depositions and trial transcripts clearly show that the chain of custody was suspect, and that hair samples taken from the deceased’s body clearly did not belong to me. The lack of effort put forth by my assigned counsel, Mr. Escobar and Ms. Pittman, and their willingness to work with the State is but one example that shows ineffectiveness by trial counsel.

Mr. Kiley again insists that, according to former counsel, Joseph Hobson, there are no new issues except for the ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel. If this is true, then why did Mr. Hobson file a motion stating there were new issues? And, if not for the valid concerns that arguments for these new issues were being developed by Mr. Hobson, why was the State, in turn, then prompted to file an "Appellee’s Motion to Prohibit Assertion of New Issues at Oral Argument?" It seems that if there were no new issues, both Mr. Hobson and the State wasted considerable, precious time in filing unnecessary motions to this Honorable Court. If there were not valid claims of "possible new issues," the state would not have had to ask this Court to "issue an Order directing counsel for Mr. Finney to refrain from asserting any issues at oral argument which have not, at this time, been presented to any court." (as stated in the Appellee’s Motion to Prohibit Assertion of New Issues at Oral Argument filed April 2, 2001)

Moreover, Kiley’s decision to contest Mr. Hobson’s motion, filed on my behalf, by relying on a purported conversation with Joe Hobson proves that there is a conflict at work. Kiley has chosen to attack a motion that a previous attorney filed advancing my claims. Kiley has chosen to sabotage my case in retribution for my motions. Surely, Mr. Hobson did not tell him that he filed a frivolous motion premised upon nothing. If Mr. Hobson did say such a thing, he would be saying that the motion was filed in violation of the Code of Professional Conduct and would subject Mr. Hobson to sanctions by the Florida Bar. Since I do not have access to Mr. Hobson, because Mr. Jennings precludes such access, I can only assume that Kiley is either blatantly misrepresenting a conversation with Mr. Hobson, or he is revealing his ignorance that Mr. Hobson had intended to provide the fruits of additional investigation and research detailing the prejudice I have suffered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Moreover, Mr. Hobson had previously explained to me that this Court has sent matters back to the circuit court where post-conviction counsel had committed serious blunders. I understand that this occurred in cases involving Peede, Fotopoulos, and others.

Earlier claims made to me by Mr. Kiley asserted that no information concerning these developing issues remained in my files after the firing of Mr. Hobson. At the time of this conversation, all efforts made to inform Mr. Kiley of said developing issues fell on deaf ears and blind eyes. Mr. Kiley was given information on these issues, and as my attorney, regardless of what Mr. Hobson had developed during his turn on my case, it should have been Mr. Kiley’s duty to investigate these claims on his own. By his actions, Mr. Kiley let it be known that he had no intentions of doing, nor did he in fact, do any research into my claims. He was given the information, but rather than do any actual work or investigation into my case, Mr. Kiley states that on August 20, 2001, all he did was again phone Mr. Hobson as Mr. DeMinico claims he also did on July 2, 2001. Clearly this demonstrates to the Court how disinterested Mr. Kiley is in my case, and a clearer example of conflict of interest can't be stated. If my attorney is given arguments worthy of investigation, and he refuses to explore them, that creates a conflict of interest between him and me, as he is refusing to explore all options that will save my life. Under these circumstances, CCRC-Middle can in no way deny, as they have done in their "Response to my Pro Se Motion to Dismiss Post Conviction Counsel," that no conflict of interest exists. It most certainly does. Surely Kiley’s response makes it clear that he now possesses antagonism towards both my case and myself, and that he does not intend to be an active zealot on my behalf. He chooses to attack me and my claims which my prior counsel investigated and indicated he wished to present on my behalf. Given these actions, if Kiley remains on my case, I will have no real representation. I will be punished for daring to speak the truth and embarrassing the office.

Mr. Kiley also asserts in his Response to this Court that John Moser’s association with the CCRC has no relevance to my case. Mr. Moser, in tandem with Mr. Jennings, head of the CCRC-Middle office, are attempting to get the Middle Region’s statistics up by proving that they can move cases through the system as fast and cost effectively as possible. This is in order to defeat the voucher system that is being proposed by Mr. Thomas to replace the CCRC system. Although Mr. Jennings and Mr. Moser have attempted to influence both the North and South offices of the CCRC with their plan to guarantee that their jobs remain secure, both offices have rejected their plan as being unethical. Therefore, Mr. Kiley’s statement to the court is in error, and only CCRC-Middle, as led by Bill Jennings, is influenced by Mr. Moser, not the North and South offices.

When Mr. Moser speaks before the prosecution at their death penalty conference this October, he will be revealing information regarding the defense prospective, which aligns him with those who would execute me and others. And, when he works as campaign manager for Locke Burt during his run to become Attorney General, Mr. Moser will again be aligning himself with the prosecution. His influence over CCRC-Middle has a direct influence upon me, my case, and my life, and his close association with that office is yet another valid reason for stating a conflict of interest with Bill Jennings and CCRC-Middle.

The appellant again asserts that there are strong examples of conflict of interest between myself and between Mr. Kiley, Mr. Jennings, and the office of CCRC-Middle in general. Ineffective assistance of counsel in earlier appeals has severely handicapped me, and the current ineffective counsel of Mr. Kiley is continuing to prejudice me.

The Appellant again beseeches this Honorable Court to appoint counsel free from these stated conflicts of interest, and prays that this Court will grant relief from CCRC-Middle and appoint counsel from either CCRC-North or CCRC-South, where there is no conflict of interest.

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this motion has been furnished by United

States mail to all counsel of record on October 1, 2001.

Respectfully Submitted,

Copies furnished to:

The Honorable Chet A. Tharpe

Circuit Court Judge

Hillsborough County Courthouse

317 Tower

801 East Kennedy Blvd.

Tampa, Florida 33602

Carol M. Dittmar

Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Attorney General

Westwood Building, Seventh Floor

2002 North Lois Avenue

Tampa, Florida 33607

Sharon Vollrath

Assistant State Attorney

Office of the State Attorney

Hillsborough County Courthouse Annex

800 East Kennedy Blvd.

Tampa, Florida 330602

Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region

3801 Corporex Park Drive,

Suite 210f

Tampa, Florida 33619