1
The questions upon which certiorari was granted in Ring are:Walton v. Arizona,
497 U.S. 639 (1990), held that Arizona's capitalsentencing statute, which assigns solely to the trial judge the responsibility for
making the findings of fact which are necessary to subject a defendant to a death
sentence, does not contravene the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial right as made
CAPITAL CASE
DEATH WARRANT
SIGNED
EXECUTION SET FOR
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
Case Nos. SC02-128 & SC02-___
LINROY BOTTOSON,
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent/Appellee.
__________________________________/
LINROY BOTTOSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL MOORE,
Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections,
Respondent.
___________________________________/
MOTION TO CONTINUE ORAL ARGUMENT
AND APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION
Mr. Bottoson’s case presents two issues pending before the United States Supreme Court,
Atkins v. Virginia
, No. 00-8452 (does execution of the mentally retarded violate the EighthAmendment?), and
Ring v. Arizona, No. No. 01-488 (did Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466(2000), overrule
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).1 In addition, Mr. Bottoson presentsapplicable to the States through the Fourteen Amendment's Due Process Clause.
The question presented is whether Walton should be overruled in light of this
Court's subsequent holding, in
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), that"for the legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the
prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed" (id. at 490
(internal quotation marks omitted) violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial.
2
Fleming v. Zant, 259 Ga. 687, 386 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. 1989).3
Van Tran v. State, No. W2000-00739-SC-R11-P1 (Tenn. S. Ct12/4/01)(www.tscaoc.tsc.state.tn.us).
4
The lower court was aware that his actions would not decide these important questions:"Ultimately the [Florida] Supreme Court – whatever I do here,
I’m just a conduit to theSupreme Court, in a practical sense, in terms of ruling on the issue, because they’re going to
review it." Tr. At 35 (
Huff hearing)(emphasis added). He noted that this Court "is alreadythinking about this issue" and that this case "will go to the people who are considering this
issue."
Id. at 32.The lower court then did not address the tough legal questions, going instead directly to
the question of whether Mr. Bottoson is mentally retarded. Petitioner explains in his brief before
this Ccourt that the process afforded by the lower court for resolving the "fact" of mental
retardation violated fundamental notions of notice and due process. Simply compare the
process Petitioner received to what is provided by statute for other persons at sentencing now,
at a critical stage of the capital trial–qualified attorneys, adequate funding, discovery, the duty of
the state to provide exculpatory evidence on the issue of mental retardation under
Brady, etc--onthe mental retardation issue. The type of process that is provided will often determine the
outcome, especially in hotly contested matters, as here.
For example, on December 12, 2001, Sherman Elwood Skipper was found to be mentally
2
important issues of first impression with which other state Supreme Courts (Georgia
2 andTennessee
3) have also struggled: 1.) whether when the legislature prohibits prospectively theexecution of the mentally retarded, this reflects an evolved standard of decency which would
prohibit the execution of any mentally retarded persons in the state; and 2.) what process is due for
determining this issue when it first arises in a post-conviction setting.
4retarded by a trail court judge in North Carolina. Mr. Skipper, who had been on death row for
years, was then granted a life sentence under North Carolina’s new mental retardation statute
(which is retroactive).
However, when he had been previously provided substantially lessprocess, he was expressly found not to be mentally retarded by the North Carolina Supreme
Court.
State v. Skipper, 337 N.C. 1, 64-66, 446 S.E.2d 252, 288-89 (1994)(Exum, C.J.,concurring). In adversarial proceedings, process is a life or death matter.
5
Yesterday, the Supreme Court stayed the execution of Amos King based upon hisApprendi
claim and the grant of certiorari in Ring. King will be held until Ring is decided.Thus, by the end of the term in June, the impact of
Apprendi on Florida will be decided.6
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000)("It suffices to say that the issuance of the staysuggests that a majority of this Court, while not deciding the issues presented, believe that the
petitioner has a substantial probability of success.") (Scalia, J., concurring in grant of stay).
7
Mr. King did not present a mental retardation question of any sort.3
Petitioner believes the execution date in this case will be stayed by the United States Supreme
Court.
5 However, Petitioner suggests that this Court should enter a stay of execution now, andpostpone argument in this case
, for two reasons. First, this Court has said that the "SupremeCourt’s denial of certiorari [in a capital case raising
Apprendi] indicates that the Court meant whatit said when it held that
Apprendi was not intended to affect capital sentencing schemes." Mills v.Moore
, 786 So.2d 532, 537 (Fla. 2001). Applying the same reasoning, the grant of certiorari inRing
and the grant of a stay in King, indicates that the Justices who in concurring and dissentinghave said the
Apprendi rule casts doubt on Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), are nowpoised to render a decision overruling
Walton.6 This changes the practical and legal landscape fromwhen the Court denied King’s request for a stay, and counsels in favor of awaiting the decision in
Ring
before deciding Mr. Bottoson’s case.Second, and perhaps more importantly, Mr. Bottoson presents not one but
two questionsthat are before the United States Supreme Court–
Atkins7 as well as Ring–and presents questions8
There is now no reason for this Court to decide, under warrant circumstances, legalquestions like: 1.) whether a defendant who shows that he or she is more likely than not
retarded can still be executed (the Florida mental retardation statute, requiring clear and
convincing proof, would allow such an execution, and Petitioner argues that this is too high a
standard, and unconstitutional.); 2.) whether a determination of mental retardation can be made
in a post-conviction court under post-conviction procedures, or requires trial court, critical
stage, constitutionally guaranteed protections; 3.) whether a Terman IQ test administered in
1951 during a persons developmental years ought to be considered when determining mental
retardation, and whether a Vineland test administered to a prison guard to determine present
adaptive function ought not to be considered (matters which several amici have expressed an
interest in addressing before this Court, but who cannot under current warrant conditions.)
On critical questions like these,
"Without adequate study there cannot be adequate reflection; without adequate
reflection there cannot be adequate discussion; without adequate discussion there
cannot be that fruitful interchange of minds which is indispensable to thoughtful,
unhurried decision and its formulation in learned and impressive opinions."
SalveRegina College
, 499 U.S. at 232, quoting Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S.437, 458-459 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
4
that would best be evaluated in the fullness of time,
8 and in light of the forthcoming decisions inboth
Atkins and Ring.Thus, petitioner requests that the Court enter an Order staying the scheduled execution and
continuing oral argument.
A. Mental Retardation
This case presents this Court with several questions that will effect not only Mr. Bottoson,
but the death-sentenced persons in Florida who have mental retardation. This Court must decide
whether the prohibition on the execution of persons with mental retardation contained in section
921.137, Florida Statutes, applies to persons sentenced to death before the statute’s effective date.
Alternatively, this Court must decide whether the Eighth Amendment to the United States
5
Constitution, and/or Article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution, bars the execution of a person
with mental retardation. If the answer to any of these questions might be yes, this Court must also
decide what procedures must be used by trial courts when they decide whether a man or woman
is ineligible for the death penalty because he or she has mental retardation.
Regarding the question whether the enactment of laws in Florida, 17 other States, and the
federal government barring the execution of persons with mental retardation shows that under the
"evolving standards of decency" such punishment violates the Eighth Amendment, this Court may
obtain guidance from the Supreme Court, who in
Atkins v. Virginia, No. 00-8452, will decide thatvery question. In
Atkins, as in this case, the state contests whether the petitioner is mentallyretarded. There, as here, expert testimony was presented on both sides of the question in the trial
court. The Virginia Supreme Court discounted Atkins’ testimony and credited the State’s.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the substantive federal constitutional
issue.
See Attachment I to Initial Brief (portion of state’s brief in opposition in Atkins). See alsofootnote 4,
supra. If under the Eighth Amendment a person with mental retardation has the rightnot to be executed,
then the process that must be provided to protect that right will be defined bythe Court in
Atkins. This Court is in the same position with respect to Petitioner’s claim under theFlorida constitution–first define the right, then provide the process.
"The procedures by which the facts of the case are determined assume an importance as
great as the validity of the substantive rule of law to be applied. And the more important the rights
at stake the more important must be the procedural safeguards surrounding those rights."
Speiserv. Randall
, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958). It has shown this understanding through, for example, the6
care and deliberation that preceded the adoption of Rule 3.851 following this Court’s decision in
Carter v. State
, ___ So. 2d ___ (Fla. 1996). Deciding what process will be followed whendetermining whether a death sentenced person who may have mental retardation may or may not be
put to death surely calls for deliberation of more than a few days, if arriving at the correct process
to be followed when determining whether someone is competent to proceed in post-conviction
proceedings took years.
This Court has held that a stay of execution is proper when the defendant presents "enough
facts to show . . . that he might be entitled to relief under rule 3.850."
State v. Schaeffer, 467 So.2d 698, 699 (Fla. 1985). This Court has "a valid basis for exercising jurisdiction" and granting a
stay of execution so that the petitioner’s claims may be heard before they are mooted by an
execution.
Id.; see also State v. Crews, 477 So. 2d 984, 984-85 (Fla. 1985); State v. Sireci, 502 So.2d 1221, 1224 (Fla. 1987);
O'Callaghan v. State, 461 So. 2d 1354, 1355-56 (Fla. 1984); Lemonv. State
, 498 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1986).B.
ApprendiIn case the grant of a stay in
King leaves any doubt as to the potential merit of Mr.Bottoson’s
Apprendi claim, and whether Ring has potential implications for Florida’s capitalsentencing scheme in Mr. Bottoson’s case, consider the following. Justice O'Connor observed in
Apprendi
that the Court in Walton reached its conclusion[r]elying in part on our decisions rejecting challenges to Florida’s capital
sentencing scheme, which also added that "‘the Sixth Amendment does
not require that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the
7
sentence of death be made by the jury.’"
Walton, [497 U.S.] at 648(quoting
Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-641 (1989) (percuriam)).
Indeed, the petitioner in
Walton recognized that he had to distinguish the Supreme Court’sFlorida decisions in order to prevail. The Court found he could not do so:
The distinctions Walton attempts to draw between the Florida and
Arizona statutory scheme are not persuasive. It is true that in Florida the
jury recommends a sentence, but it does not make specific factual
findings with regard to the existence or mitigating or aggravating
circumstances and its recommendation is not binding on the trial judge.
A Florida trial court no more has the assistance of a jury’s findings of
fact with respect to sentencing issues than does a trial judge in Arizona.
Walton
, 497 U.S. at 648.Significantly, one of the decisions relied upon in
Walton was Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.447 (1984).
Walton, 497 U.S. at 647-48. Justice Stevens, the author of the majority opinion inApprendi
dissented from the majority opinion upholding Florida’s capital sentencing scheme inSpaziano
. In words that echo in Apprendi, Justice Stevens wrote that[t]he same consideration that supports a constitutional entitlement to a
trial by a jury rather than a judge at the guilt or innocence state–the right
to have an authentic representative of the community apply its lay
perspective to the determination that must precede a deprivation of
liberty–applies with
special force to the determination that must precedea deprivation of life.
Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 482-83 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
In Mr. Bottoson’s case, none of the Sixth Amendment requirements identified in
Apprendiand
Jones were satisfied. The indictment did not give Mr. Bottoson notice of the aggravating8
circumstances upon which the State would attempt to establish his eligbility for the death penalty.
The judge, and not the jury, made the specific findings authorizing imposition of the death penalty.
There was no unanimous jury finding regarding any aggravating factor. The judge, and not the jury,
was assigned and carried out the responsibility for determining whether an aggravating circumstance
existed. Absent that finding, Mr. Bottoson was ineligible for the death penalty, and the sentence
provided under Florida law was life imprisonment. The jury in Mr. Bottoson’s case were not told
that the existence of any aggravating circumstance had to be agreed upon by all jurors. Their nonbinding
recommendation was not unanimous.
With a stay certain, and such weighty issues pending in this Court and the Supreme Court,
there is no reason to proceed in haste.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner/Appellant LINROY BOTTOSON, through counsel, respectfully
requests that this Court enter an Order staying his execution, and continuing the briefing schedule
and oral argument in this case to allow for more thorough argument and deliberation.
Respectfully submitted,
___________________________
M
ARK E. OLIVEFla. Bar No. 0578533
Law Offices of Mark E. Olive, P.A.
320 West Jefferson Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
850-224-0004
850-224-3331 (facsimile)
Tim Schardl
801 K Street, 10
th FloorSacramento, California 95822
(916) 498-6666
(916) 498-6656 (facsimile)
9
W
ILLIAM JENNINGSC
APITAL COLLATERAL COUNSELM
IDDLE REGION______________________________
P
ETER CANNONAssistant CCRC
Fla. Bar No. 109710
E
RIC PINKARDAssistant CCRC
Fla. Bar No. 651443
O
FFICE OF THE CAPITAL COLLATERALR
EGIONAL COUNSEL3801 Corporex Park Drive, Suite 201
Tampa, Florida 33619
813-740-3544
813-740-3554 (facsimile)
10
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Continue Oral
Argument and Application for Stay of Execution is being furnished by facsimile transmission to
counsel for Respondent, Assistant Attorney General Kenneth Sloane Nunnelley, Office of the
Attorney General 444 Seabreeze Boulevard, Suite 500, Daytona Beach, Florida 32818, this 24
th dayof January, 2002.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This motion was prepared using Times New Roman 14 point font.
____________________________
PETER J. CANNON
ERIC PINKARD