IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 85,682

ROY CLIFTON SWAFFORD,

Appellant,

V.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT

OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,

IN AND FOR VOLUSIA COUNTY, STATE OF FLORIDA

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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

MARTIN J. MCCLAIN

Chief Assistant CCR

Florida Bar No. 0754773

OFFICE OF THE CAPITAL

1533 South Monroe Street

Tallahassee, FL 32301

COLLATERAL REPRESENTATIVE

(904) 487-4376

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT

W E OF CONTENT8

Paqe

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

REPLY TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . 1

ARGUMENT I

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MR. SWAFFORD WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHTS TO

DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS HIS

RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND EIGHTH

AMENDMENTS, BECAUSE THE STATE WITHHELD

EVIDENCE WHICH WAS MATERIAL AND EXCULPATORY

IN NATURE AND/OR PRESENTED MISLEADING

EVIDENCE. SUCH OMISSIONS RENDERED DEFENSE

COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION INEFFECTIVE AND

PREVENTED A FULL ADVERSARIAL TESTING.

FURTHER, NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE

ESTABLISHES THAT MR. SWAFFORD IS INNOCENT OF

THE OFFENSE FOR WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED AND

SENTENCED TO DEATH, AND THUS HIS CONVICTION

AND DEATH SENTENCE VIOLATE THE EIGHTH AND

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

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TABId OF AUTHORITIES

Garcia v. State,

622 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Kvles v. whitlev,

115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

ne v. Duuuer,

549 So. 2d 1364 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 13

Parker v. Duaa er ,

Nos. 74,978 and 78,700 (Fla. Oct. 5, 1995) . . . . . 11, 12

Scott v. State,

20 Fla. L. Weekly S132 (Fla. 1995) . . . . . . . 5, 6, 8 , 13

Smith v. Wainmsht,

799 F.2d 1442 (11th Cir. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

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NT OF TH,E CASE

In its Answer, the State relies heavily on the gun which was

recovered on February 14, 1982 and which allegedly belonged to

Ms. Swafford.

given the fact that no scientific evidence in any way linked Mr.

Swafford to the victim in this case. There was no hair, fiber,

finger prints, blood or any other forensic evidence linking Mr.

Swafford to the crime.

The State's reliance on this gun is not surprising

Despite the fact that the gun was the centerpiece of the

prosecutor's case, there are serious problems in connecting Mr.

Swafford to the gun and connecting the gun to the murder of

Brenda Rucker. The State, in order to llprovell that Mr. Swafford

possessed this weapon, used an informant, Roger Harper, to

allegedly link the gun to Mr. Swafford. Mr. Harper stated that

the gun was Vhe exact type as [Mr. Swafford] had with the hammer

like thisR1 (R. 810). Undisclosed madv material regarding Mr.

Harper was presented in Mr. Swafford's previous Rule 3.850

motion. Indeed, Harper lied about getting a deal in exchange for

his testimony (R. 836). Furthermore, Harper's identification of

the gun was clearly suspect given the fact that on May 21, 1984

in deposition he had been shown another gun by Mr. Swafford's

attorney, Howard Pearl, and identified that gun as being Roy

Swafford's. He admitted in that deposition that he could not

tell one gun from the other and, at trial, admitted this as well

(R. 826).

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The other "family members" from Nashville who testified on

behalf of the State did & link this gun to Mr. Swafford. Carl

Johnson testified that he never saw a gun during this trip (R.

848). Chan Hirtle stated that he did not really know whether or

not the gun which was entered as Exhibit I was Roy Swafford's

(R. 859). Ricky Johnson, the only other remaining family member

who testified etated that he never saw the gun (R. 885). In fact

he didn't see the gun until he was taken to jail on February 14,

1982 and at that time the police did not know to whom the gun

belonged (R. 894). Therefore, no one but Roger Harper, whose

testimony was essentially bought with a deal, testified that this

particular weapon belonged to Roy Swafford.

Even the manner in which this particular gun was found was

highly suspect. Two other State's witnesses, Clark Bernard

Griswold and Karen Sarniak, gave two totallv different versions

as to how this weapon was seized. Indeed, M r . Griswold said that

even though he didn't see this gun on Mr. Swafford (R. 1051) that

he somehow knew that Mr. Swafford hid this gun in the trash can

in the men's room (R. 1045). Mr. Griswold further related that

Mr. Swafford, at the time of his arrest, was wearing only jeans

and a black t-shirt (R. 1052). He was not wearing a leather

jacket, as Mr. Harper testified to on cross-examination (R. 825).

The other State's witness, Karen Sarniak, stated that Mr.

Swafford put the gun in a wastepaper basket in the ladies room

(R. 1093-1094). She also testified that the police came into the

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ladies room and seized the weapon (R. 1098). The testimony of

these two witnesses was mutually exclusive.

Further, the State could not have proven a chain of custody

on the gun and the bullets fired from it.

attorney, Raymond Cass, requested that he be provided with all

materials which were discoverable (R. 1513). What was not known

by defense counsel at any time prior to or during the trial was

that the State tampered with the chain of custody of the gun and

the bullets.

under Chapter 119.01, Florida Statutes et seq., which included,

intey u, copies of evidence and property receipts for the gun

and the bullets, proves this allegation (PC-R2. 448-535).

Mr. Swafford's trial

Documents released to CCR pursuant to CCR's request

Analysis of the sheets evidence and property demonstrates

that the sheets themselves are internally contradictory. It is

apparent that individuals have gone back over the sheets and

whited-out information while at the same time substituting new

information on them. Furthermore, evidence logs indicate that on

June 10, 1983 Detective Hudson checked out the gun from the

Sheriff's Department. The gun was at that time labeled Q-1.

Also checked out was a set of Mr. Swafford's fingerprints, the

same being labeled Q-2. On the same day both the gun and the

fingerprints were turned over to Debbie Fisher at FDLE.

Additionally, Detective Hudson filed with the FDLE a request

for analysis on the gun and the prints. This, again, was done on

June 10, 1983. The problem with this particular submission is

that one copy of the submission simply indicates that the gun and

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fingerprints were turned over to FDLE (PC-R2. 717). However,

another copy (PC-R2. 719) has added to it in handwriting the fact

that Detective Hudson also submitted b ullets w i t h the gun.

This does not coincide with Charles Meyers' initial report of

February 19, 1982 wherein Mr. Meyers, firearms examiner at FDLE,

indicates that the bullets would be kept in FDLE's Itopen shooting

file" (PC-R2. 721). In other words, there is a very real

question as to where the bullets that were submitted by Detective

Hudson actually originated.

indicate the bullets did not leave that facility, a serious

question arises as to the authenticity of the bullets that were

eventually allegedly linked to the Ilmurder weapon".

Since FDLE's own internal documents

Mr. Swafford has submitted these property receipts to Lonnie

Hardin, the expert who originally analyzed the gun and the

bullets that were submitted to him. Mr. Hardin did not have the

benefit of reviewing these evidence logs or property receipts at

the time that he conducted his pre-trial analysis.

Hardin's opinion as a firearms/ballistics expert with substantial

experience in law enforcement, that the chain of custody was not

intact.

It is Mr.

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MR. BWAFFORD WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHTS TO

DUB PROCESS WDER THE FOURTEENTH AXENDMENT TO

THE WHITED EITATEB CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS HIS

RIGHT8 UWDER THE BIBTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH

AMENDMENTS, BgCAUBE THE STATE WITEEELD

EVIDENCE WHICH W M UTERIAL AND EXCULPATORY

I1 NATURE AND/OR PRESENTED MISLEADING

WIDEMCE. SUCH OMI8810M8 RENDERED DEFENSE

COWHSEL'B REPRESENCATIOBI INEFFECTIVE AND

PREV-ED A BULL ADVERSARIAL TESTING.

FURTHER, NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE

EBTABLISHEB TEAT MR. SWAFFORD 18 INNOCENT OF

THE OFFENSE BrOR WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED AND

Aan, DEATH SENTENCE VIOLATE THE EIaHTH AND

SENTEMCED TO DEATH, AND THUS HIS CONVICTION

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS.

In its Answer, the State fails to distinguish Scott v.

w, 20 Fla. L. Weekly S132 (Fla. 1995), from Mr. Swafford's

case. In fact, the State fails to address the Scott decision.

AS noted in Mr. Swafford's initial brief, this case is very

similar to situation in Scott. There, Mr. Scott had previously

raised a Bradv violation maintaining the State withheld evidence

that tended to show that the actual killer was Mr. Scott's codefendant.

Subsequently, Mr. Scott presented a successor Rule

3.850 motion asserting a Bradv violation based upon evidence not

previously available to post-conviction counsel which also tended

to prove that Mr. Scott's co-defendant was the actual killer.

The new evidence consisted of two affidavits and a photograph.

The State argued that Mr. Scott's Bradv claim was

procedurally barred because the newly discovered evidence only

corroborated the claim previously presented and rejected by

the Court. However, Mr. Scott argued that in light of the newly

discovered evidence, this Court should revisit its previous

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ruling rejecting Mr. Scott's Bradv claim. This Court found the

new evidence of a Bsadv violation warranted an evidentiary

hearing. Scott v. S t a te, 20 Fla. L. Weekly S132 (Fla. 1995)

(Slip Op. at 8).

Here, Mr. Swafford previously raised a Bradv violation

maintaining other individuals were responsible for the death of

Brenda Rucker, the victim in this case. Subsequently, Mr.

swafford presented a successor Rule 3.850 motion asserting a

Bra& violation based upon evidence not previously available to

post-conviction counsel which tended to prove that other

individuals were responsible for the death of Brenda Rucker.

Just as in Scott, this Court did not have the benefit of the

newly discovered evidence when it made its previous ruling

concerning the Bradv violation. Here, Mr. Lestz's affidavit

proves (in conjunction with Ray Cass, the trial attorney's

affidavit) that if the State had disclosed the Bradv material

implicating Walsh, Levi and Lestz in the murder of Brenda Rucker,

is innocent. Mr. Lestz's affidavit proves that had the State

complied with its discovery obligations, Mr. Swafford would have

been acquitted:

My name is Michael Eugene Lestz and I

live in the state of Illinois. In 1982 I was

in Daytona Beach, Florida during the Daytona

500. The Daytona 500 Auto Race took place on

Sunday, February 14, 1982.

While I was there, I was in the presence

of two guys named Walter Levi and Michael

Walsh. Michael Walsh borrowed my van on

several occasions and without telling me

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where he was going. I previously told the

Daytona Beach sheriff's office about these

occasions.

I remembex. on the dav of th e Davtogg

ad two 38 c aliber *

handauns and was in a biu W r v to qe t rid of

500, Michael Walsh h

them. One of t hese 38'6 was a hammerle ss

revolver. He told me that t he handcrun s had

sed an d he had to ue t rid of th em.

ted soincr to d ifferent bar s in

order to set rid of the sum. One of the

Walsh star

Shack T m l e ss bar. bandauns was the Shbule

The three of us ha d been to th is bar on

several occasions md we were all very

very nervous on this Darticular day . He said

it was because he didn't want the uuns in h i s

possession.

places id of these Walsh went t o cret r

ar with it. Also M ichael was actinq * I

A couDle 0 f days afte.r th e Davtona 500

and after M ichael Walsh had u otten r id of the

two uuns, we were in the x) arkins lo t of a

to e d out t e

er homicide. Walsh became wset

snatch the gamD hlets off th e

cars savins t h e a o u ldn't be look ins for t he

sustxct ~n Davt ona Beach when she was no t

k i l b d here, Walsh would n ever tell us what

Two sheriff's officers from the Volusia

meant bv this.

County Sheriff's department came to interview

me when 1 was in the Marion Federal Prison in

Illinois. I gave them detailed, truthful

statements of what I could remember at that

time. At some point at a later date I

remembered some more details and I wrote them

back to explain the details to them.

wrote me back and told me to 'Inot worry about

it.

and after the incident, I knew how he was

acting and I think there is a good chance

that he committed the murder of Brenda

Rucker .

They

Because I was with Michael Walsh before

(Affidavit of Michael E. Lestz, PC-R3. 22-23)(emphasis added).

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In its Answer, the State argues that Mr. Swafford's newly

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discovered evidence fails to meet the requirements of Jones v.

State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1991), in which the "newly discovered

evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an

acquittal on retrial or result in a life sentence rather than the

death penaltyn (Answer at 16). As noted below, the information

uncovered concerning Walsh, Levi and Lestz easily meets the

requirements in Jones.

However, the State's reliance on Jones is misplaced. This

Court was faced with a similar situation in Scott where newly

discovered evidence established a Brady violation. The Court in

maintained that the central issue was whether Mr. Scott was

entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

previous ruling in Scott rejecting the Bradv claim, this Court,

citing Liahtbourne v. Duscrer , 549 So. 2d 1364, 1365 (Fla. 1989),

remanded the case back to the lower court for an evidentiary

Despite this Court's

hearing on the Bradv issue. Scott v. State , 20 Fla. L. Weekly

S132 (Fla. 1995).

In Liahtbourne, this Court held that for the purposes of

appeal the Court must accept defendant's allegations as true when

determining if an evidentiary hearing is required. Here, Mr.

Swafford's allegations clearly established that an evidentiary

hearing is necessary: a

Walsh had claimed that he committed

three murders in Florida, and that one of the

victims was a white female in the Daytona

Beach area.

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Between 6:OO a.m. and 10:30 a.m. on the

day of the Rucker homicide, Walsh and Levi

left Lestz in a laundromat in Daytona Beach,

a couple of blocks from the Fina station.

Walsh had on numerous occasions

frequented the Fina station from which Rucker

was abducted.

Walsh was arrested in Arkansas following

an armed robbery in which he told the victim

that he had ‘killed‘ three persons’ in the

State of Florida.

Walsh strongly resembles the composite

of Brenda Rucker’s killer.

Walsh was arrested in March of 1982, he

had in his possession a composite bulletin

concerning details of the Brenda Rucker

homicide.

Arkansas police, upon seeing the BOLO,

contacted Volusia County authorities because

Walsh matched the composite drawing.

Brenda Rucker‘s autopsy revealed two

marks on the body of the victim possibly

caused by the application of a lighted

cigarette. Walsh subjected Lestz to

homosexual attacks during which Lestz was

burned with a cigarette. Lestz‘ body

strongly resemble those burns found on the

body of Brenda Rucker as the investigating

officer who inspected the burns stated in an

undisclosed affidavit.

At 6:OO a.m. on February 14, 1982, Walsh

and Levi had taken Lestz’s van and

disappeared. When Walsh returned, he

disposed of two .38 caliber handguns in a

Daytona Beach tavern.

hair black and forced Lestz to drive him to

New Orleans.

Walsh then dyed his

Walsh was interviewed and allowed to

view several photographs of the Rucker

homicide at which time it was observed that

Walsh became extremely upset, disorganized,

nervous and unsure of his statements.

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Thereafter, Walsh stated that he would

not relate what he was doing or his

whereabouts during the period of February 14 - February 15, 1982, stating "that he would

rather not say."

Further, this Court in Scott looked at the totality of the

case in making its determination of whether an evidentiary

hearing should be granted. Here, the allegations taken in the

context of the totality of Mr. Swafford's case demand that an

evidentiary hearing be granted. M r . Swafford's original trial

counsel, Ray Cass, has thoroughly examined all of the materials

uncovered during Mr. Swafford's post-conviction investigation

(including Mr. Lestz's affidavit) and he explained what impact

case:

Further, I have been shown the affidavit

of Michael Lestz which implicates Walter Levi

and Michael Walsh in the murder of Brenda

Rucker. Mr. Lestz's affidavit is attached to

this affidavit (Attachment F). Lestz's

affidavit demonstrates that had I been

advised regarding these suspects and

investigated them (as no doubt I would have

had I known of their existence) I would have

been able to present evidence of their guilt

and Mr. Swafford's resulting innocence. This

affidavit is further proof of Mr. Swafford's

innocence and I would have presented the

testimony of Mr. Lestz as evidence at

Mr. Swafford's trial. The testimony of Mr.

Lestz would have undermined the State's

erroneous theory in this case and would have

led to the perpetrators of this crime being

brought to justice. I am simply astounded by

the State's non disclosure of this

exculpatory evidence.

(Affidavit of Ray Cass, PC-R3. 182-87).

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Again, the procedural posture of Mr. Swafford's claim is no

different than that in Scott. In SCQW, the Court rejected the

State's argument that Mr. Scott's Bradv claim was procedurally

barred because in light of the new evidence Mr. Scott's Bradv

claim has merit. Here, in light of Mr. Lestz's and Mr. Cass's

affidavits, it is clear that Mr. Swafford is entitled to an

evidentiary hearing.

Also, the State has not presented any evidence that Mr.

Swafford failed to exercise due diligence in obtaining the

affidavit of Mr. Lestz and the lower court has not ruled that Mr.

Swafford has failed to exercise due diligence. Thus, M r .

Swafford is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

Further, the lower court never ruled on the merits of Mr.

Swafford's claim.

sumrnarily denying Mr. Swafford relief. While the lower court

noted that this Court had previously rejected Mr. Swafford's

Bradv claim that other individuals were responsible for the death

of the victim, it did not make an independent assessment of the

merits of Mr. Swafford's claim.

It wholly relied on a procedural bar in

The lower court never made an independent determination

regarding the need for an evidentiary hearing.

court make a determination that the record conclusively showed

that Mr. Swafford was not entitled to relief. This Court has

held that it will not rule upon the merits of a claim where the

lower court failed to reach the merits. Par ker v. DuqCleF, Nos.

Nor did the lower

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74,978 and 78,700 (Fla. Oct. 5, 1995). In Par-, this Court

specifically held:

In addition, the State argues that, even

if the claims are not waived, the record

conclusively shows that no relief is

warranted. Thus, the State contends, the

trial court did not err in denying these

claims without an evidentiary hearing in this

case, the court never made a determination

regarding the need for such a hearing. N o r

did the court make a determination that the

record conclusively showed that Parker was

not entitled to relief. The court never

looked beyond the procedural bar to consider

the merits of Parker's claims. The trial

court is the appropriate place for the

initial evaluation of the merits of Parker's

claims. We will not rule U D O ~ th e merits of

those claims when the trial co urt never

reached the merits below.

Accordinalv, we reverse the tr ial

cour t's de nial of wstconv iction relief and * onsideratio b e

trial c o u ~ .

Parker v. State, Nos. 74,978 and 78,700 (Fla. Oct. 5, 1995) (Slip

Op. at 6, 7) (emphasis added). Likewise here, the Court should

remand this cause for consideration by the trial court.

The Eighth Amendment mandates this Court not dismiss this

newly discovered evidence of a further a violation committed

by the State of Florida in this case. Scott v. State; Kvles v.

itlev, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995). When viewed in conjunction with

other evidence never presented because of the State's discovery

violations and/or trial counsel's deficient performance, there

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can be no question that Mr. Swafford's conviction cannot

withstand the requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth

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Amendments. gvleg. An evidentiary hearing is required. Scott

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Mr. Swafford adamantly maintains that critical Bradv

documents were withheld from the defense. Additionally, the

State failed to correct the perjured testimony that went to the

jury. Mr. Swafford maintains that he was denied an adversarial

testing. Garcia v. State, 622 So. zd 1325 (Fla. 1993). Under

Smith v. W a i w , 799 F.2d 1442 (11th Cir. 1986), postconviction

relief is required.

Mr. Swafford further maintains that Scott v, State, 20 Fla.

Weekly S132 (Fla. 1995), and Lishtbourne v, Dusser, 549 So. 2d

1364, 1365 (1989), dictate the necessity of an evidentiary

hearing in this case, even though this is a successive Rule 3.850

motion. The manner in which the State has disclosed exculpatory

evidence, i . e . , in piecemeal fashion, has affirmatively prevented

a detailed, thorough analysis of this case by Mr. Swafford's

counsel. The State should not be allowed to profit from its own

wrongdoing. Accordingly, Mr. Swafford requests that he be given

an evidentiary hearing on this issue and that the requested

relief be granted.

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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing Reply

Brief of Appellant has been furnished by United States Mail,

first class postage prepaid, to all counsel of record on October

9, 1995.

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MARTIN J. MCCLAIN

Y n F l o r i d a Bar No. 0754773

Chief Assistant CCR

Post Office Drawer 5498

Tallahassee, Florida 32314-5498

Attorney for Appellant

(904) 487-4376

Copies furnished to:

Margene Roper

Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Attorney General

444 Seabreeze Boulevard, 5th Floor

Daytona Beach, FL 32118

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