No.
80,192ROY CLIFTON
SWAFFORD, Appellant,V.
STATE OF
FLORIDA, Appellee.[April
7, 19941PER
CURIAM.Roy
Swafford, a prisoner on death row appeals the trialcourt's denial
of his second motion for postconviction relief.We
have jurisdiction. Art. V, 5 3(b) (11, F l a . Const.; Fla. R.Crim.
P. 3.850. We affirm the trial court's action.A jury convicted Swafford of the first-degree murder and
sexual battery of an employee he abducted from
a gas station andrecommended that he be sentenced to death, which the trial court
did. This Court
affirmed the convictions and sentence. Swaffordv. State, 533 So. 2d
270 ( F l a . 19881, cert. knied, 489 U.S.1100,
109 S. C t . 1578, 103 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1989). On September 7,1990 Governor Martinez signed
a death warrant an Swafford,setting his execution for November
13. On October 15 Swaffordfiled his first rule
3.850 motion.' Circuit Judge Kim Hammondheld a preliminary hearing on October 24, 1990 and, on October
30, summarily denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing.
This
Court entered a temporary stay and then affirmed the trialcourt and denied Swafford's petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Swafford v. Dusser, 569
So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1990) M 2 In May 1991Swafford filed
a second habeas petition, arguing the allegedconflict of interest of one
of Swafford's trial attorneys, HowardPearl, which this Court denied. Swafford v. Sinsletarv,
584 So.2d
5 (Fla. 1991).In November 1991 Swafford filed
a second rule 3.850motion.3 Judge Hammond summarily denied the second motion
That first postconviction motion raised the following
issues: 1) presentation of false evidence; 2) violation
of Bradvv. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215(1963);
3) ineffective assistance at guilt phase; 4) ineffectiveassistance at penalty phase;
5) Howard Pearl's conflict ofinterest;
6 ) conflict of interest from a prior public defender'srepresentation of both Swafford and
a witness against him; 7 )excessive security measures at trial;
8) violation of Johnson v.Missississi, 486 U.S. 578,
108 S. Ct. 1981, 100 L. Ed. 2d 575(1988);
9) violation of Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529,
96 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1987); 10) no independent weighing bytrial court;
11) burden shift in instructions; 12) violation ofGaldwell v. Mississippi, 472
U.S. 320, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 86 L. Ed.2d 231
(1985); 13) sexual battery not proved; 14) cold,calculated aggravator not proved;
15) heinous, atrociousaggravator instruction insufficient and aggravator not proved;
and
16) violation of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.A
federal appellate court later granted a stay.The
motion raised the following issues: 1) violation ofchapter 119, Florida Statutes; 2) Bradv violation;
3) ineffectiveassistance at guilt phase;
4 ) factual innocence; 5) Pearl's- 2 -
without an evidentiary hearing
in May 1992. After Judge Hammonddenied Swafford's motion for rehearing and for disqualification,
Swafford appealed the denial
of relief to this Court and alsomoved for relinquishment
of jurisdiction, arguing the need for anevidentiary hearing on whether Swafford's other trial counsel,
Ray Cass, had a conflict of interest and on whether Judge Hammond
engaged in improper ex parte communication with the state when he
directed the attorney general's office to prepare the orders
denying relief in October 1990 and May 1992. In
January 1993this Court granted Swafford's motion
to relinquish jurisdictionand in March clarified the relinquishment: "The purpose of the
relinquishment is
to allow expansion of the record on appeal toinclude an evidentiary hearing on the status of Mr. Swafford's
trial counsel, Ray Cass, as
a special deputy sheriff and Mr.Swafford's claim that
ex parte communication occurred between theState and the trial judge."
On March 29,
1993 Circuit Judge R. Michael Hutcheson heldan evidentiary hearing pursuant to this Court's order. The
following witnesses testified on the ex parte communication
issue: 1) Judge Hammond stated that, although time had dimmed
his
recollection of this case, he, alone, decided how to rule incases, after which he instructed his staff to contact
the partiesand request proposed
orders; 2) Barbara Davis, assistant attorneygeneral, said that
Randy Rowe, Hammond's law clerk, called herconflict
of interest; 6) ineffective assistance at penalty phase;and
7) cumulative errors.-3-
after the October
24, 1990 hearing, that he told her what changesto make
in her previously filed order, and that they did notdiscuss the merits and, after the second
rule 3.850 motion hadbeen filed, that
Rowe called her and requested a proposed ordersetting out the state's position;
3) Jerome Nickerson, formerassistant capital collateral representative
(CCR), testified thathe never received personal notice from Rowe that Judge Hammond
requested the state to prepare an order after the October 1990
hearing;
4) two CCR secretaries said that telephone messages tothe
CCR office were always given to the person being telephoned;5)
Sean Daly, former assistant attorney general, currentassistant state attorney in the seventh circuit, testified that,
from what he remembered of the case, Davis asked him to prepare
the 1992 requested proposed order
and that in his experience, ifthe person called at
CCR were not in, a telephone call wasusually not returned; and
6) Randy Rowe, Judge Hammond's lawclerk, stated that for the
1990 order he called the attorneygeneral's office to request the order and
CCR to notify thatoffice of the request, that he always called both sides when the
judge wanted an order, and that he never discussed the merits of
any
requested orders with the parties.On
the conflict of interest claim Ray Cass testified thathe
received a deputy's card from former Sheriff Duff between 1968and
1971, that he thought the card was merely a goodwill gesture,that he never thought the
card was worth anything or that it madehim
a deputy, that he stopped carrying the card in 1973, and that- 4 -
he told CCR about the card
in 1990. The current sheriff'ssecretary, who had worked
for Sheriff Duff, showed her card tothe court and testified that Duff gave them
to everyone,including babies and the secretary's five- and seven-year-old
nephews.
Swafford raises the following issues on appeal:
1) thesecond
3.850 motion should not have been denied summarily; 2)Judge Hammond should have disqualified himself because of
exparte communications;
3) chapter 119 violations occurred; 4)Bradv
violations occurred; 5) counsel was ineffective at theguilt phase;
6 ) newly discovered evidence establishes Swafford'sinnocence; 7) counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase; 8)
there were constitutionally invalid penalty instructions and
theimproper application
of aggravators; and 9 ) Ray Cass had aconflict of interest. Swafford relies on Huff v. State,
622 So.2d 982 (Fla.
19931, and Rose v. State, 601 So. 2d 1181 (Fla.19921,
in arguing issues 1 and 2, but those cases are factuallydistinguishable from the instant one.
during the pendency of
a postconviction motion and, it appearsfrom the opinion, that he received no hearing on his motion at
all. Similarly, the trial court denied Huff's motion without any
hearing. Such
is not the case here, however, where Judge Hammondlistened to the parties in October
1990 and subsequently decidedthat an evidentiary hearing was not
needed.4Rose changed counsel
That the state suggested that an evidentiary hearing might
be needed
is not dispositive of the actual need for one becausethat determination is to be made by the trial court.
- 5 -
Judge Hammond then simply requested the state to prepare
an order.
No discussions on the merits of the case were held exparte. This matter needed
to be disposed of in a timely mannerand we hold that no improper ex parte communications occurred.
Judge Hammond did not err
in refusing to disqualify himself.Swafford had the opportunity to, and did, argue against the
correctness
of the order denying postconviction relief in amotion
for rehearing.As
noted earlier, we affirmed the summary denial of thefirst rule
3.850 motion.also proper. Francis v. Barton,
581 So. 2d 583 (Fla.), cert.denied, 111
S. Ct. 2879, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1045 (1991). Thus, issues35
through 8 are procedurally barred because they were or couldhave been raised previously. EsDinosa v. Florida,
112 S. Ct.2926, 120
L. Ed. 2d 854 ( 1 9 9 2 ) , claims are cognizable inpostconviction proceedings
i f they have been preserved, butSwafford
did not preserve the claims he now makes, and they areprocedurally barred.
Summary
denial of the second motion wasFinally, there is no merit to issue 9. The record shows
that
Cass had no conflict of interest due to his having beengiven a deputy sheriff's card by a previous sheriff.
Cf., Harich'
At the October 1990 hearing Nickerson said that everythinghe had requested under chapter 119 had been disclosed except
forsome
things from the Ormond Beach Police Department and theseventh circuit state's attorney office. Representatives
ofthose offices were present with their records, Judge Hammond
inspected them and turned over everything but the officers'
personal notes. Nickerson then said that
the fourteenth circuitstate's attorney
office had complied and that he was satisfiedwith the chapter
119 disclosures.- 6 -
v. State,
573 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1990), 6 cert. denied, 499 U.S.985,
111 S. C t . 1645, 113 L. Ed. 2d 740 ( 1 9 9 1 ) .Therefore,
we affirm the trial court's denial ofSwafford's second motion for postconviction relief.
It
is so ordered.BARKETT, C.J.,
and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES, KOGAN andHARDING,
JJ., concur.NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND,FILED,
DETERMINED.IF
This claim is also time
barred. See Agan v. S t a t e , 560So.
2d 222 (Fla, 1 9 9 0 ) ; Dernz>s v, State, 515 So. 2d 196 (Fla.1 9 8 7 ) .
- 7 -
,
. -An Appeal from
the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County,Kim
C. Hammond, Judge - Case No. 83-3425-BBMichael J. Minerva,
Capital Collateral Representative; Martin J.McClain,
Chief Assistant CCR; and Kenneth D. Drigqs, AssistantCCR and Harun Shabazz, Assistant CCR, Office
of the CapitalCollateral Representative, Tallahassee, Florida,
for
AppellantRobert
A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Margene A. Roper,Assistsant Attorney General,
Daytona Beach, Florida,for Appellee
- a -