I,
a
a
0
0
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO.
80,182ROY CLIFTON SWAFFORD,
Appellant,
V.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appe 1
1 ee .ON APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND
FOR VOLUSIA COUNTY, STATE OF FLORIDAOF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT
MICHAEL J. MINERVA
Interim capital collateral
Florida
Bar No. 092487Representative
MARTIN J. MCCLAIN
Chief Assistant CCR
Florida
Bar No. 0754773HARUN
SHABAZZAssistant
CCRFlorida Bar
No. 0967701OFFICE OF THE CAPITAL
1533
South Monroe StreetTallahassee, FL
32301COLLATERAL
REPRESENTATIVE(904) 487-4376
COUNSEL
FOR APPELLANTPRELIMINARY
STATEMENTThis proceeding involves the
appeal of the circuit court'ssummary denial
of Mr. Swafford's motion for post-convictionrelief. The circuit court denied Mr. Swafford's claims without
an evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed.
Mr.
swafford filed a Motion to Temporarily RelinquishJurisdiction and
Hold Appeal in Abeyance. This Court grantedsaid motion
and ordered an evidentiary hearing "for the purposeof getting the facts regarding Attorney Ray Cass' status
as aspecial deputy sheriff and
ex parte communication between theState and the trial judge.It An evidentiary hearing was held
March
29, 1993, where the presiding judge made factual findings,but reached no legal conclusions. Mr. Swafford's request for
supplementary briefing
was granted by this Court.Mr. Swafford does not waive any claims previously discussed.
He relies upon the presentations
in his initial brief regardingany
claims not specifically addressed herein.Citations in this brief to designate references to the
records,
followed by the appropriate page number, are as follows:"R.
- I' - Record on appeal to this Court in first directappeal
;"PC-R1.
- - Record on appeal from denial of the firstMotion to Vacate Judgment and Sentence.
"PC-R2.
- - Record on appeal from denial of the secondMotion
to Vacate Judgment and Sentence.i
8
I)
0
0
0
0
All
other citations will be self-explanatory or willotherwise be explained.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paqe
PRELIMINARY
STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iTABLE OF CONTENTS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iiiTABLE OF AUTHORITIES
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ivSUPPLEMENT
TO THE STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . 1A.
October 1990 Ex Parte Contact . . . . . . . . . . . 1B. May
1992 Parte Contact. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4C.
Trial Counsel's Status As a Special DeputySheriff.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5SUMMARY
OF THE ARGUMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13ARGUMENT I
THE CIRCUIT COURT'S DENIAL OF ALL OF
MR. SWAFFORD'SCLAIMS WAS ERRONEOUS.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14A ( 3 ) .
Ex Parte Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14ARGUMENT I1
MR.
SWAFFORD WAS DENIED A FULL AND FAIR HEARING ON HISRULE
3.850 MOTION TO VACATE IN VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OFTHE
STATE OF FLORIDA AND THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTHAMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
WHEN THECIRCUIT COURT DENIED THE MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE
JUDGE..
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25ARGUMENT IX
TRIAL COUNSEL'S UNDISCLOSED CONFLICT OF INTEREST
INVIOLATION OF THE LAWS AND CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
FLORIDA
DENIED MR. SWAFFORD THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OFCOUNSEL GUARANTEED
UNDER THE SIXTH, EIGHTH ANDFOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION. AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS REQUIRED.
. . . 28CONCLUSIONS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42I'
iiiTABLE
OF AUTHORITIESPase
Cuvler
v. Sullivan,446
U.S. 335 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34, 42E.E.O.C.
v. Federal Reserve Board of Richmond,698
F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Golf
City, Inc. v. Ssortinq Goods, Inc.,555
F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Grvzik v. State,
380
So. Zd 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) . . . . . . . 41Herrins v. State,
580
So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Holland v.
State,503
So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Holloway
v. Arkansas,435
U.S. 475 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38Huff
v. State,18
Fla. L. Weekly S396 (Fla. July 1, 1993) . . . . . 22, 27Love v. State,
569
So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . 21People
v. Washinqton,461
N.E.2d 393 (Ill. Sup. Ct.),cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1022 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . 38Porter
v. Wainwriaht,805
F.2d 930 (11th Cir. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . 34, 42Quince v. State,
592
So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42Roclers
v. State,18
Fla. L. Weekly S414 (Fla. July 1, 1993) . . . . . . . 27Rose v. State,
601
So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1992) . . . . . . . . 14, 18, 20, 27Simms
v. Greene,161
F.2d 87 (3rd Cir. 1947) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22iv
m
a
State ex rel. Davis v. Parks,141
Fla. 516,194
So. 613 (1939) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20State
ex rel. Smith v. Jorandbv,498
So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40Stevenson v. Newsome,
774
F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . 34, 42Swafford v.
Duqqer,569
So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28swafford
v. Sinsletarv,584
So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Vircrin
Islands v. Ze748
F.2d 125 (3Ykir. 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38Wrisht v. State,
581
So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34Zuck
v. Alabama,588
F.2d 436 (5th C i r . 1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39BUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT
OF THE CASEThe
previously filed initial brief contains a Statement ofthe Case. However, additional facts were established at the
evidentiary hearing held on March
29, 1993. These facts must beviewed in the proper context. Here, Mr. Swafford supplements the
previous Statement of the Case, repeating facts only to the
extent necessary to establish the proper context.
A.
October 1990 Ex Parte Contact.On September
7, 1990, a warrant was signed setting Mr.Swafford's execution for November
13, 1990.On October
1, 1990, Jerome Nickerson who was the AssistantCCR assigned to represent
M r . Swafford resigned. The resignationwas
effective upon the entry of a stay of execution in Mr.Swaffordls case.
On
October 15, 1990, a Rule 3.850 motion was filed. OnOctober
18, 1990, a motion to compel production of Chapter 119materials
was filed on behalf of Mr. Swafford.On
October 2 2 , 1990, the State submitted its responsewherein it conceded an evidentiary
on Mr. Swaffordls Bradv claimand on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
A
status hearing was held on October 24, 1990. The Stateagain conceded that an evidentiary hearing was appropriate. The
State also disclosed in excess of one thousand
(1000) pages ofadditional
119 material. However, no opportunity to review andamend the Rule
3.850 motion was provided.1
At the March
29, 1993, evidentiary hearing, it wasestablished that, after the October
24, 1990, hearing, the judgehad his
law clerk contact the Assistant Attorney General, BarbaraDavis, and discuss
ex parte the contents of an order denying Rule3.850
relief. Specifically the following facts were found by thepresiding judge at the
March 29th hearing:THE
COURT: Rowe. Apparently the Judge,himself, did not communicate direct with
either the Attorney General's office,
MissBarbara Davis, or the State Attorney's
office, but apparently from his testimony and
the testimony
of his law clerk, Mr. Rowe,apparently he directed Mr. Rowe to call the
Attorney General's office, resuest a arososed
order
to be prepared.And
I'll set for what Mr. Rowe wastestifying.
1'11 make a finding of fact thatthe Judge
did direct his law clerk to callthe Attorney General's office to have the
proposed order to be prepared, and ultimately
it looks like
it might have been prepared bythe State Attorney's office after the
Attorney General's contacted them. But I'll
find that Judqe Hammond did direct his clerk
to
call the State Attornev -- or the AttorneyGeneral's office and that to request and
prepare
a proposed order.And that I'll
also find that though Mr.Rowe attempted to also call the
CCR office,he
did that after hours. He apparentlytalked to a male voice. Did not ask
theman's name.
Did not ask the man's position,other than Mr. Rowe said it was someone that
seemed to know what was going on.
So, he didnot
ascertain the man's name or whether ornot he was talking to a lawyer, an
investigator, a paralegal, maybe a secretary
or, as pointed out, maybe the janitor
inthere.
I
find that it was after hours and,frankly, I'll make a findincr that it was
2
(PC-R2.
ineffectual as far as at least even
DU ttinqCCR
on notice that the Judse had directedthat
his clerk call the Attorney General'soffice
and set a mososed order.1777-79)
(emphasis added).The court further found that the order denying Mr.
Swafford's
1990 3.850 motion was llultimatelyll prepared by theState
and that there was no attempt to furnish a copy of theproposed order to Mr. Swafford's counsel for review and
opportunity to file objection:
[THE COURT:] 1'11 further find that
before it
was sisned by Judse Hammond orultimately an order prepared by the Attorney
General or the State Attorney's office was
sisned, there was no attempt to set a copy to
the CCR
so that it had an o w o r t u n i t v toreview it and
an opportunity to file anyobjections to the
proposed order, as pointedout in the Rose case.
(PC-R2.
1779)(emphasis added).Finally, the court found that Judge Hammond's law clerk did
not
attempt to remedy the situation by arranging a conferencecall between
the trial court, the State, and the defense counselconcerning the proposed
order denying Mr. Swafford's 3.850 nordid
the law clerk attempt to notify both parties by way ofwritten communication giving opposing sides an equal opportunity
to respond:
[THE
COURT:] I should make a furtherfindincs of
fact as far as the contact of theAttorney General's
office, there was noattempt at the time
by Judcre Hammond's lawclerk. He did not attempt to either, one,
set
UD a conference call so at the same timehe was talkins to the Attorney General's
3
lm
office
he could talk to, YOU know, eitherattorney
or at least a representative of theCCR office.
N o r , was it done bv way ofwritten communication, where at least
maybethroush the mail they would have had
basicallv the same amount of
owortunitv t oknow
what was soins on. So, those are thefindings of fact I'm going to make and,
frankly, at this point
I'm going to donothing further.
(PC-R2.
1779) (emphasis added).Because the collateral counsel in October
of 1990 receivedfacsimile transmitted
copies of the order, he was completelyunaware
of the ex parte contact between the S t a t e and the judge(PC-R2.
1607-08). He was not in a position to note the typesimilarities that alerted subsequent counsel
to the ex partecontact.
Counsel in 1990 had Itno information" whatsoever ''thatthere had been
ex parte contact between the judge and the Stateregarding
M r . Swafford's case (PC-R2. 1608-09).B.
May 1992 Ex Parte Contact.A second Rule
3.850 motion was filed on November 21, 1991.The motion
was premised upon a full examination of the Chapter119
materials and subsequent further disclosures.The State filed
its Response on February 10, 1992.Subsequently,
Barbara Davis, the assigned Assistant AttorneyGeneral,
received another phone call from Judge Hammond's lawclerk directing her to draft an order for the judge's signature
denying the second motion to vacate
(PC-R2. 1579). Pursuant tothe discussion with the judge's law clerk, Ms. Davis prepared the
order
and provided it to Sean Daly, the Assistant State Attorney4
assigned to the case (PC-R2. 1579). Mr. Daly then sent the order
to the
judge with a copy mailed to M r . Swafford's collateralcounsel on May
29, 1992. The cover letter made no mention of thejudge's
ex parte direction to provide the draft order (PC-R2.1227-1233).
The judge, thereafter, signed the order beforecollateral counsel had ever received
Mr. Swafford's copy.C.
Trial Counsells Status As a special Deputy Sheriff.In December
of 1992, collateral counsel learned that Mr.Swafford's
trial counsel, Ray Cass, had received a special deputyappointment
in Volusia County. At the March 29, 1993,evidentiary hearing,
Mr. Swafford was not permitted to presentevidence
from Mr. Pearl, co-counsel, and Mr. Cass detailing theexculpatory evidence that was withheld by the Volusia County
Sheriff's Office and the State Attorney:'
MR.
MCCLAIN: For the record I need toproffer, then, what
I would be presenting.What
I would present is I would have Mr.Pearl,
the Volusia County Sheriff's Officereport of March 17th,
1982, indicating Mr.Walsh was arrested in Arkansas with various
types
of .38 ammunition.He strongly resembled the composite
drawing
made of the suspect. He also madestatements to the police that he had killed
three people in Florida. Actually, he didn't
make those statements to the police. He had
made
those statements to other people whoreported them to the police.
'Mr.
Swafford sought to introduce the evidence to show thatthe special deputy appointments
of Mr. Cass and Mr. Pearl led theState to take advantage of them.
5
The Volusia County Sheriff's report
dated
July 20th, 1982, Mr. Walsh was atraveling companion.
Mr. Lestz gaveinformation to the police that Walsh had
committed three murders in Florida, and that
one of those
victims had been a white female.He also indicated that they had been in the
Daytona Beach area the weekend that Brenda
Rucker was murdered. He further implicated
Mr.
Walsh in that homicide.The Volusia County Sheriff's Office
report dated August
30, 1982, the thirdtraveling companion, Levi, implicated
-- I'msorry. For the court reporter's benefit,
Levi
is spelled L-e-v-i; Walsh is W-a-l-s-h,and Lestz is L-e-s-t-z. Levi implicated both
Walsh and Lestz and indicated that the two
ofthem had disappeared at the time that the
homicide occurred, approximately
6:OO a.m. onthe date of the homicide, and left him. That
they were in the neighborhood several blocks
away from a convenience store.
In addition, there
is the results ofLestz' polygraph examination,
in which hefailed
it and claiming he was not involved.There's also the
Volusia County Sheriff'sreport
dated January 31st of 1983, indicatingfurther the results of Letsz' polygraph and
further indicating that Levi had, again,
implicated Walsh and Lestz in the Brenda
Rucker murder.
There was also a search warrant and an
affidavit prepared
by Detective Boucher tosearch Walsh's van, which was located in the
State of Illinois. In that affidavit
prepared by Detective Boucher,
he indicatedthat Lestz had indicated he had had a
homosexual relationship with Walsh; that
Walsh liked to burn people while having
sexwith them. That there were burns on
L e s t z ,which he showed to Detective Boucher, which
Detective Boucher
said were very similar tothe burn marks on Brenda Rucker and were
consistent with those burns.
Detective Boucher also indicated that
there were two crime scenes in Florida.
6
a
There was where the body was found, butthat's not where the homicide occurred. The
homicide occurred in
a different location.Again,
it is important information as itrelates to the trial. Further, Lestz again
implicated
Walsh and Levi in the BrendaRucker murder.
aThen there's the Volusia County
Sheriff's Office report dated July
26, 1982.Walsh was found with various guns, various
types
of .38 caliber ammunition.e
a
MS.
ROPER: Objection, Your Honor. Thisis
not a proffer. He's reading what's in therecord. What are these people going to
testify to?
MR.
MCCLAIN: I believe I said they'regoing to testify
to they were not providedwith these documents,
and that if had theyhave
been they would have used them andpresented them to a
jury.MS.
ROPER: You presented a list ofdocuments that could
be put into the record,and instead
of having --MR. MCCLAIN:
I don't tell you how to doa proffer. I'm making a proffer
for thecourt reporter.
If you wish to object,please make
an objection.MS.
ROPER: Well, I object. I don'tplan
on --MR.
MCCLAIN: I believe that I'mentitled under
the rules to make an oralproffer of the evidence that
I intend toproduce or wish
to produce, but for theCourt's ruling.
THE
COURT: None of this has alreadybeen
--MR.
MCCLAIN: M r . Pearl has never takenthe stand and testified that these documents
were not given to
him. He's never taken thestand and testified that he believes
Mr.Swafford
is innocent. He believes these7
0
~. Ia
documents show he was innocent and certainly
would have been pursued
and presented at Mr.Swaffordls
trial, either by him if he hadbeen
counsel or by M r . Cass, and Mr. Cass hadknown about these documents.
THE
COURT: Now, I understand, Mr.McClain, what you're trying to do
is aproffer
of what you feel M r . Pearl would havetestified
--MR.
MCCLAIN: And will testify to thishere
today if allowed.(PC-R2.
1686-90).MR.
MCCLAIN: I have spoken with Mr.Pearl
several times about this matter. Ihave provided him with these documents.
has
reviewed these documents, and wecategorically
state they were not provided tohim at any point in time during
hisrepresentation of Mr. Swafford.
He
(PC-R2. 1692).
THE
COURT: How about if we just go withyour recitation of what you anticipate.
MR.
MCCLAIN: It's not going to takevery long.
THE COURT: Secondly, can we excuse Mr.
Pearl, then,
if he -- you indicated he hadexpressed concern about
I guess, what does helife
in Lake County?a
MR. MCCLAIN: Yes, Your Honor.THE
COURT: About trying t o get on theroad before dark.
MS.
ROPER: I don't have any problemwith
excusing Mr. Pearl as long as you'resatisfied with
your ruling that he's notgoing to testify.
THE COURT:
Any problems with me tellingthe deputy to go ahead and excuse Mr. Pearl?
8
a
e
MS. ROPER: No, Your Honor.a
d
a
a
THE
COURT: All right. Go ahead andtell
M r . Pearl he's excused.MR.
MCCLAIN: Your Honor, previously --and
I can't find the document right handy.It was either in the State's response or it
was
the State's response to motion forrehearing
filed back in 1990. The State didattach and handwritten note to Howard and it
just indicated IIHoward'l on it and
1 believethere
was initials that were supposed to beGene White's initials and the State's
position was there was no Brady claim because
this note indicated that Gene White had
opened up his complete file to Howard Pearl.
So,
the State's argument previously hasbeen premised upon that and has maintained
that there was no policy so, therefore, there
could not
be a Brady claim and that Mr. Pearlhad
complete access. There was not anyevidence taken other than the submission
ofthat one-page document to some pleading that
the State filed, and so Mr. Pearl has not
testified.
Continuing
on with the proffer, YourHonor, there's the Volsuia County Sheriff
Report dated July 26th,
1982, in which Walshwas
found with various guns, various types of.38
caliber ammunition. Walsh becameextremely
nervous when shown pictures of thevictim's
body and refused to state where hewas at the time of the murder.
He also had in his back pocket a copy of
the
BOLO of the suspect and would -- and heexplained only
that he had gotten it left onthe windshield
of his car. Then, inaddition, Lestz and Levi
both indicated Walshhad sold his guns within a day or two
of whenthe homicide would have occurred.
A
July 23rd, 1982 statement of Lestz,again indicating that Walsh would burn Lestz
with cigarettes and urinate on him.
9
a
a
e
a
a
Again, Lestz met
Walsh at the HolidayInn in Daytona Beach
during that weekend ofthe homicide. Levils statement
of August25th,
1982, in which he also implicated Walshand
Lestz in Rucker's murder, he confirmedLestz'
statement that Walsh, Lestz and Levihad been dropped off at
a laundromat withinblocks of the Fina station the day before the
murder and that
the other two had left atsometime prior
to 6:OO a.m. on the morning ofthe
murder and where -- he didn't know oftheir
whereabouts. And when they came back,they attempted to get
rid of the gun.Turning to another matter
of -- it's theletters that Roger Harper wrote
to GeneWhite. There's a letter dated
4/2 of ' 8 4 , aletter dated
8/12 of ' 8 4 , a letter dated May16th of
' 8 5 , a letter dated 6/6/ of '85, anda
letter dated August 5th of ' 8 5 . Mr. Pearlalso has reviewed all of these documents and
again indicates he was not provided with
these documents. These documents
go to showRoger Harper's bias
and interest and motivein testifying in the fashion that
he did.And, in fact, they contradict Mr. Harper's
testimony with reference to what he expected
to get out of his testimony.
There's
also a Parole Commission letterto Gene
White dated August 30th of 1985, andthis reflects
Mr. Harper's status, parolestatus, at that point in time and, again,
it's inconsistent with his trial testimony.
Mr. Pearl [would] testif[y] that these
documents he had not seen he would
have used.They were important information
to present tothe
jury in considering Harper's testimony.MS. ROPER: Your
Honor, I think I willmake a proffer.
I can guarantee you thatHoward Pearl will not take
the stand to sayhe didn't get these documents because he was
a
deputy sheriff.m.
MCCLAIN: Now that Mr. Pearl's gone,it's very convenient
for Miss Roper to makethat proffer.
10
a
a
MS. ROPER:
Well, will you proffer that,that he will say that?
MR.
MCCLAIN: I'm proffering that hewill say that he did not get this information
for whatever reason. That's my proffer.
MS.
ROPER: Fine. That's your Bradyclaim.
Now, if you want to have a validclaim here
-- never mind.MR.
MCCLAIN: Your Honor, that's myproffer of what
Mr. Pearl would say.And in addition, there was other police
reports. One dated March 19th, regarding
where
the body was found on the morning ofthe murder. There was a witness from the
Sheriff's Office who had been there and did
not
see the body. Mr. Pearl had not seenthat report.
He was
also unaware of the report datedMarch 22nd, indicating that the body had been
reported
to park rangers a day earlier thanthe trial testimony indicated; and he was
also unaware
of documents indicating that thecrime scene was not secured
for two daysafter the body was found. That's his
proffer
.(PC-R2.
1692-97) .MR. MCCLAIN:
Mr. Cass is going to betestifying in reference to his status
asspecial deputy sheriff. If she doesn't care
what he says about that and
she's going tostand by her objection no matter what he
says, then
--MS.
ROPER: I'm not objecting to that,Your
Honor. I am objecting to, I think, theCourt mentioned about a proffer asking Mr.
Cass
about these same items he didn'treceive, which
is basically a brady claimindication, Your Honor. Relitigation.
THE
COURT: Let me ask you this, Mr.McClain: Now, I don't know if
M r . Cass hassomething that you feel he could say beyond
11
e
a
a
what
you have just already put on the recordthat Mr. Pearl would have testified to had he
taken the
stand in reference to what theywould
have done had they known about thesealleged items
of evidence.Is
it your understanding that Mr. Casswould,
in essence, say the same things thatyou have just put on the
record?MR. MCCLAIN: Yes. Mr. Cass
is adamantMr. Swafford
is innocent, wronslv convicted,and he feels terrible that he did not
setthese documents because with these documents
hels convinced he should clearly have shown
his innocence.
MS.
ROPER: Objection to counseltestifying.
MR. MCCLAIN: I'm making a proffer.
MS.
ROPER: In lieu of Mr. Cass takingthe stand, that's
-- I understood that's whatwe
did on Mr. Pearl in lieu of Mr. Pearl onproffer taking the stand and saying the
samething. Mr. McClain just put on
the recordwhere he understood Mr.
Pearl would testifyto had he been called to give testimony on
proffer, since
I already said he could not,as evidence in chief on those
issues.THE
COURT: So, the State agrees, atleast
as far as just adopting for M r . Cass,what Mr. McClain has already put on the
record
for Mr. Pearl and in that respect?a
a
MS. ROPER:
We would agree to that, YourHonor. We wanted
to hear from Mr. Cass as awitness
as to the circumstances of thestatus.
(PC-R2.
1699-1700) (emphasis added) .Without considering this proffered evidence, the judge did
find that Ray Cass was issued
a special deputy appointment. Thisappointment was made by Sheriff Duff who handed out this
12
0
a
appointment for
111111 make a finding, basically call it politicalpatronage1'
(PC-R2. 1772). " [ I J t I s kind of favors to people inhopes that maybe they would think kindly towards Sheriff Duff"
(PC-R2.
1772).SUMMARY
OF THE ARGUMENTS1.
The judge presiding over both Rule 3.850 proceedingsinitiated
ex parte contact in both proceedings.law clerk to contact the
State and discuss the pending motions inorder to obtain a draft order
for his signature. This proceduredenied
Mr. Swafford due process. Both orders denying must bevacated and the case remanded to circuit court
for furtherproceedings which comport with due process.
He
directed his2.
M r . Swafford filed a motion to disqualify Judge Hammondfor engaging in ex parte communications with the State. The
motion was facially sufficient.
It was error for Judge Hammondto deny the motion.
9.
Mr. Swaffordls trial counsel was a special deputysheriff. An evidentiary hearing must
be ordered on whethercounsel's
status affected his ability to render effectiveassistance and/or affected the State's disclosure
of exculpatoryevidence.
13
a
ARGUMENT ITHE CIRCUIT COURT'S DENIAL OF
ALL OF MR.SWAFFORD'B CLAIMS WAS
ERRONEOUS.2
A ( 3 ) . Ex Parte Communication. aMr.
Swafford argued in his initial brief that the State andthe trial court engaged in
ex parte communications during Mr.0
Swafford's initial
3.850 proceedings and that thesecommunications were not disclosed
by either the judge or theState. This
ex parte contact only became apparent whencollateral counsel reviewed the type of the orders signed by the
judge. These orders were prepared on the same machine used to
prepare the State's pleadings. While the case proceeded under
warrant, prior counsel received faxed copies of these orders
which distorted the type and precluded discovery of the
ex partecontact.
Mr. Swafford further argued that this undisclosed exparte communication must void the prior
1990 3.850 proceedings,and
warrants consideration of the merits of Mr. Swafford'sclaims.
Rose v. State, 601 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1992). In lightof
the State's contention in its Answer Brief that there was nom
a
21n the previously filed initial brief, Argument
I containedsections and subsections. The March
29, 1993, evidentiaryhearing only related to subsection A(3) of Argument I. This was
the subsection arguing that the undisclosed
ex parte contact inOctober
of 1990 rendered the order denying the motion to vacatesubject to a valid attack in the second Rule
3.850 filed inNovember of
1991. In light of the March 29, 1993, evidentiaryhearing, this should probably be
a separate free standingargument. However,to assist this Court
in cross-referencing, Mr.Swafford
inserts the designation of Argument I, Sec. A ( 3 ) .14
a
-
ex parte contact, M r . Swafford requested a remand to get thea
facts. This Court granted that request.
On
March 29, 1993, an evidentiary hearing was held "for thepurpose
of getting the facts regarding . . . the ex partecommunication between
the State and the trial judgett pursuant tothis Court's order. The presiding
judge made factual findings,but reached no legal conclusions.
The court, nonetheless, notedthat the factual circumstances in
M r . Swafford's 1990 3.850proceedings were strikingly similar to
the factual circumstancesa
in
Rose:[THE
COURT:] As far as the ex Partecommunication
-- and I would certainlyconcede the language in Rose versus
the Stateis very. very similar in a lot of respects to
what we have here
. . .* * *
Apparently the State filed a response to
Rosels motion,
3.850 motion, and apparentlyon the response agreed that
an evidentiaryhearing
was required. And then apparentlysubsequently the State submitted a proposed
order adopted in his entirety
by the TrialJudge denying
all relief. And it goes on tosay that the new trial counsel was
not servedwith
a copy of the proposed order, norprovided an opportunity to file objections to
it.
And
they go on, the Sumeme Court, andthis is
a direct mote, Vnder these facts,we must assume that the Trial
Court in an exparte communication had resuested the State
to prepare the proposed order," which
certainly, frankly, seems to
be the situationwe have here.
(PC-R2.
1776-77)(emphasis added).15
a
a
The presiding judge found that Judge Hammond, Mr. Swafford'sa
a
m
original trial
judge, had directed h i s law clerk, Randy Rowe, tocall
the Attorney General's office and request a proposed orderto
be prepared and that Mr. Rowe was llineffectual" in putting Mr.Swafford's
counsel on notice that Judge Hammond had directed himto get a proposed order from the State:
THE
COURT: Rowe. Apparently the Judge,himself, did not communicate direct with
either the Attorney General's office,
M i s sBarbara Davis,
or the State Attorney'soffice, but apparently
from h i s testimony andthe testimony of
his law clerk, Mr. Rowe,apparently he directed Mr. Rowe to call the
Attorney General's office, request
a proposedorder to
be prepared.And
1'11 set for what Mr. Rowe wastestifying. I'll make a finding of fact that
the Judge did direct
h i s law clerk to callthe
Attorney General's office to have theproposed order to be
prepared, and ultimatelyit looks like it might have
been prepared bythe State Attorney's
office after theAttorney General's contacted them. But 1'11
find that Judqe Hammond
did direct his clerkto
call the State Attornev -- or the AttornevGeneral's office and that to request and
prex>are a sroposed order.
And
that I'll also find that though Mr.Rowe attempted to also call the CCR office,
he did that after
hours. He apparentlytalked to a male voice.
Did not ask theman's name. Did not ask the
man's position,other than
Mr. Rowe said it was someone thatseemed to know what was going on.
So, he didnot ascertain the man's name or whether or
not he was talking
to a lawyer, aninvestigator, a paralegal, maybe a secretary
or, as pointed out, maybe the janitor in
there.
I
find that it was after hours and,frankly,
I'll make a findins that it was16
a
a
a
a
a
a
ineffectual as far as at least even puttinq
CCR
on notice that the Judse had directedthat his clerk call the Attornev General's
office and set a srososed order.
(PC-R2.
1777-79)(emphasis added).The
court further found that the order denying M r .Swafford's
1990 3.850 motion was llultimatelyll prepared by theState and
that there was no attempt to furnish a copy of theproposed
order to Mr. Swafford's counsel for review andopportunity to file objection:
[THE COURT:]
I'll further find thatbefore it was sisned bv Judse Hammond
orultimately an order Prepared
bv the AttorneyGeneral or
the State Attorney's office wassisned, there was no attemst to set a
COPY tothe
CCR so that it had an opportunity toreview it and an omortunitv to file any
objections to the srososed order,
as Pointedout in the Rose case.
(PC-R2.
1779)(emphasis added).Finally, the court
found that Judge Hammond's law clerk didnot attempt to remedy the situation
by arranging a conferencecall between the trial court, the State, and the defense counsel
concerning the proposed order denying Mr. Swafford's
3.850 nordid
the law clerk attempt to notify both parties by way ofwritten
communication giving opposing sides an equal opportunityto
respond:[THE
COURT:] I should make a furtherfindinq of fact
as far as the contact of theAttorney General's office, there was no
attempt at the time
by Judge Hammond's lawclerk. He did not attempt to either, one,
set
up a conference call so at the same timehe
was talkinq to the Attornev General's17
e
a
a
a
a
office he could talk
to, YOU know, eitherattorney or at least a representative
of theCCR
office. Nor, was it done bv wav ofwritten communication, where at least maybe
throush
the mail they would have hadbasically the same amount of opportunitv to
know what was qoinq on.
So, those are thefindings of fact I'm going to make and,
frankly, at this point I'm going to do
nothing further.
(PC-R2.
1779) (emphasis added).AS
noted by the presiding judge at the evidentiary hearing,Mr. Swafford's case is nearly identical to Rose v. State,
601 So.2d
1181 (Fla. 1992). As in Rose, Mr. Swafford filed his initial3.850
and the State filed a response agreeing that an evidentiaryhearing was required
(PC-R1. 367). The trial court's law clerkcontacted the State in an
ex parte communication and the Stateprepared an order denying the
3.850 motion without providing Mr.Swafford a reasonable opportunity to
respond to it (PC-R2. 1574-75, 1578, 1776-79).
In Rose, this Court reversed the denial of Rule
3.850 reliefbecause it l1appearedIt that the State and trial judge had
ex partecommunications during which the State was directed
to prepare theorder denying relief. This Court maintained that Il[u]nder these
facts we must assume that1'
ex parte communication had takenplace. Rose
v, State, 601 So. 2d at 1182, 83. However, in Mr.Swafford's case, no assumption is necessary.
A t the evidentiaryhearing, the presiding judge made the factual finding that there
was
ex parte communication between the trial court and the State(PC-R2.
1776-79).18
a
a
The trial court's actions in initiating ex parte discussions0
with the State regarding the merits of
Mr. Swafford's case deniedM r .
Swafford his right to have his cas