i

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

PROCEDURAL HISTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

CLAIM I

THE STATE WAS ERRONEOUSLY ALLOWED TO INTRODUCE TESTIMONY

BASED SOLELY ON HEARSAY TO ESTABLISH A LINK BETWEEN MR.

TREPAL AND THE BROWN BOTTLE, AND THIS COURT ERRED IN

FAILING TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE ON DIRECT APPEAL, OR

APPELLATE COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN

FAILING TO RAISE IT PROPERLY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

A. THE TESTIMONY OF DEA AGENT BROUGHTON WAS INADMISSIBLE

HEARSAY AND VIOLATED MR. TREPAL’S CONFRONTATION RIGHTS. 5

B. THIS COURT ERRED ON DIRECT APPEAL IN FAILING TO

ADDRESS THIS CLAIM, OR APPELLATE COUNSEL PROVIDED

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN FAILING TO RAISE IT PROPERLY. 13

CLAIM II

APPELLATE COUNSEL FAILED TO RAISE ON APPEAL NUMEROUS

MERITORIOUS ISSUES WHICH WARRANT REVERSAL OF EITHER OR

BOTH THE CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES. . . . . . . . . . . 15

A. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

B. FAILURE TO RAISE ON APPEAL THE STATE’S REPEATED

PRESENTATION OF INADMISSIBLE, IRRELEVANT, INFLAMMATORY AND

UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

1. The "Voodoo" Pamphlet. . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

2. Chemicals, Chemistry Equipment And Chemistry

Books. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

3. Mr. Trepal’s "Guilty Mind." . . . . . . . . . . 23

4. Access To The Carr House. . . . . . . . . . . . 25

5. Other Irrelevant But Inflammatory Evidence. . . 27

6. Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

ii

C. FAILURE TO RAISE ON APPEAL THE IMPROPER LIMITATIONS

ON THE DEFENSE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF STATE WITNESSES. . 30

1. Limitations on the Cross-Examination of Diana

Carr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

2. Limitations on Cross-Examination Regarding the

Status of Pye and Peggy Carr’s Marriage. . . . . . . . . 35

3. Argument. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

D. FAILURE TO RAISE ON APPEAL THE IMPROPER JURY

INSTRUCTIONS ON AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES. . . . . . . . 44

E. CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

iii

Archer v. State,

613 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Atkins v. State,

452 So. 2d 529, 532 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Barclay v. Wainwright,

444 So. 2d 956, 959 (Fla. 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Berger v. California,

393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Brown v. State,

756 So. 2d 230, 231 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) . . . . . . . . . 25

Chambers v. Mississippi,

410 U.S. 394 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Coco v. State,

62 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1953) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Coco v. State,

62 So. 2d 892, 895 (Fla. 1953) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Coxwell v. State,

361 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Douglas v. Alabama,

380 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Drake v. State,

441 So. 2d 1079, 1082 (Fla. 1983) . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Espinosa v. Florida,

112 S. Ct. 2926 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Evitts v. Lucey,

469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright,

490 So. 2d 938, 940 (Fla. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Godfrey v. Georgia,

446 U.S. 420 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Hamblen v. State,

527 So. 2d 800, 805 (Fla. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Johnson v. Singletary,

iv

612 So. 2d 575, 577 (Fla. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Johnson v. Wainwright,

498 So. 2d 938, 939 (Fla. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Kampff v. State,

371 So. 2d 1007, 1009-10 (Fla. 1979) . . . . . . . . . . 46

Killian v. State,

730 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Matire v. Wainwright,

811 F. 2d 1430, 1438 (11th Cir. 1987) . . . . . . . . . 16

Maynard v. Cartwright,

486 U.S. 356 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Merritt v. State,

523 So. 2d 573, 574 (Fla. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Nichols v. State,

760 So. 2d 223, 225-26 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) . . . . . . . 25

Ohio v. Roberts,

448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 35

Orazio v. Dugger,

876 F. 2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Parker v. State,

643 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Pointer v. Texas,

380 U.S. 400, 404-05 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Pointer v. Texas,

380 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 35

Ray v. State,

31 So. 2d 156, 158 (Fla. 1947) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Richardson v. State,

604 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Richmond v. Lewis,

113 S. Ct. 528 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Rogers v. State,

511 So. 2d 526, 533 (Fla. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Santos v. State,

v

591 So. 2d 160, 163 (Fla. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

vi

Sochor v. Florida,

112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

State v. DiGuilio,

491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . 13, 30, 44

State v. McClain,

525 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Stephens v. State,

787 So. 2d 747, 759 (Fla. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 30

Stringer v. Black,

112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Trepal v. State,

621 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1993),

cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 892 (1994) . . . . . . . . . 2

Trepal v. State,

621 So. 2d 1361, 1363 n.2 (Fla. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . 1

Trepal v. State,

621 So. 2d 1361, 1364 n.7 (Fla. 1993) . . . . . . . . . 19

Trepal v. State,

704 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Trepal v. State,

754 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Turner v. Louisiana,

379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

United States v. Abel,

419 U.S. 45, 56 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Walton v. Arizona,

497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Williams v. State,

110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.),

cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 (1959) . . . . . . . . . 13

Williams v. State,

574 So. 2d 136, 138 (Fla. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Williamson v. State,

vii

681 So. 2d 688, 696 (Fla. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Wilson v. Wainwright,

474 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Wilson v. Wainwright,

474 So. 2d 1162, 1165 (Fla. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Zerquera v. State,

549 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

challenged his non-capital convictions. Trepal v. State, 621 So. 2d

1361, 1363 n.2 (Fla. 1993). This was erroneous. Mr. Trepal’s

Initial Brief specifically stated as to Issue #1, "Phraseology of the

argument in this section focuses on the conviction for First Degree

Murder, but is equally applicable to all charges for which Appellant

was convicted." Trepal v. State, No. 77,667, Initial Brief of

Appellant at 21 n.1. The conclusion to Mr. Trepal’s brief requested

the Court "to grant a Judgment of Acquittal as to all charges." Id.

at 109.

1

This petition for habeas corpus relief is being filed in order

to address substantial claims of error under the Fourth, Fifth,

Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States

Constitution, claims demonstrating that Mr. Trepal was deprived of

the effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal and that the

proceedings that resulted in his convictions, death sentence and

other sentences, as well as the affirmance of those convictions and

sentences, violated fundamental constitutional guarantees. This

petition challenges all of Mr. Trepal’s convictions and sentences,

Appeal shall be as (R. page number). All other citations shall be

self-explanatory.

A writ of habeas corpus is an original proceeding in this Court

governed by Fla. R. App. P. 9.100. This Court has original

jurisdiction under Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(3) and Article V, §

3(b)(9), Fla. Const. The Constitution of the State of Florida

guarantees that "[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall be grantable of

right, freely and without cost." Art. I, § 13, Fla. Const.

regarding public records. Trepal v. State, 704 So. 2d 498 (Fla.

1997).

2

Mr. Trepal requests oral argument on this petition.

Mr. Trepal was indicted by the grand jury in the Tenth Judicial

Circuit, Polk County, Florida, on April 5, 1990, for one count of

first-degree murder, several counts of attempted first-degree murder,

poisoning food or water, and tampering with a consumer product. Jury

trial commenced January 7, 1991. At the close of the four-week

trial, the jury found Mr. Trepal guilty of all counts. The penalty

phase took place on February 7, 1991, the day after the guilty

verdict, and the jury recommended death by a vote of nine to three.

On March 6, 1991, the Court sentenced Mr. Trepal to death. This

Court affirmed, with two justices dissenting. Trepal v. State, 621

So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 892 (1994).

Mr. Trepal filed his initial Rule 3.850 motion on June 16,

hearing was conducted on some claims in October, 1996, and an order

denying relief was entered on November 6, 1996. Following the denial

of rehearing, a timely notice of appeal was taken to this Court.

On April 15, 1997, the Office of the Inspector General of the

United States Department of Justice issued a report (OIG Report) with

findings regarding various practices at the FBI Crime Laboratory and

serious deficiencies noted in various cases in which the FBI Crime

interlocutory appeal. Trepal v. State, 754 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2000).

3

Laboratory and its scientists were involved. Part of the OIG Report

addressed Mr. Trepal's case.

On June 20, 1997, Mr. Trepal sought, and this Court granted, a

relinquishment of jurisdiction to investigate and file a second Rule

3.850 motion based on the OIG Report. Mr. Trepal thereupon filed a

second Rule 3.850 motion. The circuit court held an evidentiary

Mr. Trepal timely filed a notice of appeal, which was consolidated

with the first 3.850 appeal. Trepal v. State, No. SC89710.

The State’s position at Mr. Trepal’s trial was that Mr. Trepal

had put Thallium I Nitrate into Coke bottles which were then

introduced into the Carr house. The State contended that a brown

bottle found in Mr. Trepal’s garage, known as sample Q206, contained

Thallium I Nitrate and that Coke bottles found in the Carr house also

contained Thallium I Nitrate (R. 4193-94). This theory depended upon

the testimony of FBI chemist Roger Martz, who testified that Q206

contained Thallium I Nitrate (R. 3561-63), and that the Coke bottles

contained thallium nitrate, but that there was no way to determine

whether the thallium was in the form of Thallium I Nitrate or

both the Coke bottles and the brown bottle was perjured, inaccurate,

and misleading, as is explained in the pending appeal of Mr. Trepal’s

Rule 3.850 proceedings. Indeed, the postconviction judge, after an

exhaustive evidentiary hearing, found that "Martz's conduct at trial

was outrageous and shocking" (2PCR. 2682), and that while "there is a

possibility that the substance is in fact thallium I nitrate, the

court declines to so find" (Id. at 2680). Moreover, at the hearing,

Martz himself acknowledged telling the OIG investigators that, as to

sample Q206, his results were "debatable" (Id. at 3013). Dr.

Frederic Whitehurst, whose testimony and opinions were found "highly

credible" by the postconviction judge (2PCR. 2678), opined at the

evidentiary hearing that he could not, to a reasonable degree of

scientific certainty, conclude that thallium I nitrate was in Q206

(Id. at 3431).

was "that of the chemical forms of thallium that exist, only one form

can be introduced into Coca-Cola without producing noticeable changes

in the drink." Trepal, 621 So. 2d at 1364. However, Reese clearly

testified that when he put Thallium Sulfate and Thallium Maleanate in

Coke, "The product looked the same" (R. 3405). Moreover, as proven

at the postconviction hearing, records of the testing performed by

the Coca-Cola company also revealed that other substances aside from

thallium nitrate caused no visible changes in Coke.

4

the form of thallium in the Cokes, the State’s theory also depended

on the testimony of a Coca-Cola chemist, Frederick Reese, who

conducted tests to determine if various forms of thallium would

dissolve in Coke without changing its appearance (R. 3402). Reese

determined that Thallium Sulfate, Thallium Maleanate and Thallium I

Nitrate went into solution in Coke without changing its appearance,

but that Thallium III Nitrate turned Coke a muddy color (R. 3405-

To link Mr. Trepal to Thallium 1 Nitrate, the State presented

evidence regarding Mr. Trepal’s prior involvement in a

methamphetamine lab. The only reason this evidence was admissible

was the State’s contention that it demonstrated that Mr. Trepal knew

1970s he was involved in a methamphetamine lab with Mr. Trepal, that

Mr. Trepal was the chemist for the group, that Warren obtained

chemicals for the group, and that Warren provided only P-2-P in its

final form to Mr. Trepal (R. 3487-88). Warren never testified that

he provided Thallium III Nitrate to Mr. Trepal. The State agreed

that without Broughton’s testimony regarding the chemical process of

manufacturing methamphetamine, Warren’s testimony was not relevant

and was therefore inadmissible (R. 3440-42).

5

how to manufacture Thallium 1 Nitrate. The State’s position appeared

to be that Mr. Trepal either manufactured the Thallium 1 Nitrate

found in Q206 or had that material left over from his prior

involvement in the methamphetamine lab (R. 4207). However, the only

evidence the State had to show that the manufacture of

methamphetamine produces Thallium 1 Nitrate was the hearsay testimony

of a DEA agent who had no qualifications as a chemist and who

described methamphetamine production from a description provided in a

DEA pamphlet.

At trial, the State proposed to call Richard Broughton, an

agent of the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), to testify to

his investigation of a clandestine drug laboratory with which Mr.

Trepal was involved in the 1970s and the process for manufacturing

methamphetamine (R. 3434-74). The State argued the evidence was

relevant to show Mr. Trepal’s "knowledge and opportunity" because

Broughton would testify that the use of Thallium III Nitrate to

produce phenyl-II-propanone (P-2-P), which is then used to

manufacture methamphetamine, results in a precipitate of Thallium I

6

The defense objected to Broughton's testimony, arguing that he

was not a chemist (R. 3441, 3471), and that he obtained his

"knowledge" of the chemistry involved in methamphetamine production

only after Detective Ernest Mincey asked him about it:

[Broughton is] a DEA agent. He went looking to his

computer to find out whether it could be done or not. So

it comes from hearsay. Detective Mincey called him and

said, "I need to know how you make methamphetamine to find

out whether or not Thallium is used."

Then Broughton hung up the phone, two hours later he

called up and said that he had looked on his computer and

found out that it could be used but it’s an extremely rare

process.

(R. 3441). The state argued that the information upon which

Broughton’s testimony would rely was contained in a DEA publication

and was not hearsay because it was a regularly kept business record

(R. 3442). The defense argued that the chemical processes for

producing methamphetamine were not within the knowledge of the

average person and thus required an expert witness (R. 3443-44). The

court opined that the DEA publication "looks like a recipe for making

methamphetamine" and likened it to baking a cake: "if I give you a

recipe for baking a cake and you know all about baking cakes you can

read the thing and say, yeah, that’s right, or that’s wrong. You

don’t need to be a chemist" (R. 3443). The State conceded that

Broughton did not have a degree in chemistry, but argued that since

Broughton was a DEA agent and the publication was produced by the

DEA, "[i]t doesn’t have to be expert testimony if he can say here’s a

publication that I get from DEA" (R. 3444).

After a recess, the court ruled that the DEA publication was

7

hearsay (R. 3450), and said, "I could see this sort of testimony

coming in as expert testimony" (R. 3451). When the court asked

whether Broughton knew how to make P-2-P, the state again conceded,

"That I don’t know. He’s not a chemist" (R. 3451). The state

continued to argue that the DEA pamphlet was a business record and

therefore trustworthy (R. 3451-54, 3454-55). The defense argued, "We

cannot cross-examine this witness [Broughton] about it because he

doesn’t know anything about it. . . . This witness is not qualified

to testify" (R. 3454). The court ultimately sustained the defense

objection to the DEA pamphlet (R. 3456).

The State then proffered Broughton’s testimony (R. 3459-69).

Broughton testified he had been a DEA agent for twenty years and had

a bachelor’s degree in geography (R. 3459, 3460). He had attended a

seminar on the manufacture of illicit drugs, including

methamphetamine, and from 1972 to 1976, investigated illicit drug

labs, some of which produced methamphetamine (R. 3461). The DEA

provided agents a handbook listing the chemicals used to manufacture

various illicit drugs (R. 3462). Broughton had used that handbook in

his work and found it to be accurate (R. 3463). He then testified

that Thallium III Nitrate is used in the production of phenyl-IIpropanone

(P-2-P), which is used in the manufacture of

methamphetamine (R. 3463). During this process, the Thallium III

Nitrate becomes Thallium I Nitrate and settles out of the solution

(R. 3464). Broughton testified that State Exhibit 270 was a page

from the DEA handbook describing in laymen’s terms the process by

which P-2-P is manufactured from Thallium III Nitrate (R. 3465).

8

On cross-examination on the proffer, the defense asked

Broughton what chemical reactions take place when thallium is used to

make P-2-P, and Broughton responded, "I am not a chemist by training

. . . [and] have a layman’s knowledge of the chemicals" (R. 3466).

He compared his knowledge of the use of thallium in making P-2-P to

the use of baking soda in baking a cake: "I have no idea what baking

soda does in a cake but I know how to bake a cake" (R. 3466). When

Polk County officers told Broughton about the thallium poisoning

case, "I then took the term thallium and proceeded to the DEA agent’s

handbook and was able to immediately find the formula that I brought

here" (R. 3468). He learned that thallium was used in the production

of methamphetamine from his handbook and from a DEA computer database

(R. 3468). On redirect, the State asked Broughton if he had ever

been qualified in a Florida court as an expert "regarding

investigation and operation of clandestine drug labs" (R. 3469).

Broughton testified he had been so qualified once in 1974 in

Highlands County (R. 3469).

After the proffer, the defense argued:

As to hearsay, Your Honor, he’s not an expert as to

thallium being used in the manufacture of P-2-P. He has

to refer to the hearsay. He has to testify about the

hearsay, and he’s not an expert at that. Clearly he’s

not. He’s not a chemist. He can’t be cross-examined

about it. He said he doesn’t know about it.

(R. 3469-70). The State argued that Broughton was a DEA agent who

had been qualified as an expert in the investigation of drug labs and

"he knows these things and he refers to resource material as doctors

do and lawyers do and chemists do and everyone else does" (R. 3470).

9

The State argued, "forget the document. Mr. Broughton’s knowledge is

a different subject area" (R. 3470). The defense pointed out that

Broughton got his knowledge solely from the DEA publications (R.

3470). The State argued that it was immaterial that Broughton was

unable to state the scientific reactions occurring in the synthesis

of these illegal substances (R. 3471). The defense again argued, "He

can’t testify how it’s used without testifying to hearsay" (R. 3471).

The court ruled that the document was hearsay, but that the

testimony of Broughton and Warren was admissible (R. 3472). The

defense continued to object, pointing out that Broughton "did not say

one time that he has ever seen thallium in a lab" and "never

testified that he has ever seen thallium in an illicit

methamphetamine lab" (R. 3473-74).

Broughton testified before the jury that Thallium III Nitrate

is used in the production of P-2-P, which is used to manufacture

methamphetamine, and that this process produces a sediment of

Thallium I Nitrate (R. 3480-81). On cross-examination, Broughton

admitted he was not a chemist, did not know what chemical reaction

thallium causes in the course of making P-2-P, had never performed

this process, and had never seen it performed (R. 3483, 3485).

During Broughton’s testimony, the defense reiterated its

hearsay objections (R. 3478, 3480, 3481). Later, the defense moved

for a mistrial based upon Broughton’s testimony, and that motion was

denied (R. 3497-98).

Broughton’s testimony regarding the chemistry of

methamphetamine production was wholly inadmissible hearsay. A

the DEA publication was admissible under the business records

exception to the hearsay rule. That exception provides that such

records are admissible if they record "acts, events, conditions,

opinion or diagnosis." § 90.803, Fla. Stat. The DEA publication did

not contain any such matters.

10

witness must have personal knowledge of the matters about which he or

she testifies. § 90.604, Fla. Stat. Broughton did not have any

personal knowledge regarding the chemistry of methamphetamine

production, but simply recited what he had read in a DEA publication.

then inexplicably allowed Broughton to testify to its contents.

The only exception to the personal knowledge requirement is for

expert witnesses. §90.604, Fla. Stat. However, the State never

offered Broughton as an expert in any field, much less as an expert

in chemistry.

Hearsay evidence is inadmissible. §90.802, Fla. Stat. Hearsay

is a statement "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted." § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Broughton’s testimony

regarding the chemistry of methamphetamine production was clearly

offered "to prove the truth of the matter asserted." The State’s

purpose in presenting the evidence was to show that Mr. Trepal had

to make Thallium I Nitrate and/or possessed Thallium I Nitrate from

his involvement in the methamphetamine lab, and that is what the

State relied on this evidence to show (R. 4207-08).

Admission of hearsay prevents cross-examination. See Ray v.

State, 31 So. 2d 156, 158 (Fla. 1947) (introduction of a document

postconviction court in Mr. Trepal's Rule 3.850 proceedings

explicitly refused to find as a matter of fact that the Coke bottles

even contained thallium nitrate due to Martz's incompetence and/or

perjured testimony at trial (2PCR. 2680).

11

improper because "its recitals are pure hearsay and do not afford

cross-examination essential to a proper focus of the truth"). Such

impairments of cross-examination violate the Confrontation Clause of

the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Ohio v.

Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-

07 (1965) ("A major reason underlying the constitutional

confrontation rule is to give a defendant charged with crime an

opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him."). The Sixth

Amendment contemplates that "the `evidence developed' against a

defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom

where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's right of

confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel." Turner v.

Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965).

Absent the hearsay testimony of Broughton, there would have

been no evidence, either direct or circumstantial, from which the

jury or court could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the

Thallium I Nitrate found in Q206 was either an ingredient in or a

byproduct of the manufacturing process for methamphetamine; thus, the

link between Q206 and the Coke bottles would have been completely

put Thallium I Nitrate in the Coke bottles:

We put in evidence that he was a chemist at a

methamphetamine lab for two reasons. . . .

(Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 (1959).

12

Now, it just so happened that there’s a process by

which thallium could be used in that, and that the

byproduct of that process is Thallium I Nitrate which is

muddy, and it just so happens that he has Thallium I

Nitrate which was off-colored in his garage. Maybe that’s

where the Thallium I Nitrate came from and maybe it is

not.

(R. 4207). Broughton’s testimony was necessary to link Mr. Trepal to

the Thallium I Nitrate in Q206 and the Thallium I Nitrate in the Coke

bottles. Moreover, without Broughton’s hearsay testimony linking

Thallium I Nitrate to methamphetamine production, the prejudicial and

inflammatory testimony of Broughton and Warren would have been

excluded as not relevant to the charges against Mr. Trepal. The

State even conceded that without Broughton's testimony, Warren's

testimony would be inadmissible (R. 3440-42). Admission of this

hearsay testimony, which violated the Confrontation Clause, was not

harmless error. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986).

As Issue #3 of Mr. Trepal’s direct appeal initial brief,

appellate counsel argued that seven categories of evidence introduced

77,667, Initial Brief of Appellant at 66-67). One of these matters

was the testimony of Broughton and Warren regarding Mr. Trepal’s

involvement in the methamphetamine lab (Id. at 66, 70-75). Buried

within this Williams rule argument was an argument that Broughton’s

13

testimony regarding the chemistry of methamphetamine production was

hearsay (Id. at 70-75). Appellate counsel cited to the portions of

the record where the hearsay objections were made and discussed (id.

at 70-72), and argued that Broughton’s testimony was inadmissible

hearsay which violated Mr. Trepal’s confrontation rights (Id. at 73-

75). This Court’s opinion, however, did not address this

hearsay/confrontation argument, addressing only the broad Williams

rule issue of Mr. Trepal’s involvement in the methamphetamine lab.

The Court’s entire discussion of Issue #3 of Mr. Trepal’s direct

appeal was as follows:

Trepal alleges that evidence was admitted in violation of

the Williams rule. We find no Williams rule violation.

While testimony was admitted that during the 1970s Trepal

was involved in an amphetamine laboratory, the fact that

Trepal was convicted of a crime in connection with this

activity was not introduced. A witness described Trepal

as the chemist and "mastermind" of the lab. The testimony

was admitted to show Trepal’s knowledge of chemistry and

poisons--to show that Trepal had the requisite knowledge

to commit the instant crimes. The evidence introduced was

relevant and properly admitted.

Trepal, 621 So. 2d at 1365-66 (footnotes omitted).

This Court should now correct this omission. This Court has

habeas corpus jurisdiction to correct failings in its review process.

Article V, §§ 3(b)(1), (7) & (9), Florida Constitution; Parker v.

State, 643 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. 1994). The error in admitting

Broughton’s hearsay testimony regarding the chemistry of

methamphetamine production is plain. The testimony was clearly

hearsay, clearly inadmissible, clearly violative of Mr. Trepal’s

confrontation rights, and clearly not harmless error. The evidence

was a crucial link in the State’s flimsy circumstantial case, but it

14

plainly does not qualify as "evidence" at all.

To the extent the Court believes this issue was not presented

on direct appeal, appellate counsel’s performance was prejudicially

deficient. Appellate counsel has the responsibility of presenting

arguments in an organized, comprehensible fashion, rather than

burying a significant error within another issue, as happened here.

Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 So. 2d 1162, 1165 (Fla. 1985). Appellate

counsel clearly recognized the significant error in allowing

Broughton to testify to hearsay because counsel made some attempt to

present the issue. Thus, there can be no strategic reason for the

deficiencies in counsel’s presentation. Mr. Trepal was prejudiced by

these deficiencies: the issue is clearly meritorious, and counsel’s

inadequate presentation therefore undermines confidence in the

outcome of the direct appeal. Wilson, 474 So. 2d at 1165.

Finally, this Court should now address this issue in light of

the findings of the postconviction court regarding Martz's

conclusions as to the Q206 bottle and the Coca-Cola bottles. Since

this reversible error entitles Mr. Trepal to a new trial, the Court

should order a new trial rather than a new direct appeal. Johnson v.

Wainwright, 498 So. 2d 938, 939 (Fla. 1986). Alternatively, the

Court should order a new direct appeal.

15

Mr. Trepal had the constitutional right to the effective

assistance of counsel for purposes of presenting his direct appeal to

this Court. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Evitts v.

Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). The Strickland test applies equally

to ineffectiveness allegations of trial counsel and appellate

counsel. See Orazio v. Dugger, 876 F. 2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1989).

Because the constitutional violations which occurred during Mr.

Trepal’s trial were "obvious on the record" and "leaped out upon even

a casual reading of transcript," it cannot be said that the

"adversarial testing process worked in [Mr. Trepal's] direct appeal."

Matire v. Wainwright, 811 F. 2d 1430, 1438 (11th Cir. 1987). The

lack of appellate advocacy on Mr. Trepal's behalf is identical to the

lack of advocacy present in other cases in which this Court has

granted habeas corpus relief. Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 So. 2d 1162

(Fla. 1985). Appellate counsel's failure to present the meritorious

issues discussed in this petition demonstrates that his

representation of Mr. Trepal involved "serious and substantial

deficiencies." Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 938, 940 (Fla.

1986). Individually and "cumulatively," Barclay v. Wainwright, 444

So. 2d 956, 959 (Fla. 1984), the claims omitted by appellate counsel

establish that "confidence in the correctness and fairness of the

result has been undermined." Wilson, 474 So.2d at 1165 (emphasis in

original). There is more than a reasonable probability that the

outcome of the appeal would have been different had these issues been

raised, and a new direct appeal must be ordered.

and perjurious scientific testimony as to the key pieces of physical

evidence in this case.

16

"In order for evidence to be relevant it must have some logical

tendency to prove or disprove a fact which is of consequence to the

outcome of the case." Stephens v. State, 787 So. 2d 747, 759 (Fla.

The vast majority of the evidence the State presented at Mr. Trepal’s

trial was absolutely irrelevant to the issue of whether Mr. Trepal

was guilty of first-degree murder and the other charges. Further,

the probative value of much of the State’s evidence was substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues,

misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

§90.403, Fla. Stat. Much of the evidence was also inadmissible as a

prohibited attempt to show that Mr. Trepal acted in conformity with

his character. See Killian v. State, 730 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 2d DCA

1999). Despite the defense’s repeated objections to this evidence,

appellate counsel failed to raise this meritorious argument on

appeal.

The cumulative effect of all of this erroneously admitted

evidence is clear: it resulted in Mr. Trepal’s convictions and

sentences. The State had no real evidence against Mr. Trepal, so it

presented 80 witnesses, 10 of whom testified more than once and few

17

of whom had anything to say which implicated Mr. Trepal.

There is no dispute that the case against Mr. Trepal was

entirely circumstantial. As the State repeatedly said in closing

argument, the case against Mr. Trepal came down to "coincidences":

"What we have here in looking at Mr. Trepal as the person who did

this crime is that if he did not commit this crime, if he did not,

there are a list of coincidences which have to be true despite his

innocence in order for you to have a reasonable doubt"; "if you can

convince yourself that all these coincidences . . . can exist and him

not have done it then you have a reasonable doubt" (R. 4190, 4219;

see also R. 4191, 4192, 4193, 4194, 4195, 4198, 4199, 4206, 4208,

4209, 4211, 4212, 4215, 4216, 4218, 4220, 4227, 4228, 4229, 4232).

According to its closing argument, the State’s case depended upon

putting Mr. Trepal into "the class of people who could have committed

this crime" (R. 4187; see also R. 4199, 4200, 4220, 4221, 4222, 4227,

4230, 4232). Therefore, the State argued, the jury should not be

concerned with missing evidence such as the lack of fingerprints on

the Coke bottles, the lack of fingerprints on the threatening note,

the missing bottle capper, the absence of proof that the thallium in

the brown bottle was the thallium that was put in the Coke bottles,

the failure to find the typewriter which wrote the threatening note,

the lack of evidence that Mr. Trepal placed the Cokes in the Carr

house, or the lack of evidence regarding when Mr. Trepal is supposed

to have placed the Cokes in the Carr house (R. 4186-87, 4198, 4208,

4210, 4218-19, 4223). To shore up this case based on "coincidence"

and the "class of people who could have done this," the State

weeks to move out of Florida forever or else you will all die. This

is no joke" (R. 1595).

intelligence quotients in the top two percent of the general

population." Trepal v. State, 621 So. 2d 1361, 1364 n.7 (Fla. 1993).

as sold to the media the rights to the story. This issue is

discussed in more detail in Mr. Trepal's Rule 3.850 appeal brief.

18

repeatedly presented inadmissible, irrelevant, inflammatory and

unfairly prejudicial evidence.

Trepal to the threatening note the Carr family received in June

1594). The police found no fingerprints on the note and could not

locate the typewriter on which the note was typed. To connect the

note to Mr. Trepal, the State introduced evidence regarding Mr.

Trepal’s membership in Mensa and his participation in Mensa "murder

"Sherry Guin," befriended Mr. Trepal during a Mensa murder mystery

weekend in April 1989, six months after the October 1988 poisoning

event, she was given a packet of information which included a

pamphlet on "voodoo" (R. 3216-17). Four fictional murders were

portrayed during the weekend, and each murder "victim" received a

threatening note (R. 3223). Mr. Trepal told Goreck he prepared the

"voodoo" pamphlet, which was admitted over defense objection (R.

3224-25). Again over defense objection, Goreck was permitted to read

a passage from the "voodoo" pamphlet which she found significant:

19

"Few voodooists believe they can be killed by psychic means, but no

one doubts that he can be poisoned. When a death threat appears on

the doorstep, prudent people throw out all their food and watch what

they eat. Hardly anyone dies from magic. Most items on the doorstep

are just a neighbor’s way of saying, ‘I don’t like you. Move or

else’" (R. 3226). Goreck was allowed to testify over defense

objection that this passage was significant to her "because I had

read the threatening note that the Carr family had received prior to

the poisoning" (R. 3226). Mr. Trepal told Goreck that his wife,

although this was their fourth murder weekend, they had not written

all of them (R. 3264-65). Goreck never established the date on which

Mr. Trepal had written the "voodoo" pamphlet.

In closing argument, the State relied upon Goreck’s testimony

regarding the murder mystery weekend and the "voodoo" pamphlet to

establish Mr. Trepal’s guilt (R. 4216-18). The State argued that on

the weekend Goreck attended, the "victims" were sent threatening

notes (R. 4216). The State argued that Mr. Trepal sent the

threatening note to the Carrs because the note used the same language

as the "voodoo" pamphlet (R. 4218).

This evidence was irrelevant to the charges against Mr. Trepal,

largely because the murder mystery weekend which Goreck attended

post-dated the Carr poisoning by six months and because the State

never established that any of the materials used at that weekend,

and sentenced to death, one of the jurors confessed that "that odd

club of his called Mensa -- scared her from the very beginning. [The

juror] said she believes Mensa has 'voodoo ceremonies' during

1991, at 17.

moved to Sebring.

20

including the "voodoo" pamphlet and the notes sent to the "victims,"

existed at the time of the Carr poisoning. Despite its irrelevance,

this evidence was clearly inflammatory and unfairly prejudicial not

only because the Carrs received a threatening note, but also because

it injected notions of "voodoo" into the case, notions which could

only have been frightening to the jurors and served to "demonize" Mr.

State introduced numerous bottles of chemicals, chemistry equipment,

and chemistry books found in Mr. Trepal’s Sebring home in April 1990

presentation, the defense objected that this evidence was irrelevant,

misleading, inflammatory, and cumulative (R. 3785, 3793, 3794, 3796,

3797, 3821, 3822, 3823, 3825-33, 3838-46, 3847). The defense argued

that the State was introducing these items "to try and show that my

client is a bad person because he keeps poison in his house"; that

any probative value of this evidence was outweighed by its

prejudicial effect; that introducing chemicals "that don’t have

anything to do with thallium is simply not relevant"; that the

evidence simply went to Mr. Trepal’s character; that the State could

not prove Mr. Trepal ever possessed thallium, "[s]o what he’s trying

death, the trial court found there was no evidence that Mr. Trepal

actually read the journal which told what would happen to victims of

thallium poisoning (R. 5551). In light of this factfinding, this

Court erred on direct appeal in relying upon Mr. Trepal knowing the

contents of this journal. See Trepal, 621 So. 2d at 1364.

21

to do is to inflame the jury by selecting just a few chemicals out of

many and showing them and saying look what a dangerous man this is"

(R. 3828, 3829, 3832). The State also introduced extensive testimony

regarding the kinds of chemicals found in Mr. Trepal’s home and their

toxicity, all over defense objection (R. 3876-87).

The State relied heavily upon this evidence in closing

argument, using it, as the defense had argued, as evidence of Mr.

Trepal’s character. The State argued that Mr. Trepal was "very

likely the most dangerous, diabolical man you will ever come face-toface

with in your entire life. Very dangerous. That’s what the

evidence showed" (R. 4177). The State argued that when Mr. Trepal

put thallium in the Cokes, "He knew what was going to happen. . . .

So exactly what was in the book happened. . . . Poison Detection in

Sebring home, the State argued, showed Mr. Trepal "ain’t a guy

playing with a high school chemistry set," but a man with "a high

degree of chemistry knowledge" (R. 4206-07). Mr. Trepal was guilty,

the State argued, because he belonged to "a class of people who keep

deadly poisons in their garages and in their house" (R. 4221).

None of the chemicals introduced or testified about was

thallium. No evidence was presented that any of the chemicals

introduced or testified about was in Mr. Trepal’s Alturas home in

22

October 1988. The State used the evidence to argue Mr. Trepal

belonged to the "class of people that could have done this" precisely

because this evidence did not connect Mr. Trepal to thallium and

because the evidence was not connected to October 1988. This

evidence was not relevant, but was clearly highly inflammatory and

unfairly prejudicial.

and highly prejudicial evidence upon which the State relied was

testimony regarding Mr. Trepal’s character and odd behavior. Over

defense objection, the State was allowed to present evidence that Mr.

Trepal did not talk about the poisoning of his neighbors. Gordon

Rowan, who rented office space to Mr. Trepal, was asked by the State

if Mr. Trepal ever discussed the poisoning of his neighbors (R.

3283). The defense objection to this question was sustained (R.

3283). When the State asked Rowan if Mr. Trepal was a person who

kept up with things going on around him, the defense objected that

the question referred to Mr. Trepal’s character (R. 3283). The court

overruled the objection, and Rowan answered "yes" (R. 3284). The

State then asked if Mr. Trepal ever mentioned that his neighbors had

been poisoned (R. 3284). The defense objection to relevance was

overruled, and Rowan answered, "I don’t really recall. I think there

was one occasion when I brought up the subject. . . . I believe

that’s the only time we ever spoke about it" (R. 3284). Again over

defense objection, the State was permitted to elicit from Patricia

Boatwright, who used to work for Mr. Trepal’s wife, that when she

asked Mr. Trepal about the poisonings, "For the first time that I

23

remember George didn’t meet my eyes, and the subject was then

dropped" (R. 3700-01). Boatwright was also permitted to testify over

defense objection that whenever the subject of the poisonings came up

in Mr. Trepal’s presence, "It always just fell like a thud and the

subject was changed" and Mr. Trepal’s demeanor had "a strained

quality. I can’t give you an actual tangible thing, but it seems

that for some time later our face-to-face conversations were not as

comfortable as they had been" (R. 3701).

Along the same lines, the court admitted a videotape of an

encounter Detective Goreck had with Mr. Trepal while she was "Sherry

Guin." In December 1989, some 14 months after the poisonings, Goreck

pretended to rent Mr. Trepal’s Alturas house (R. 3231-32, 3246). In

January 1990, after "renting" the house, Goreck arranged to meet Mr.

Trepal and videotaped their encounter (R. 3733-34). The defense

relevance objection to admission of the videotape was overruled (R.

3710, 3735). On the videotape, Goreck told Mr. Trepal that she had

just heard about the poisonings and that police had her asked about

Mr. Trepal (R. 3739). Mr. Trepal said an FBI agent had told him the

neighbor was poisoned by something put in Coke bottles, that if the

police were interested in him it was because of the poisoning, that

he might be a suspect just because he lived in the area, that he

hoped he was not the prime suspect, that Goreck had nothing to worry

about because he was probably the prime suspect, and that it was

probably his turn to be a suspect because the police had suspected

everyone else (R. 3739-57). After the videotape ended, Goreck was

allowed to testify, over defense objection, that Mr. Trepal’s

Coca-Cola to the family. Early on, Peggy Carr's daughter, Gelena

24

behavior during this conversation was different than usual (R. 3759-

60).

The State argued that the testimony regarding Mr. Trepal’s

behavior was evidence that he had a "guilty mind" (R. 4197-98, 4226-

27). This evidence was irrelevant and highly prejudicial to Mr.

Trepal. Evidence of a "consciousness of guilt" may be admissible,

but only if the evidence clearly indicates a consciousness of guilt.

See, e.g., Nichols v. State, 760 So. 2d 223, 225-26 (Fla. 5th DCA

2000); Brown v. State, 756 So. 2d 230, 231 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). For

example, in cases where evidence of flight is relied on to show

consciousness of guilt, this Court has noted that "flight alone is no

more consistent with guilt than innocence." Merritt v. State, 523

So. 2d 573, 574 (Fla. 1988). The testimony about Mr. Trepal’s

behavior which the State was allowed to introduce is "no more

consistent with guilt than innocence." An innocent neighbor of

poisoning victims could well find the subject difficult and wish to

avoid it. An innocent person who is told police are inquiring about

him could well wonder if the police believe he is a suspect. This

irrelevant and inflammatory evidence regarding Mr. Trepal’s behavior

should not have been admitted.

testified that he bought an eight-pack of 16-ounce bottles of Coca-

Cola a couple of days before he became ill and that he and other

"Cissy" Shiver, was convinced that both Pye Carr and his sister,

Carolyn Dixon, had poisoned her mother. During the days when Peggy

was at home sick, Dixon continued to bring food and drink into the

house that was shared by everyone except Cissy and Tammy Carr. It

bothered Cissy that as Peggy's health continued to decline, Dixon

administered medicines to Peggy that were not prescribed by a doctor.

Dixon was also steadily plying Peggy with the Coca-Cola, on the

pretext that it would provide some type of "nourishment" (R. 1800).

While Dixon was freely passing out Coca-Cola to the family members,

she herself did not drink any Coke (R. 6121). Dixon was one of the

suspect that was not adequately investigated at the time of trial;

this issue is addressed in more detail in Mr. Trepal's Rule 3.850

appeal.

25

needed to try to prove a connection between Mr. Trepal and the

bottles of Coke and a method by which Mr. Trepal could have

introduced the Cokes into the Carr house. The only evidence the

State managed to muster on these points was misleading and lacking in

any probative value. Over defense objection, the State was permitted

to introduce photographs of and testimony about a screen door of the

Carr house (R. 3350-51). The defense argued the photographs were

irrelevant and inflammatory because they showed some scraping next to

the door, which implied the door was jimmied open, although there was

no evidence anyone illegally went through the door (R. 3351). The

State argued that Detective Mincey and Pye Carr would testify the

door was easy to jimmy, so the court overruled the objection (R.

3351). Mincey later testified over defense objection about the

photographs of the door and about being able to open the locked door

with a credit card (R. 3782-83). To connect Mr. Trepal to the Coke

bottles, the State also presented evidence that Mr. Trepal preferred

Coca Cola over other soft drinks (R. 3242-43). This was not

probative of any issue, but since the crime involving poison in Coca

26

Cola, the evidence was highly prejudicial.

Although this evidence was irrelevant, misleading and lacked

probative value, the State later relied upon it in closing argument.

The State argued that it did not have to prove how Mr. Trepal got

into the house, but suggested he may have gotten in the house because

the door was easily jimmied (R. 4218-19). The State also asked the

jury whether it was "just coincidence" that Mr. Trepal preferred Coca

Cola, even though admitting, "Does that prove that he did it? Not by

itself" (R. 4205).

no direct evidence that Mr. Trepal tampered with the Coke bottles.

However, over defense objection, the State was permitted to introduce

testimony that in 1982--six years before the Carr poisoning--a man

helping Mr. Trepal move had seen an "antique" bottle capper among Mr.

Trepal’s belongings (R. 3628, 3631). In closing, the State then

wondered if it was coincidental that Mr. Trepal once had a bottle

capper and asked why he did not have it when the police searched his

home (R. 4198). In addition to the fact that this evidence was far

remote in time from the poisoning, there was no evidence that the

antique bottle capper was of the type which could cap modern Coke

bottles. Of course, since the case involved removing and replacing

bottle caps, the evidence was highly inflammatory.

Over a defense relevance objection, the State was permitted to

introduce a package of gloves found in Mr. Trepal’s garage in April

1990 (R. 3730-32). In closing argument, the State pointed to these

gloves as another coincidence proving Mr. Trepal’s guilt (R. 4199).

27

There was no showing that the gloves were used for anything connected

to the poisoning, or even that the gloves were in the garage in

October 1988. Again, the evidence was irrelevant, and in the context

of this case was also inflammatory.

In another attempt to connect Mr. Trepal to the threatening

note, the State introduced a roll of stamps found in Mr. Trepal’s

house in April 1990. Detective Mincey searched Mr. Trepal’s Sebring

home in April 1990, after Mr. Trepal’s arrest (R. 3775). One item

found in that search was a roll of postage stamps (R. 3853). The

defense objected to the relevance of the stamps (R. 3853). The State

argued the roll of stamps was relevant because the stamp on the

threatening note was taken from a roll (R. 3854). The defense

pointed out that the State could not show the stamp on the note was

from the roll being introduced (R. 3854). The court overruled the

defense objection (R. 3855). The State introduced the roll of stamps

(R. 3855-56), and later presented testimony that the stamp on the

note came from a roll (R. 3992-93). Besides not connecting the roll

of stamps to the stamp on the note, the evidence never established

that Mr. Trepal had a roll of stamps in 1988. In closing, the State

argued that the roll of stamps was another unusual coincidence that

showed Mr. Trepal’s guilt (R. 4222). This evidence was irrelevant

and in the context of this case was also inflammatory.

found in Mr. Trepal’s Sebring home (R. 3578). The State wanted

Detective Goreck to testify about the story line of the novel, but

the court ruled that the only way the State would be permitted to

28

introduce the story line would be to introduce the book itself (R.

3719-22). The State elected not to introduce the book, so the story

line was never introduced. Thus, the only evidence introduced

read it (R. 3578). This evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial. It

is quite possible some member of the jury knew the story line and

used that as evidence against Mr. Trepal even though it was never

a material issue other than propensity or bad character." Drake v.

State, 441 So. 2d 1079, 1082 (Fla. 1983). Even relevant evidence

should be excluded when the danger of unfair prejudice from the

evidence substantially outweighs its probative value. § 90.403, Fla.

Stat. (1995); State v. McClain, 525 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1988).

Application of this rule requires the court to conduct a balancing

test, weighing the prejudicial impact of the evidence against its

probative value. Williamson v. State, 681 So. 2d 688, 696 (Fla.

1996). Here, the trial court did not conduct the appropriate

balancing test, erroneously admitting evidence which went to Mr.

Trepal’s character, post-dated the October 1988 poisoning and was

never connected to that time frame or to Mr. Trepal, and which was

highly inflammatory in the context of this case. These errors were

29

not harmless, as the State repeatedly relied upon this evidence to

argue Mr. Trepal’s guilt. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.

1986).

Appellate counsel’s failure to raise this issue on appeal was

prejudicially deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984). Alone and in conjunction with the other errors

presented in this petition, a new trial and/or a resentencing are

warranted.

Repeatedly throughout Mr. Trepal’s trial, the court sustained

State objections to questions the defense attempted to ask on crossexamination

of State witnesses. Although these limitations on crossexamination

were clear on the record, appellate counsel did not raise

this issue on direct appeal. Appellate counsel’s performance was

prejudicially deficient.

State called Mr. Trepal's wife, Diana Carr, as a witness to testify

about a conversation she had had with Peggy Carr regarding the Carr

children playing loud music in the yard shortly before members of the

Carr family became ill (R. 3576-78). Diana testified she believed

Mr. Trepal was home at the time of this conversation (R. 3578).

Diana also testified that she had never had a container of thallium,

that she had read the book "The Pale Horse," that she owned that book

when Mr. Trepal was arrested, and that she owned several thousand

books (R. 3578-79).

30

On cross-examination, the defense questioned Diana regarding

her educational background and the fact that while she and Mr. Trepal

had "several thousand" murder mystery books in their house, Mr.

Trepal read mostly science fiction (R. 3579). Diana testified that

murder mysteries were "only indirectly" the inspiration for the Mensa

murder mystery weekends (R. 3579-80). When the defense asked whether

she wrote the plots for the murder mystery weekends, the prosecution

objected that the question was beyond the scope of direct, and the

court sustained the objection (R. 3580). When the defense asked

Diana whether Mr. Trepal drank bottled water or regular water, the

prosecution's objection was sustained (Id.). When the defense asked

whether Mr. Trepal had any speech impediments, the prosecution's

objection was sustained (R. 3580-81).

After a brief redirect examination by the prosecution, the

State excused Diana. The defense then asked to proffer the answers

to the cross-examination questions to which the State’s objections

had been sustained.

The defense asked one question on the proffer, eliciting that

Diana was the one who wrote the plots for the murder mystery weekends

(R. 3585). Following her answer, Richard McKinley, Diana Carr’s

attorney, pointed out that "Dr. Carr is still testifying based on the

subpoena that compelled her attendance here today. And the testimony

that's given pursuant to this proffer, we would invoke the same

immunity as any testimony that's been elicited prior" (R. 3583). The

prosecutor disagreed, arguing that if Diana were to answer any

questions not asked by the State, then the immunity would disappear:

31

MR. AGUERO: No, sir. I'm not asking the

questions. She answered all of the State's

questions. The State is the only agency that

can confer immunity. And if [defense counsel]

asks her any questions, that's between Mr.

McKinley and [defense counsel]. But the State

isn't giving her any immunity.

. . . .

THE COURT: I understand your position,

(R. 3583) (emphasis added). Defense counsel then proffered that

Diana would have testified that she wrote the plots for the murder

mystery weekends, that George Trepal did not help write the plots,

that George did some technical research, and that George drank

bottled water (R. 3583-84).

The defense moved for a mistrial based on Coco v. State, 62 So.

2d 892 (Fla. 1953), because the court had denied an opportunity for

full cross-examination (R. 3584). The court ruled that the questions

were beyond the scope of direct and denied the motion for mistrial

(R. 3584). The State excused Diana from her subpoena and stated that

if she testified any further, she would be testifying without use

immunity (R. 3584). The defense requested that Diana remain under

subpoena and objected to the State intimidating the witness by taking

away her immunity for cross-examination or for being called as a

defense witness (R. 3584-85).

The limitations on cross-examination of Diana Carr allowed the

State to exploit the exclusion of the evidence she would have

provided. While the State was allowed to present testimony that Mr.

Trepal was guilty of poisoning Peggy Carr and the other family

proceedings. Mr. Trepal does in fact have a speech impediment

consisting of not garden variety stuttering, but rather characterized

as "disfluency" due to muscle weakness. Because of this inherent

debility also known as dysarthria, Mr. Trepal's muscles are weak and

do not move efficiently. This issue has been raised in regard to

ineffective assistance of counsel, as trial counsel failed to

investigate and retain an expert who could have diagnosed the speech

impediment and who could have explained that Mr. Trepal's stutter and

tremor were not born of artifice or indicative of guilt, but rather

an innocent speech defect and hand tremor that was due to a birth

trauma.

32

members because he made strange sounds when he spoke to Detective

Mincey and FBI Agent Brekke (see, e.g., R. 2079, 3175), the evidence

evidence that Mr. Trepal drank bottled water was important for the

jury to know because the State argued that since Mr. Trepal felt safe

enough to drink water coming from the Carrs’ well, he was guilty of

placing the poison in the Coca-Cola bottles (R. 4184). The exclusion

of the evidence that Diana wrote the murder mystery weekend plots

allowed the State to argue that the murder mystery weekends indicated

Mr. Trepal was guilty. For example, the State argued that Mr. Trepal

"was practicing when he was at Mensa murder weekends" (R. 4212), and

that Mr. Trepal must have sent the threatening note to the Carr

family because "on each of the Mensa murders . . . a threatening note

is sent to the victim" (R. 4216).

The trial court’s limitations on cross-examination based on

scope of direct examination were erroneous. This Court has explained

the parameters of cross-examination:

[W]hen the direct examination opens a general subject, the

cross-examination may go into any phase, and may not be

restricted to mere parts. . . or to the specific facts

33

developed by the direct examination. Cross-examination

should always be allowed relative to the details of an

event or transaction a portion only of which has been

testified to on direct examination. As has been stated,

cross-examination is not confined to the identical details

testified to in chief, but extends to its entire subject

matter, and to all matters that may modify, supplement,

contradict, rebut or make clearer the facts testified to

in chief. . . .

Coxwell v. State, 361 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1978) (quoting Coco v.

State, 62 So. 2d 892, 895 (Fla. 1953)).

In Zerquera v. State, 549 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1989), the trial

court did not permit Zerquera to cross-examine his co-defendant,

Puttkamer, and the investigating detective regarding bullets found in

Puttkamer’s personal belongings because those questions exceeded the

scope of direct examination. Id. at 191-92. The state was allowed

to present other evidence which implied that the bullets belonged to

Zerquera. Id. at 192. Based upon these facts and relying upon

Coxwell and Coco, this Court held that the preclusion of this crossexamination

was error. Id.

What happened in Zerquera is what happened in Mr. Trepal’s

case. The State presented evidence and argument that Mr. Trepal was

guilty because he was not afraid to drink water from the Carrs’ well,

that Mr. Trepal was guilty because he made odd noises when he talked

to Detective Mincey and FBI Agent Brekke, and that Mr. Trepal was

guilty because he wrote murder mystery weekend scenarios. Yet, Mr.

Trepal was not allowed to ask Diana Carr questions relevant to these

matters. As is shown by Zerquera, cross-examination cannot be so

mechanically limited by the scope of direct examination. A state

evidence rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat a criminal

34

defendant’s right of confrontation. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410

U.S. 394 (1973).

The State’s withdrawal of Diana Carr’s immunity for crossexamination

was fundamentally unfair. The State used the immunity in

order to secure her testimony for the State’s case, but foreclosed

cross-examination by then withdrawing that immunity. This is

tantamount to allowing no opportunity for cross-examination at all, a

clear violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Ohio v.

Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-

07 (1965).

The trial court also repeatedly sustained State objections to

defense cross-examination of State witnesses regarding the status of

Pye and Peggy Carr’s marriage. The questions were intended to raise

the issue of whether the police adequately investigated Pye Carr’s

possible involvement in the poisonings. The objections to these

questions were mainly based upon hearsay, because the defense wished

to ask witnesses what Peggy Carr had said about her marriage.

Although the defense was not allowed to ask these questions, the

State was repeatedly allowed to ask questions regarding Pye Carr’s

relationships with and concern about Peggy Carr, Travis Carr and

Duane Dubberly, even though these questions also elicited answers

relying upon hearsay. Thus, while the State was allowed to elicit

evidence excluding Pye Carr as a suspect, the defense was never

key piece of evidence regarding the state of the Carr's marriage was

suppressed by the State. A letter from Peggy Carr to Pye was

discovered in the Carr's home during a search by Detective Mincey;

this letter revealed the serious state of the marriage, contradicting

the testimony at trial from a number of state witnesses. Mincey

never showed the note to Pye Carr, but did show it to prosecutor John

Aguero, who indicated that it had no evidentiary value; Mincey then

put the note in an intelligence file and it was never disclosed to

trial counsel. The note was revealed, however, pursuant to a Chapter

119 request made by Mr. Trepal's postconviction counsel.

admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another is thereby

rendered inadmissible; quite the contrary is the case." United States

v. Abel, 419 U.S. 45, 56 (1984).

35

This issue first arose before any witnesses testified. The

State made a motion in limine to prohibit the defense from asking

questions about what Peggy Carr had said about her relationships or

some event in the past (R. 1507). Citing Section 90.803(3), Fla.

Stat., the defense argued that Peggy Carr’s state of mind at the time

she made the statements was relevant because her relationship with

Pye Carr was relevant (R. 1507-08). The defense also argued that

such testimony was not hearsay because the defense needed to ask

witnesses whether they told police that Peggy Carr had said she

wanted to leave Pye Carr (R. 1509). The defense argued this line of

questioning was not eliciting Peggy Carr’s statements for their truth

but to explore whether the police adequately investigated all leads

The court stated that a statement of Peggy Carr regarded the

status of her marriage was not state of mind, but was hearsay (R.

1509). However, the court indicated that offering these statements

36

to show the police did not investigate might be appropriate (R.

1509).

The defense wanted to ask such questions of the State’s first

witness, Rita Tacker (R. 1511). The defense argued that in addition

to testifying that Peggy Carr came to her home with the children for

three days, Tacker could testify that Peggy Carr said she was leaving

Pye Carr for good because he treated the children unfairly, worked

late hours, had a girlfriend and drank too much (R. 1511-12). The

defense argued these matters were admissible:

[T]he sufficiency of the police’s investigation is

directly relevant to this case. They’ve got a

circumstantial case here. . . . Therefore, if someone

else could have done this, which is an obvious reasonable

hypothesis of innocence, they didn’t go around and prove

that no one else did this, then they don’t even get to a

jury. So the sufficiency of their investigation is

absolutely relevant. It’s crucial to the defense. It’s

absolutely crucial.

(R. 1512). The State agreed that the defense could elicit from

Tacker that Peggy Carr came to her house, that she stayed there three

days and that she had separated from her husband, but could not

elicit what Peggy Carr told Tacker about separating from her husband

(R. 1513-14). The court ruled that the defense could not ask Tacker

what Peggy Carr had said about her marriage (R. 1515).

The defense maintained that the question was not what Peggy

Carr told Tacker but what Tacker told the police (R. 1514). The

defense argued that this was not hearsay and that there were indicia

of reliability in that Tacker had told police these things

immediately after the poisoning (R. 1515-16). The defense argued

that Tacker had told police that Peggy Carr had said she was leaving

37

her husband for good because of his drinking, his girlfriend, his not

coming home at night, and his treating the children unfairly (R.

1516). This was why Pye Carr was the main suspect of the first

detective on the case, Paul Schaill, but this angle was not further

investigated after that detective left and was replaced by Mincey (R.

1516). The defense argued that the critical factor in determining

the admissibility of the testimony was "[w]hat’s it offered to prove"

(R. 1520). The court ruled that the defense could not ask Tacker

what Peggy Carr said to her or what Tacker told the police Peggy Carr

had said (R. 1522).

Tacker testified that she knew Peggy Carr from work, and they

had become best friends (R. 1530-32). She identified a photograph of

Peggy and Pye Carr (R. 1534), to which the defense had previously

objected because it showed Peggy Carr "snuggling up to her husband"

at her daughter’s wedding (R. 1526). Tacker then testified to Peggy

Carr’s symptoms before she entered the hospital (R. 1534-36). On

cross-examination, the defense elicited from Tacker that Peggy Carr

and her two children had stayed with Tacker for three days because

Peggy and Pye Carr were having marital problems (R. 1536-37). Tacker

testified that she spoke to police, who wanted her to retrace Peggy

Carr’s life for the last two weeks before she became ill (R. 1537-

38). When the defense attempted to ask Tacker what she told the

police and whether the police asked about Peggy Carr’s relationship

with Pye Carr, the State’s objections were sustained (R. 1538).

Outside the presence of the jury, the defense then proffered

Tacker’s testimony that Peggy Carr had said she was leaving Pye Carr

38

because he did not treat her children fairly, he drank too much, and

he had another woman in his life (R. 1541-43). The defense also

proffered Tacker’s testimony that Peggy Carr’s daughter Sissy had

come to her about a week after Peggy Carr became ill and said she

thought Pye Carr and his sister Carolyn Dixon were poisoning Peggy

Carr (R. 1543-44). Sissy repeated this concern the whole time Peggy

Carr was in the hospital and even after her death (R. 1544). Tacker

testified she told the police about Peggy and Pye Carr’s marital

problems (R. 1545).

Duane Dubberly, Peggy Carr’s son, testified on direct to

describe the members of the Carr family and their living arrangements

in the Carr house (R. 1582-86). He also testified regarding his,

Peggy Carr’s and Travis Carr’s illnesses, the note the Carr family

received, who was home the week before Peggy Carr became ill, and the

Cokes under the kitchen sink (R. 1586-1600). On cross-examination,

the defense asked Dubberly if he ever observed any arguments between

Peggy and Pye Carr and whether he remembered going to stay with

Tacker (R. 1605). The State objected to both of these questions, and

the court sustained the objections, the second time saying,

"Sustained as being beyond the scope of direct examination" (R.

1605).

Pye Carr testified about numerous matters on direct

examination, including that he took care of Peggy Carr when she

became ill, that he took Peggy to doctors and the hospital, and that

he spent every day at the hospital with Peggy for five weeks (R.

1686-97, 1706). Before cross-examination, the court instructed the

39

defense it could ask Pye Carr whether he and Peggy Carr were having

trouble and whether they separated, but no details about the

separation (R. 1723). The defense stated that it wanted to ask Pye

Carr about his former and subsequent girlfriends because "the

prosecution has painted a very nice picture of a very concerned and

caring husband here, who was concerned about Peggy, who was staying

by her side in the hospital for five weeks. And information has come

out that that was just not true. . . . [S]o it’s proper crossexamination

because of that" (R. 1723-24). The defense wanted to ask

Pye Carr whether he had told his girlfriend Laura Irving that he had

made a mistake by marrying Peggy and that he wanted Irving back (R.

1724). Pye Carr said he would answer "no" to that question (R.

1724). The defense said that Irving had told the police that Pye

Carr had said this (R. 1725). The court ruled the defense could not

ask the question because it was hearsay (R. 1725). The defense

pointed out that "[w]e have the declarant right her[e]"--the

declarant being Pye Carr--and that if he denied making the statement,

the defense would be entitled to call Irving to present evidence of

the prior inconsistent statement (R. 1725).

The defense also wanted to ask Pye Carr about another

girlfriend, Joyce Crabbs (R. 1723). On proffer, Pye Carr said that

he presently lived with Crabbs, but denied he began dating her while

Peggy Carr was in the hospital (R. 1726-27).

Ronald Chester, the former husband of Peggy Carr’s daughter

Sissy, testified on direct that he lived in the apartment next to the

Carr house in September of 1988 and did not observe any problems in

40

the Carr household (R. 3599-3600). On cross-examination, the defense

tried to ask Chester about Pye Carr telling him "he didn’t blame him

for leaving Sissy, that he wishes that he could get out of his

marriage, too, but it would cost him too much" (R. 3602-03). The

defense argued this was not being offered for the truth of the matter

asserted and was not hearsay (R. 3602-03). The court ruled the

answer was hearsay and did not allow it (R. 3603). The defense moved

for a mistrial because the court had denied Mr. Trepal his

constitutional right to cross-examination, and the court denied the

motion (R. 3604).

Peggy Carr’s daughter Gelena Shiver, also known as Sissy,

testified on direct that the only problem in the family just before

people began getting sick was feuding between the children (R. 3651).

On cross, the defense tried to ask her about her statement to police

that she believed Pye Carr killed her mother (R. 3652). The defense

argued the question was permissible because the State had asked

Shiver about the family situation (R. 3652). The court would not

allow the question (R. 3653).

While the defense was prevented from asking questions which

would raise the issue of whether Pye Carr could have been responsible

for the poisoning based on hearsay objections, the State was

repeatedly allowed to elicit hearsay testimony indicating Pye Carr

should be excluded as a suspect. For example, Peggy Carr’s sister,

Shirley Martin, testified that she visited Peggy in the hospital one

day when Pye Carr was there (R. 1855). Peggy was unable to speak,

but she and Martin knew sign language, so Martin assisted Pye in

41

communicating with Peggy (R. 1855). Over several defense hearsay

objections, Martin was permitted to testify that Peggy asked Pye why

she was in the hospital, that Pye said Peggy had been poisoned, that

Peggy asked why, and that Pye said he did not know (R. 1855-56,

1857). Martin testified that Peggy kept asking why and Pye told her

he did not know but would find out (R. 1858).

Over defense objection, the State was permitted to ask Pye

Carr’s ex-wife, Margaret Smith, how he treated his children, to which

Smith responded that Pye Carr was "very good" with the children,

"loved" the children, was "real lenient" with the children and

"worshiped" the children (R. 3587). Over two defense objections, the

State was also allowed to ask Smith how Pye Carr reacted to the

illness of his son Travis, to which Smith responded, "He was very

upset. He said, ‘If I lose Travis, I don’t know what I’m going to

do’" (R. 3588-89).

Over defense objections, the State was allowed to ask the

Carrs’ minister, Robert Grant, how Peggy and Pye Carr reacted to the

threatening note they received (R. 3612-14). Grant was permitted to

testify that Peggy Carr "could not believe that someone would want to

harm the family" and "seemed a bit irritated . . . and upset that

someone would have enough against them that they would want to harm

the family" (R. 3613). Grant was permitted to testify that Pye Carr

"was concerned about it" (R. 3613). Again over defense objection,

the State was allowed to ask Grant how Pye Carr reacted to his family

being in the hospital, to which Grant responded, "Very much

concerned. I could tell that it bothered him deeply as it prolonged

42

and the condition of each of them seemed to get worse" (R. 3615).

Over defense objection, the State was allowed to ask Pye Carr’s

daughter, Tammy Reed, about the relationship between Pye and Travis

Carr (R. 3656). Reed answered, "They’ve always been real close, a

very close relationship," which continued to the present (R. 3656).

regarding questions the defense wished to ask on cross-examination of

State witnesses and the rulings on questions the State was permitted

to ask its witnesses at least indicate the unfairness of Mr. Trepal’s

trial. The State was repeatedly permitted to ask questions regarding

the Carr family’s relationships and to elicit hearsay answers or

answers clearly based on hearsay. The defense was improperly

precluded from asking questions which would have "modif[ied],

supplement[ed], contradict[ed], rebut[ted] or ma[d]e clearer" the

facts as presented by the State. Coxwell, 361 So. 2d at 151, quoting

Coco, 62 So. 2d at 895. The "beyond the scope of direct" rule cannot

be so mechanically applied. Zerquera; Chambers v. Mississippi. Nor

can the defense be precluded from asking questions exploring the

adequacy of the police investigation. Coxwell; Coco. The errors in

excluding this cross-examination were not harmless. Zerquera, 549

So. 2d at 192 (citing State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.

1986)). The State focused much of its case on excluding Pye Carr,

while the defense was never given the opportunity to include him.

"There are few subjects, perhaps, on which [the Supreme] Court

and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their

43

expression of belief that the right of confrontation is an essential

and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this

country's constitutional goal." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404-

05 (1965). Accord Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1965);

Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969). Here, the defense

was precluded from pursuing cross-examination directly relevant to

the State’s case, in violation of Mr. Trepal’s confrontation rights.

The trial court instructed the jury to consider as an

aggravator that "the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced

was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without

any pretense of moral or legal justification" (R. 4404). Trial

counsel objected to the jury being instructed on this aggravator,

both in a pre-trial motion (R. 5081, 5263), and in the penalty phase

charge conference (R. 4345). Counsel argued that the instruction is

vague and overbroad, and "provides insufficient meaningful standards

to separate by definition such homicide from every premeditated

murder" (R. 5079-81). The objections were overruled (R. 4345).

The trial court did not instruct Mr. Trepal's jury regarding

this aggravator in accordance with this Court's limiting

constructions. At the time of Mr. Trepal’s trial and direct appeal,

this Court had held that "calculated" consists "of a careful plan or

prearranged design," Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d 526, 533 (Fla.

1987), and that "premeditated" refers to a "heightened" form of

premeditation greater than the premeditation required to establish

44

first-degree murder. Hamblen v. State, 527 So. 2d 800, 805 (Fla.

1988). In order to satisfy the "coldness" element, the murder must

also be the product of calm and cool reflection. See, e.g.,

Richardson v. State, 604 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1992); Santos v. State,

591 So. 2d 160, 163 (Fla. 1991). The trial court instructed the

jury to consider as an aggravator whether "the defendant, in

committing the crime for which he is to be sentenced, knowingly

created a great risk of death to many persons" (R. 4405). Trial

counsel objected to the jury being instructed on this aggravator,

both in a pre-trial motion (R. 5080, 5262-63), and in the penalty

phase charge conference (R. 4348-49). Counsel argued that the

instruction is "irrefutably vague," and "contains qualifying

adjectives which are subject to definitions without any guidelines or

standards" (R. 5080, 5263). The objections were overruled (R. 4349).

The trial court did not instruct the jury regarding the

aggravator of great risk of death to many persons in accordance with

this Court's limiting constructions, which require an "immediate and

present risk." Williams v. State, 574 So. 2d 136, 138 (Fla. 1991).

Nothing in the wording of the factor itself, which is all the jury

heard, tells the jury that the risk created must be immediate and

present. Further, the Court has held that "great risk" means more

than a mere possibility, but rather a likelihood or high probability.

Kampff v. State, 371 So. 2d 1007, 1009-10 (Fla. 1979). "Many"

persons means more than "a small number of persons." Id.

The trial court instructed the jury on the "heinous, atrocious

and cruel" aggravator. The defense objected because, as a matter of

45

law, the evidence was insufficient to prove HAC beyond a reasonable

doubt (R. 4344). In fact the State did fail to prove the factor, as

evidenced by the trial court’s rejection of it (R. 5551). Because

HAC did not apply as a matter of law, it was error to submit it to

the jury. Archer v. State, 613 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1993); Atkins v.

State, 452 So. 2d 529, 532 (1984).

The instructions given to the jury violate the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments. Espinosa v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2926 (1992);

Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992); Sochor v. Florida, 112 S.

Ct. 2114 (1992); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988); Godfrey

v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). States must not only adopt

narrowing constructions, but also apply them during a sentencing

calculus. Richmond v. Lewis, 113 S. Ct. 528 (1992). In Florida, the

penalty phase jury is part of the "sentencing calculus." See Johnson

v. Singletary, 612 So. 2d 575, 577 (Fla. 1993). The only way for a

jury to apply a narrowing construction is to be told what that

narrowing construction is. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653

(1990). Mr. Trepal's jury was not told about the limitations on the

aggravating factors, but presumably found the aggravators present.

Espinosa, 112 S. Ct. at 2928.

Appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise any issue

regarding the jury instructions on aggravating factors on direct

appeal. Trial counsel had preserved the issue, and Espinosa,

Stringer and Richmond were issued while Mr. Trepal’s direct appeal

was pending. Appellate counsel’s omissions undermine confidence in

the outcome of Mr. Trepal’s direct appeal.

46

Several meritorious arguments were available for direct appeal,

yet appellate counsel unreasonably failed to assert them. These

errors, singularly or cumulatively, demonstrate that Mr. Trepal was

denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel.

For all of the reasons discussed herein, Mr. Trepal

respectfully urges the Court to grant habeas corpus relief.

The undersigned counsel certifies that this petition is typed

using Courier 12 font.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing Petition for

Habeas Corpus has been furnished by United States Mail, first class

postage prepaid, to all counsel of record on October 15, 2001.

TODD G. SCHER

Florida Bar No. 0899641

Litigation Director

CCRC-South

101 NE 3rd Ave., Suite 400

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301

(954) 713-1284

Attorney for Appellant

Copies furnished to:

Carol Dittmar

Department of Legal Affairs

2002 North Lois Avenue

Suite 700

Tampa, Florida 33607