| [1] | SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES |
| [2] | No. 85-5747 |
| [3] | 1986.SCT.429 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 474
U.S. 1094, 106 S. Ct. 870, 88 L. Ed. 2d 909, 54 U.S.L.W.
3483 |
| [4] | January 21, 1986 |
| [5] | WRIGHT v. FLORIDA |
| [6] | Sup. Ct. Fla. |
| [7] | Reported below: 473 So. 2d 1277. |
| [8] | Certiorari denied. |
| [9] | JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL join,
Dissenting. |
| [10] | I would grant certiorari in this capital case to ensure that the
Florida courts have not sentenced a man to die based on a conviction
obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment. |
| [11] | On February 6, 1983, a woman was found murdered in the bedroom of her
home. She apparently had died the previous night after being raped and
stabbed. All the doors to her home were locked, but a back window was
found open. Several weeks later, Charles Westberry told his wife that
petitioner Joel Wright had come to Westberry's trailer
shortly after daylight on the morning of February 6 and had confessed to
killing the victim. Wright lived with his parents near the
victim's home. Westberry's wife notified the police, and
Wright was arrested and tried for the crime. At trial,
Westberry was the State's principal witness. He testified that
Wright had told him on the morning of February 6 that
Wright had entered the victim's house through the back
window to steal money, that the victim had discovered him as he was wiping
his fingerprints from her purse, and that he had killed her because he did
not want to return to prison. According to Westberry, Wright
counted out $290 he claimed to have taken from the victim's home, and he
asked Westberry to tell the authorities that Wright had
spent the previous night at Westberry's trailer. Another witness for the
State testified that, approximately one month before the murder, he and
Wright had stolen money from the victim's home after
entering through the window later found open on February 6. The jury also
was told that a fingerprint identified as Wright's had been
found on a portable stove in the victim's bedroom. |
| [12] | Wright took the stand and denied involvement in the
murder. He testified that he had returned home from a party at
approximately 1 a. m. on February 6, but had found himself locked out. He
claimed that he then had walked along Highway 19 to Westberry's trailer,
where he had spent the night. He also presented a witness who testified
that, late on the night of February 5 and early in the morning of February
6, he had seen a group of three men, whom he had not recognized, in the
general vicinity of the victim's home. |
| [13] | After the close of evidence but prior to final arguments, the defense
moved to reopen the case in order to introduce the testimony of a newly
discovered witness, Kathy Waters. Waters apparently had read newspaper
accounts of the trial, had listened to parts of the testimony, and had
discussed the trial with friends in attendance. She offered to testify
that, shortly after midnight on February 6, she had seen a person who
could have been Wright walking along Highway 19, and had
also observed three persons she did not recognize near the victim's home.
Waters claimed that she had not realized she possessed relevant
information until the morning her testimony was proffered, and that she
had come forward of her own volition. The trial Judge denied
Wright's motion, noting that Florida's sequestration rule
would be rendered "meaningless" if, after discussing the case with others,
a witness were permitted "to testify in support of one side or the other,
almost as if that testimony were tailor-made." 473 So. 2d 1277, 1279
(1985). Although the State acknowledged that the violation of the
sequestration rule had been inadvertent, it argued that the prosecution
"could very well be substantially prejudiced" if Waters were permitted to
testify. Id., at 1280. Wright was convicted and sentenced to
die. |
| [14] | On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the trial Judge's
rigid application of the State's sequestration rule was inconsistent with
Wright's Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses in his
behalf. The court affirmed the conviction, however, because it deemed the
error harmless: |
| [15] | "The record already contained unrefuted testimony that three
individuals were gathered near the victim's home. The defense did not
contend that the proffered witness would purport to identify as the person
she observed on the road or that her testimony, if accepted by the jury,
would require a finding by the jury that did not commit the murder. Based
upon our review of the record, including the nature of the proffered
testimony, we conclude that the excluded evidence would not have affected
the verdict and its exclusion was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 473
So. 2d, at 1280-1281. |
| [16] | The State Supreme Court thus recognized that a conviction resulting
from a trial marred by constitutional error must be reversed unless the
error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see also, e. g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S.
499 (1983). It seems to me, however, that the court failed to show the
requisite attentiveness to the possibility of prejudice. A constitutional
violation may be excused under Chapman only if the State " beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained." 386 U.S., at 24. It is not sufficient for a reviewing
court to conclude, as the Supreme Court of Florida appears to have done in
this case, that in its judgment the error did not change the verdict. The
question is whether the State has disproved any "reasonable possibility"
that the error made a difference. Ibid.; Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85,
86 (1963). |
| [17] | The State of Florida may well be able to carry that burden in this
case, but nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion or in the State's brief
before this Court convinces me that it has done so. Since Wright's
fingerprint could have been left during the alleged earlier break-in, this
case comes down to Wright's word against Westberry's.
Waters' testimony obviously would not have proved Wright
innocent, but it would have provided some corroboration for
Wright's story. Questions of witness credibility, of course,
are within the "special province" of the factfinder, Inwood Laboratories,
Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 856 (1982), and I cannot
say "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the corroboration Waters offered
could not have altered the jury's assessment of the conflicting stories.
More to the point, I do not see how the Supreme Court of Florida could
make that statement, particularly given the prosecution's claim of
potentially substantial prejudice and the trial Judge's suggestion that
Waters' testimony appeared almost "tailor-made" for the
defense. |
| [18] | The Chapman rule was meant to be more than merely a formula to incant
before affirming the results of constitutionally infirm prosecutions. For
the rule to have content, a reviewing court must not declare a
constitutional error harmless without first conducting a careful and
probing inquiry into the possibility of prejudice. Nothing less will
suffice if the court is to be convinced "beyond a reasonable doubt" that
the error had no effect on the verdict. Furthermore, at least in any case
where the harmlessness of an error is as questionable as it is here, an
appellate court should spell out its reasoning in sufficient detail to
permit this Court to verify compliance with Chapman. Our concern of course
must be not merely that Chapman is cited, but that it is followed
conscientiously. For me, that concern is not satisfied by the opinion of
the Florida Supreme Court in this case, particularly given the sentence
imposed. Consequently, I would grant certiorari, vacate the judgment, and
remand for a determination whether there is any "reasonable possibility"
that the automatic exclusion of Waters' testimony contributed to
Wright's conviction. |