IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDACASE
NO. 85,682ROY CLIFTON
SWAFFORD,Appellant,
V.
STATE
OF FLORIDA,Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,IN
AND FOR VOLUSIA COUNTY, STATE OF FLORIDA~
REPLY
BRIEF OF APPELLANTMARTIN
J. MCCLAINChief Assistant
CCRFlorida Bar No.
0754773OFFICE
OF THE CAPITAL1533
South Monroe StreetTallahassee, FL
32301COLLATERAL REPRESENTATIVE
(904) 487-4376
COUNSEL
FOR APPELLANTW E
OF CONTENT8Paqe
TABLE OF CONTENTS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iTABLE OF AUTHORITIES
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iiREPLY
TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . 1ARGUMENT
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MR.
SWAFFORD WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHTS TODUE PROCESS UNDER
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TOTHE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AS WELL AS HISRIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH, SIXTH,
AND EIGHTHAMENDMENTS, BECAUSE THE STATE WITHHELD
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS MATERIAL
AND EXCULPATORYIN NATURE AND/OR PRESENTED MISLEADING
EVIDENCE.
SUCH OMISSIONS RENDERED DEFENSECOUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION INEFFECTIVE AND
PREVENTED
A FULL ADVERSARIAL TESTING.FURTHER,
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCEESTABLISHES THAT
MR. SWAFFORD IS INNOCENT OFTHE OFFENSE
FOR WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED ANDSENTENCED
TO DEATH, AND THUS HIS CONVICTIONAND DEATH SENTENCE VIOLATE THE EIGHTH
ANDFOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5i
TABId
OF AUTHORITIESGarcia
v. State,622 So.
2d 1325 (Fla. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Kvles
v. whitlev,115 S.
Ct. 1555 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12ne
v. Duuuer,549
So. 2d 1364 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 13Parker
v. Duaa er ,Nos.
74,978 and 78,700 (Fla. Oct. 5, 1995) . . . . . 11, 12Scott
v. State,20
Fla. L. Weekly S132 (Fla. 1995) . . . . . . . 5, 6, 8 , 13Smith
v. Wainmsht,799
F.2d 1442 (11th Cir. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13ii
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OF TH,E CASEIn
its Answer, the State relies heavily on the gun which wasrecovered
on February 14, 1982 and which allegedly belonged toMs.
Swafford.given the fact that
no scientific evidence in any way linked Mr.Swafford to the victim in this case. There was no hair, fiber,
finger prints, blood or any other forensic evidence linking Mr.
Swafford to the
crime.The State's reliance on this gun is not surprising
Despite the fact that
the gun was the centerpiece of theprosecutor's case, there are serious problems in connecting
Mr.Swafford to the gun and connecting the gun to the murder
ofBrenda Rucker.
The State, in order to llprovell that Mr. Swaffordpossessed this weapon, used an informant, Roger Harper, to
allegedly link the gun to Mr. Swafford. Mr. Harper stated that
the gun was Vhe exact type as [Mr. Swafford] had with the hammer
like thisR1
(R. 810). Undisclosed madv material regarding Mr.Harper
was presented in Mr. Swafford's previous Rule 3.850motion. Indeed, Harper lied about getting a deal
in exchange forhis testimony
(R. 836). Furthermore, Harper's identification ofthe
gun was clearly suspect given the fact that on May 21, 1984in
deposition he had been shown another gun by Mr. Swafford'sattorney, Howard Pearl, and identified that gun as being Roy
Swafford's. He admitted in that deposition that he could not
tell one gun from the other and, at trial, admitted this as well
(R.
826).1
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The other "family members" from Nashville who testified on
behalf of the State did
& link this gun to Mr. Swafford. CarlJohnson testified that he never saw
a gun during this trip (R.848).
Chan Hirtle stated that he did not really know whether ornot the gun which
was entered as Exhibit I was Roy Swafford's(R.
859). Ricky Johnson, the only other remaining family memberwho testified
etated that he never saw the gun (R. 885). In facthe didn't see the gun until he was
taken to jail on February 14,1982
and at that time the police did not know to whom the gunbelonged
(R. 894). Therefore, no one but Roger Harper, whosetestimony was essentially bought with a deal, testified that this
particular weapon belonged to
Roy Swafford.Even
the manner in which this particular gun was found washighly suspect. Two
other State's witnesses, Clark BernardGriswold and Karen Sarniak, gave two
totallv different versionsas to how this weapon was seized. Indeed,
M r . Griswold said thateven
though he didn't see this gun on Mr. Swafford (R. 1051) thathe
somehow knew that Mr. Swafford hid this gun in the trash canin
the men's room (R. 1045). Mr. Griswold further related thatMr.
Swafford, at the time of his arrest, was wearing only jeansand
a black t-shirt (R. 1052). He was not wearing a leatherjacket, as Mr. Harper testified to on cross-examination
(R. 825).The
other State's witness, Karen Sarniak, stated that Mr.Swafford put the gun in a wastepaper basket in the ladies
room(R.
1093-1094). She also testified that the police came into the2
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ladies
room and seized the weapon (R. 1098). The testimony ofthese two witnesses was mutually exclusive.
Further, the State could not have proven a chain of custody
on the gun and the bullets fired from it.
attorney,
Raymond Cass, requested that he be provided with allmaterials which were discoverable
(R. 1513). What was not knownby defense counsel at any time prior to or during the trial was
that the State tampered with the chain of custody of the gun and
the bullets.
under Chapter
119.01, Florida Statutes et seq., which included,intey
u, copies of evidence and property receipts for the gunand the bullets, proves this allegation
(PC-R2. 448-535).Mr.
Swafford's trialDocuments released to
CCR pursuant to CCR's requestAnalysis of the sheets evidence and property demonstrates
that the sheets themselves are internally contradictory. It
isapparent that individuals have gone back over the sheets and
whited-out information while at the
same time substituting newinformation on them. Furthermore, evidence logs indicate that on
June
10, 1983 Detective Hudson checked out the gun from theSheriff's Department. The gun was
at that time labeled Q-1.Also
checked out was a set of Mr. Swafford's fingerprints, thesame being labeled
Q-2. On the same day both the gun and thefingerprints were turned over to Debbie Fisher at FDLE.
Additionally, Detective Hudson filed with the
FDLE a requestfor
analysis on the gun and the prints. This, again, was done onJune
10, 1983. The problem with this particular submission isthat one copy of the submission simply indicates that the gun and
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fingerprints were turned over to FDLE
(PC-R2. 717). However,another
copy (PC-R2. 719) has added to it in handwriting the factthat Detective Hudson also submitted b ullets
w i t h the gun.This does not coincide with Charles Meyers' initial report of
February
19, 1982 wherein Mr. Meyers, firearms examiner at FDLE,indicates that the bullets would be kept
in FDLE's Itopen shootingfile"
(PC-R2. 721). In other words, there is a very realquestion as to where
the bullets that were submitted by DetectiveHudson actually originated.
indicate the bullets did not leave that facility, a serious
question arises as to the authenticity
of the bullets that wereeventually allegedly linked to the Ilmurder weapon".
Since FDLE's own internal documents
Mr. Swafford has submitted these property receipts
to LonnieHardin, the expert who originally analyzed the
gun and thebullets that were submitted to him. Mr. Hardin did not have the
benefit of reviewing these evidence logs or property receipts
atthe time that he conducted
his pre-trial analysis.Hardin's opinion as a firearms/ballistics expert with substantial
experience in law enforcement, that the chain of custody was not
intact.
It is
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MR.
BWAFFORD WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHTS TODUB PROCESS
WDER THE FOURTEENTH AXENDMENT TOTHE WHITED EITATEB CONSTITUTION AS WELL
AS HISRIGHT8 UWDER THE BIBTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH
AMENDMENTS, BgCAUBE THE STATE
WITEEELDEVIDENCE
WHICH W M UTERIAL AND EXCULPATORYI1
NATURE AND/OR PRESENTED MISLEADINGWIDEMCE.
SUCH OMI8810M8 RENDERED DEFENSECOWHSEL'B REPRESENCATIOBI INEFFECTIVE
ANDPREV-ED
A BULL ADVERSARIAL TESTING.FURTHER,
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCEEBTABLISHEB
TEAT MR. SWAFFORD 18 INNOCENT OFTHE
OFFENSE BrOR WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED ANDAan,
DEATH SENTENCE VIOLATE THE EIaHTH ANDSENTEMCED TO
DEATH, AND THUS HIS CONVICTIONFOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS.In
its Answer, the State fails to distinguish Scott v.w,
20 Fla. L. Weekly S132 (Fla. 1995), from Mr. Swafford'scase.
In fact, the State fails to address the Scott decision.AS
noted in Mr. Swafford's initial brief, this case is verysimilar to situation in Scott. There,
Mr. Scott had previouslyraised
a Bradv violation maintaining the State withheld evidencethat tended
to show that the actual killer was Mr. Scott's codefendant.Subsequently,
Mr. Scott presented a successor Rule3.850
motion asserting a Bradv violation based upon evidence notpreviously available to post-conviction counsel which also tended
to prove that
Mr. Scott's co-defendant was the actual killer.The new evidence consisted
of two affidavits and a photograph.The State argued that
Mr. Scott's Bradv claim wasprocedurally barred because the newly discovered evidence only
corroborated the claim previously presented and rejected by
the Court. However,
Mr. Scott argued that in light of the newlydiscovered evidence, this Court should revisit its previous
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ruling rejecting Mr. Scott's
Bradv claim. This Court found thenew evidence of a
Bsadv violation warranted an evidentiaryhearing.
Scott v. S t a te, 20 Fla. L. Weekly S132 (Fla. 1995)(Slip
Op. at 8).Here, Mr. Swafford previously raised a Bradv violation
maintaining other individuals were responsible for the death
ofBrenda Rucker, the victim in this case. Subsequently, Mr.
swafford
presented a successor Rule 3.850 motion asserting aBra&
violation based upon evidence not previously available topost-conviction counsel which tended to prove that other
individuals were responsible for the death of Brenda Rucker.
Just as in Scott, this Court did not have the benefit of the
newly discovered evidence when it made its previous ruling
concerning the Bradv violation. Here, Mr. Lestz's affidavit
proves (in conjunction with Ray Cass, the trial attorney's
affidavit) that if the State had disclosed the Bradv material
implicating Walsh, Levi and Lestz
in the murder of Brenda Rucker,is innocent. Mr. Lestz's affidavit proves that had the State
complied with its discovery obligations, Mr. Swafford would have
been acquitted:
My name is Michael Eugene Lestz and
Ilive in the state of Illinois. In
1982 I wasin
Daytona Beach, Florida during the Daytona500.
The Daytona 500 Auto Race took place onSunday, February
14, 1982.While
I was there, I was in the presenceof
two guys named Walter Levi and MichaelWalsh.
Michael Walsh borrowed my van onseveral occasions
and without telling me6
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where he was going.
I previously told theDaytona Beach sheriff's office about these
occasions.
I
remembex. on the dav of th e Davtoggad
two 38 c aliber *handauns and
was in a biu W r v to qe t rid of500,
Michael Walsh hthem.
One of t hese 38'6 was a hammerle ssrevolver.
He told me that t he handcrun s hadsed
an d he had to ue t rid of th em.ted
soincr to d ifferent bar s inorder
to set rid of the sum. One of theWalsh
starShack
T m l e ss bar. bandauns was the ShbuleThe three
of us ha d been to th is bar onseveral
occasions md we were all veryvery nervous on this Darticular
day . He saidit was because
he didn't want the uuns in h i spossession.
places
id of these Walsh went t o cret rar
with it. Also M ichael was actinq * IA
couDle 0 f days afte.r th e Davtona 500and
after M ichael Walsh had u otten r id of thetwo uuns, we were
in the x) arkins lo t of ato e d out t
eer
homicide. Walsh became wsetsnatch the
gamD hlets off th ecars
savins t h e a o u ldn't be look ins for t hesustxct
~n Davt ona Beach when she was no tk i l b d
here, Walsh would n ever tell us whatTwo
sheriff's officers from the Volusiameant bv this.
County Sheriff's department came to interview
me
when 1 was in the Marion Federal Prison inIllinois.
I gave them detailed, truthfulstatements
of what I could remember at thattime. At some point at a later date
Iremembered some more details and
I wrote themback to explain the details to them.
wrote me back and
told me to 'Inot worry aboutit.
and after the incident,
I knew how he wasacting and
I think there is a good chancethat he committed the murder of Brenda
Rucker
.They
Because
I was with Michael Walsh before(Affidavit of Michael
E. Lestz, PC-R3. 22-23)(emphasis added).7
In its Answer, the State argues that
Mr. Swafford's newlya
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discovered evidence fails to meet the requirements
of Jones v.State, 591 So. 2d
911 (Fla. 1991), in which the "newly discoveredevidence must be of such nature that
it would probably produce anacquittal on retrial
or result in a life sentence rather than thedeath penaltyn (Answer at
16). As noted below, the informationuncovered concerning Walsh, Levi and Lestz easily meets the
requirements
in Jones.However, the State's reliance on Jones is misplaced. This
Court was faced with a similar situation
in Scott where newlydiscovered evidence established a Brady violation. The Court
inmaintained that the central issue was whether Mr. Scott was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
previous ruling in Scott rejecting the Bradv claim, this Court,
citing Liahtbourne
v. Duscrer , 549 So. 2d 1364, 1365 (Fla. 1989),remanded the case back to the lower court for
an evidentiaryDespite this Court's
hearing on the Bradv issue. Scott
v. State , 20 Fla. L. WeeklyS132 (Fla.
1995).In Liahtbourne, this Court held that for the purposes of
appeal the Court must accept defendant's allegations as true when
determining if
an evidentiary hearing is required. Here, Mr.Swafford's allegations clearly established that an evidentiary
hearing is necessary:
aWalsh had claimed that he committed
three murders in Florida, and that one of the
victims was
a white female in the DaytonaBeach area.
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Between
6:OO a.m. and 10:30 a.m. on theday of the Rucker homicide, Walsh and Levi
left Lestz
in a laundromat in Daytona Beach,a couple
of blocks from the Fina station.Walsh had on numerous occasions
frequented the Fina station from which Rucker
was
abducted.Walsh was arrested
in Arkansas followingan armed robbery
in which he told the victimthat he had ‘killed‘ three persons’ in the
State of Florida.
Walsh strongly resembles the composite
of
Brenda Rucker’s killer.Walsh
was arrested in March of 1982, hehad
in his possession a composite bulletinconcerning details of the Brenda Rucker
homicide.
Arkansas police, upon seeing the BOLO,
contacted Volusia County authorities because
Walsh matched the composite drawing.
Brenda Rucker‘s autopsy revealed two
marks on the body
of the victim possiblycaused by the application of a lighted
cigarette. Walsh subjected Lestz to
homosexual attacks during which Lestz was
burned with a cigarette. Lestz‘ body
strongly resemble those burns found on the
body of Brenda Rucker as the investigating
officer who inspected the burns stated in an
undisclosed affidavit.
At
6:OO a.m. on February 14, 1982, Walshand Levi had taken Lestz’s van and
disappeared. When Walsh returned, he
disposed of two
.38 caliber handguns in aDaytona Beach tavern.
hair black and forced Lestz to drive him to
New Orleans.
Walsh then dyed his
Walsh was interviewed and allowed to
view several photographs of
the Ruckerhomicide at which time it was observed that
Walsh became extremely upset, disorganized,
nervous and unsure of his statements.
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Thereafter, Walsh stated that he would
not relate what he was doing
or hiswhereabouts during the period of February
14 - February 15, 1982, stating "that he wouldrather not say."
Further, this Court in Scott looked at the totality
of thecase in making its determination of whether an evidentiary
hearing should be granted. Here, the allegations taken
in thecontext
of the totality of Mr. Swafford's case demand that anevidentiary hearing be granted.
M r . Swafford's original trialcounsel, Ray Cass, has thoroughly examined all
of the materialsuncovered during Mr. Swafford's post-conviction investigation
(including Mr. Lestz's affidavit) and he explained what impact
case:
Further,
I have been shown the affidavitof
Michael Lestz which implicates Walter Leviand Michael Walsh in the
murder of BrendaRucker. Mr. Lestz's affidavit is attached to
this affidavit (Attachment
F). Lestz'saffidavit demonstrates
that had I beenadvised regarding these suspects and
investigated them (as no doubt
I would havehad
I known of their existence) I would havebeen able to present evidence
of their guiltand Mr. Swafford's resulting innocence. This
affidavit is further proof of Mr. Swafford's
innocence and
I would have presented thetestimony of Mr. Lestz
as evidence atMr. Swafford's trial. The testimony of
Mr.Lestz would have undermined the State's
erroneous theory in this case and
would haveled to the perpetrators of this crime being
brought to justice.
I am simply astounded bythe State's non disclosure of this
exculpatory evidence.
(Affidavit
of Ray Cass, PC-R3. 182-87).10
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Again, the procedural posture of Mr. Swafford's claim is no
different than that in Scott. In
SCQW, the Court rejected theState's argument that
Mr. Scott's Bradv claim was procedurallybarred because
in light of the new evidence Mr. Scott's Bradvclaim has
merit. Here, in light of Mr. Lestz's and Mr. Cass'saffidavits, it is clear that
Mr. Swafford is entitled to anevidentiary hearing.
Also,
the State has not presented any evidence that Mr.Swafford failed to exercise due diligence
in obtaining theaffidavit of Mr. Lestz and the lower
court has not ruled that Mr.Swafford has failed to exercise due diligence. Thus,
M r .Swafford
is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.Further, the lower court never ruled on the merits of Mr.
Swafford's claim.
sumrnarily denying Mr. Swafford relief. While
the lower courtnoted that this Court had previously rejected Mr. Swafford's
Bradv claim that other individuals were responsible for the death
of the
victim, it did not make an independent assessment of themerits
of Mr. Swafford's claim.It wholly relied
on a procedural bar inThe lower court never made an independent determination
regarding the need
for an evidentiary hearing.court make a determination that the record conclusively showed
that Mr. Swafford was not entitled to relief. This Court has
held that it will not rule upon the merits of a claim where the
lower court failed to reach the merits.
Par ker v. DuqCleF, Nos.Nor did the lower
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74,978
and 78,700 (Fla. Oct. 5, 1995). In Par-, this Courtspecifically held:
In addition, the State argues that, even
if the claims are not waived, the record
conclusively shows that no relief
iswarranted. Thus, the State contends, the
trial court did not err
in denying theseclaims without an evidentiary hearing
in thiscase, the court never
made a determinationregarding the need for such a hearing.
N o rdid the court make a determination that the
record conclusively showed that Parker was
not entitled
to relief. The court neverlooked beyond the procedural bar to consider
the merits
of Parker's claims. The trialcourt is the appropriate place
for theinitial evaluation of the merits of Parker's
claims.
We will not rule U D O ~ th e merits ofthose claims when the
trial co urt neverreached the merits below.
Accordinalv, we
reverse the tr ialcour
t's de nial of wstconv iction relief and * onsideratio b etrial
c o u ~ .Parker
v. State, Nos. 74,978 and 78,700 (Fla. Oct. 5, 1995) (SlipOp. at
6, 7) (emphasis added). Likewise here, the Court shouldremand this cause for consideration by the trial court.
The Eighth Amendment mandates this Court not dismiss this
newly discovered evidence of a further
a violation committedby the State
of Florida in this case. Scott v. State; Kvles v.itlev,
115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995). When viewed in conjunction withother evidence never presented because of the State's discovery
violations and/or trial counsel's deficient performance,
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can be no question that Mr. Swafford's conviction cannot
withstand the requirements of the Eighth
and Fourteenth12
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Amendments.
gvleg. An evidentiary hearing is required. Scottv . 0
Mr.
Swafford adamantly maintains that critical Bradvdocuments were withheld from the defense. Additionally, the
State
failed to correct the perjured testimony that went to thejury.
Mr. Swafford maintains that he was denied an adversarialtesting. Garcia
v. State, 622 So. zd 1325 (Fla. 1993). UnderSmith
v. W a i w , 799 F.2d 1442 (11th Cir. 1986), postconvictionrelief is required.
Mr. Swafford further maintains that
Scott v, State, 20 Fla.Weekly
S132 (Fla. 1995), and Lishtbourne v, Dusser, 549 So. 2d1364,
1365 (1989), dictate the necessity of an evidentiaryhearing
in this case, even though this is a successive Rule 3.850motion. The manner in which the State has disclosed exculpatory
evidence,
i . e . , in piecemeal fashion, has affirmatively preventeda detailed, thorough analysis
of this case by Mr. Swafford'scounsel. The State should not be allowed to profit from its own
wrongdoing. Accordingly,
Mr. Swafford requests that he be givenan evidentiary hearing on this
issue and that the requestedrelief be granted.
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I HEREBY
CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing ReplyBrief of Appellant has been
furnished by United States Mail,first
class postage prepaid, to all counsel of record on October9,
1995.a
e
MARTIN
J. MCCLAINY n F l o r i d a Bar
No. 0754773Chief Assistant
CCRPost Office Drawer 5498
Tallahassee, Florida 32314-5498
Attorney
for Appellant(904)
487-4376Copies
furnished to:Margene Roper
Assistant Attorney General
Office of
the Attorney General444
Seabreeze Boulevard, 5th FloorDaytona
Beach, FL 32118a
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