| [1] | Florida Supreme Court |
| [2] | No. 88,961 |
| [3] | 718 So.2d 746, 1998.FL.2215 <http://www.versuslaw.com> |
| [4] | June 11, 1998 |
| [5] | JUAN ROBERTO MELENDEZ, APPELLANT, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE. |
| [6] | Gregory C. Smith, Capital Collateral Counsel, Northern Region,
Tallahassee, Florida, and Gail E. Anderson, Special Assistant Ccrc,
Greensboro, Florida, for Appellant Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney
General, and Candance M. Sabella, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa,
Florida, for Appellee |
| [7] | The opinion of the court was delivered by: Per Curiam. |
| [8] | Juan Roberto Melendez appeals an order of the trial
court denying relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We
have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. We affirm. |
| [9] | The facts of this case are set out fully in our opinion on direct
appeal. See Melendez v. State, 498 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1986).
Juan Roberto Melendez was convicted of the first-degree
murder and armed robbery of Delbert Baker and was sentenced to death. We
affirmed. Id. The trial court summarily denied Melendez's
first motion for post-conviction relief in July 1989, and we affirmed.
Melendez v. State, 612 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 1992), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 934 (1993). We denied his subsequent petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. Melendez v. Singletary, 644 So. 2d 983
(Fla. 1994). Melendez filed the present motion for
post-conviction relief in September 1994, seeking to present newly
discovered evidence that another man, Vernon James, was the killer. The
trial court held an evidentiary hearing in May 1996, wherein
Melendez called five witnesses. *fn1 |
| [10] | The court found that the testimony of these witnesses, "either
individually or cumulatively, falls short of the standard required to
grant a retrial," and denied Melendez's rule 3.850 motion.
Melendez appeals that denial, raising four issues. *fn2 |
| [11] | Melendez first claims that newly discovered evidence
establishes his innocence and the trial court erred in denying him relief.
We disagree. This Court set forth the relevant standards in Blanco v.
State, 702 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1997): |
| [12] | First, to qualify as newly discovered evidence, "the asserted facts
must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at
the time of trial, and it must appear that defendant or his counsel could
not have known them by the use of diligence." Second, to prompt a new
trial, "the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would
probably produce an acquittal on retrial." |
| [13] | In reviewing a trial court's application of the above law to a rule
3.850 motion following an evidentiary hearing, this Court applies the
following standard of review: As long as the trial court's findings are
supported by competent substantial evidence, "this Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact,
likewise of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight to be
given to the evidence by the trial court." |
| [14] | Id. at 1251 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d
911, 915, 916 (Fla. 1991), and Demps v. State, 462 So. 2d 1074, 1075 (Fla.
1984)). In the present case, the trial court addressed this claim at
length and concluded: |
| [15] | In support of the newly discovered evidence claim the defendant called
five witnesses: Deborah Ciotti, Janice Dawson, Sandra Kay James, John
Berrien and Dwight Wells. They all claimed that Vernon James had made
incriminating statements to them about the murder. Four of the five were
not credible witnesses and their testimony, either individually or
cumulatively, falls short of the standard required to grant a
retrial. |
| [16] | In summary, the newly discovered evidence claim rests on the testimony
of three convicted felons who say Vernon James made incriminating
statements about the murder, the partial recanting of a co-defendant's
testimony, and a lawyer's vague memories of Vernon James' several
confessions. The original defense was that Vernon James did it. The jury
rejected that defense and none of the above would likely have been
credible enough to change that verdict in my opinion. |
| [17] | The record shows that the trial court properly applied the law, and
its findings are supported by competent substantial evidence.
Consequently, this Court is precluded from substituting its judgment for
that of the trial court on this matter. See Blanco, 702 So. 2d at 1252
(citing Demps v. State, 462 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 1984)). We find no
error. |
| [18] | Melendez next claims that the State withheld material
exculpatory evidence and knowingly presented false testimony in violation
of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). We disagree. In order to
establish a Brady violation, a defendant must prove the
following: |
| [19] | (1) that the Government possessed evidence favorable to the defendant
(including impeachment evidence); (2) that the defendant does not possess
the evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence;
(3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability
exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been
different. |
| [20] | Hegwood v. State, 575 So. 2d 170, 172 (Fla. 1991) (quoting United
States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 1989). |
| [21] | In the present case, the trial court addressed this claim at length
and concluded: |
| [22] | The major problem with this so-called Brady violation is that in order
to sustain it one has to believe [defense witness] John Berrien. I do not
believe John Berrien. Berrien had at least three interviews with law
enforcement regarding this murder. The first occurred on March 7, 1984 at
the Lakeland Police Department. The interview was conducted by Florida
Department of Law Enforcement Agent Tom Roper. Glisson and Knapp were
there as was a Lakeland Police detective. The second occurred March 15,
1984 at the Auburndale Police Department. Presumably, this is the
interview Berrien complains of in his affidavit and testimony. He was
arrested after this interview and taken to the Polk County Jail. Two days
later Berrien called Det. Glisson and asked him to come to the jail
because Berrien had more to say. Glisson, and eventually Roper, took a
third confession at the jail. While the three statements differ in detail,
they are basically the same. It is difficult to understand how Berrien's
allegedly coerced statement on March 15th vitiates the statement he made
on March 7th. Moreover, the police obtained the March 17th statement at
the behest of Berrien himself. It seems unlikely that Berrien would summon
his tormentors from Auburndale only to subject himself to further threats
and coercion. One may certainly question Berrien's motives for giving
these statements, but there is no credible evidence of police misconduct.
None of the four elements of a Brady violation were proved. |
| [23] | The trial court applied the right rule of law governing the
withholding of evidence under Brady, *fn3 and competent substantial evidence supports the
trial court's findings. We find no error. |
| [24] | Melendez claims that trial counsel provided ineffective
representation during the guilt phase of the trial. This claim was raised
in his previous motion for post-conviction relief and is procedurally
barred. *fn4 In his final claim,
Melendez argues that the trial court failed to consider the
cumulative effect of newly discovered evidence, the Brady violation, and
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. These claims were either
meritless or procedurally barred; therefore, there was no cumulative
effect to consider. We find no error. Based on the foregoing, we affirm
the denial of Melendez's rule 3.850 motion. |
| [25] | It is so ordered. |
| [26] | KOGAN, C.J., OVERTON, SHAW, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., and
GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur. |
| [27] | NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED,
DETERMINED. |
| [28] | An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Polk County, |
| [29] | Dennis P. Maloney, Judge - Case No. CF84-1016A2 |
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| Opinion Footnotes | |
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| [30] | *fn1 The first witness, Deborah
Ciotti, a prostitute and drug addict at the time of the murder, testified
that James told her he was going to rob the beauty shop. After she read
about the murder she asked James if he did it and he responded by showing
her some money and drugs. He never told her he killed Baker. The second
witness, Janice Dawson, lived with James after both were released from
prison on unrelated crimes. She described James as a con man, a liar, and
a person adept at making people believe what he wanted them to believe.
Dawson testified that James told her on many occasions that he had been
involved in the murder, but he never said that he killed Baker nor did he
say who committed the murder. Sandra Kay James, Vernon's sister, was the
third witness. She was addicted to drugs at the time of the murder and is
presently serving a thirty-year prison sentence. She claims her brother
told her that he set up the robbery and was present when Baker was
murdered, but he did not commit the murder. The fourth witness, John
Berrien, testified against Melendez at trial in exchange for
a negotiated plea agreement. He now claims that the police intimidated and
coerced him into testifying falsely: that he had seen
Melendez with a .38 caliber pistol in the past and on the
night he drove Melendez to Baker's beauty school; that
Melendez had a towel when he came out of the beauty school;
and that he saw Melendez give George Berrien two rings, a
watch, and a gun to take to Delaware. The fifth witness, Dwight Wells, the
attorney who represented Melendez's co-defendant John
Berrien, testified that during the time he represented Berrien, James
invited him to visit his jail cell wherein he confessed to Baker's murder.
James told Wells that he and Baker were homosexual lovers who had a fight
about aggressive sexual advances which resulted in James killing
Baker. |
| [31] | *fn2 Melendez claims
error on the following points: (1) newly discovered evidence shows that
Melendez is entitled to a new trial; (2) Brady violations;
(3) ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase; and (4) failure
to consider the cumulative effect of all the newly discovered
evidence. |
| [32] | *fn3 See, e.g., Hegwood, 575 So. 2d
at 172. |
| [33] | *fn4 See Melendez v.
State, 612 So. 2d 1366, 1368 (Fla. 1992); see also Jones v. State, 591 So.
2d 911, 913 (Fla. 1991) ("A defendant may not raise claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel on a piecemeal basis by filing successive
motions."). |