1The questions upon which certiorari was granted in Ring are:

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), held that Arizona's capital

sentencing statute, which assigns solely to the trial judge the responsibility for

making the findings of fact which are necessary to subject a defendant to a death

sentence, does not contravene the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial right as made

CAPITAL CASE

DEATH WARRANT

SIGNED

EXECUTION SET FOR

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

Case Nos. SC02-128 & SC02-___

LINROY BOTTOSON,

Petitioner/Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent/Appellee.

__________________________________/

LINROY BOTTOSON,

Petitioner,

vs.

MICHAEL MOORE,

Secretary, Florida Department

of Corrections,

Respondent.

___________________________________/

MOTION TO CONTINUE ORAL ARGUMENT

AND APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION

Mr. Bottoson’s case presents two issues pending before the United States Supreme Court,

Atkins v. Virginia, No. 00-8452 (does execution of the mentally retarded violate the Eighth

Amendment?), and Ring v. Arizona, No. No. 01-488 (did Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

(2000), overrule Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).1 In addition, Mr. Bottoson presents

applicable to the States through the Fourteen Amendment's Due Process Clause.

The question presented is whether Walton should be overruled in light of this

Court's subsequent holding, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), that

"for the legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the

prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed" (id. at 490

(internal quotation marks omitted) violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right

to jury trial.

2Fleming v. Zant, 259 Ga. 687, 386 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. 1989).

3 Van Tran v. State, No. W2000-00739-SC-R11-P1 (Tenn. S. Ct

12/4/01)(www.tscaoc.tsc.state.tn.us).

4The lower court was aware that his actions would not decide these important questions:

"Ultimately the [Florida] Supreme Court – whatever I do here, I’m just a conduit to the

Supreme Court, in a practical sense, in terms of ruling on the issue, because they’re going to

review it." Tr. At 35 (Huff hearing)(emphasis added). He noted that this Court "is already

thinking about this issue" and that this case "will go to the people who are considering this

issue." Id. at 32.

The lower court then did not address the tough legal questions, going instead directly to

the question of whether Mr. Bottoson is mentally retarded. Petitioner explains in his brief before

this Ccourt that the process afforded by the lower court for resolving the "fact" of mental

retardation violated fundamental notions of notice and due process. Simply compare the

process Petitioner received to what is provided by statute for other persons at sentencing now,

at a critical stage of the capital trial–qualified attorneys, adequate funding, discovery, the duty of

the state to provide exculpatory evidence on the issue of mental retardation under Brady, etc--on

the mental retardation issue. The type of process that is provided will often determine the

outcome, especially in hotly contested matters, as here.

For example, on December 12, 2001, Sherman Elwood Skipper was found to be mentally

2

important issues of first impression with which other state Supreme Courts (Georgia2 and

Tennessee3) have also struggled: 1.) whether when the legislature prohibits prospectively the

execution of the mentally retarded, this reflects an evolved standard of decency which would

prohibit the execution of any mentally retarded persons in the state; and 2.) what process is due for

determining this issue when it first arises in a post-conviction setting.4

retarded by a trail court judge in North Carolina. Mr. Skipper, who had been on death row for

years, was then granted a life sentence under North Carolina’s new mental retardation statute

(which is retroactive). However, when he had been previously provided substantially less

process, he was expressly found not to be mentally retarded by the North Carolina Supreme

Court. State v. Skipper, 337 N.C. 1, 64-66, 446 S.E.2d 252, 288-89 (1994)(Exum, C.J.,

concurring). In adversarial proceedings, process is a life or death matter.

5Yesterday, the Supreme Court stayed the execution of Amos King based upon his

Apprendi claim and the grant of certiorari in Ring. King will be held until Ring is decided.

Thus, by the end of the term in June, the impact of Apprendi on Florida will be decided.

6See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000)("It suffices to say that the issuance of the stay

suggests that a majority of this Court, while not deciding the issues presented, believe that the

petitioner has a substantial probability of success.") (Scalia, J., concurring in grant of stay).

7Mr. King did not present a mental retardation question of any sort.

3

Petitioner believes the execution date in this case will be stayed by the United States Supreme

Court.5 However, Petitioner suggests that this Court should enter a stay of execution now, and

postpone argument in this case, for two reasons. First, this Court has said that the "Supreme

Court’s denial of certiorari [in a capital case raising Apprendi] indicates that the Court meant what

it said when it held that Apprendi was not intended to affect capital sentencing schemes." Mills v.

Moore, 786 So.2d 532, 537 (Fla. 2001). Applying the same reasoning, the grant of certiorari in

Ring and the grant of a stay in King, indicates that the Justices who in concurring and dissenting

have said the Apprendi rule casts doubt on Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), are now

poised to render a decision overruling Walton.6 This changes the practical and legal landscape from

when the Court denied King’s request for a stay, and counsels in favor of awaiting the decision in

Ring before deciding Mr. Bottoson’s case.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, Mr. Bottoson presents not one but two questions

that are before the United States Supreme Court–Atkins7 as well as Ring–and presents questions

8There is now no reason for this Court to decide, under warrant circumstances, legal

questions like: 1.) whether a defendant who shows that he or she is more likely than not

retarded can still be executed (the Florida mental retardation statute, requiring clear and

convincing proof, would allow such an execution, and Petitioner argues that this is too high a

standard, and unconstitutional.); 2.) whether a determination of mental retardation can be made

in a post-conviction court under post-conviction procedures, or requires trial court, critical

stage, constitutionally guaranteed protections; 3.) whether a Terman IQ test administered in

1951 during a persons developmental years ought to be considered when determining mental

retardation, and whether a Vineland test administered to a prison guard to determine present

adaptive function ought not to be considered (matters which several amici have expressed an

interest in addressing before this Court, but who cannot under current warrant conditions.)

On critical questions like these,

"Without adequate study there cannot be adequate reflection; without adequate

reflection there cannot be adequate discussion; without adequate discussion there

cannot be that fruitful interchange of minds which is indispensable to thoughtful,

unhurried decision and its formulation in learned and impressive opinions." Salve

Regina College, 499 U.S. at 232, quoting Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S.

437, 458-459 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

4

that would best be evaluated in the fullness of time,8 and in light of the forthcoming decisions in

both Atkins and Ring.

Thus, petitioner requests that the Court enter an Order staying the scheduled execution and

continuing oral argument.

A. Mental Retardation

This case presents this Court with several questions that will effect not only Mr. Bottoson,

but the death-sentenced persons in Florida who have mental retardation. This Court must decide

whether the prohibition on the execution of persons with mental retardation contained in section

921.137, Florida Statutes, applies to persons sentenced to death before the statute’s effective date.

Alternatively, this Court must decide whether the Eighth Amendment to the United States

5

Constitution, and/or Article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution, bars the execution of a person

with mental retardation. If the answer to any of these questions might be yes, this Court must also

decide what procedures must be used by trial courts when they decide whether a man or woman

is ineligible for the death penalty because he or she has mental retardation.

Regarding the question whether the enactment of laws in Florida, 17 other States, and the

federal government barring the execution of persons with mental retardation shows that under the

"evolving standards of decency" such punishment violates the Eighth Amendment, this Court may

obtain guidance from the Supreme Court, who in Atkins v. Virginia, No. 00-8452, will decide that

very question. In Atkins, as in this case, the state contests whether the petitioner is mentally

retarded. There, as here, expert testimony was presented on both sides of the question in the trial

court. The Virginia Supreme Court discounted Atkins’ testimony and credited the State’s.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the substantive federal constitutional

issue. See Attachment I to Initial Brief (portion of state’s brief in opposition in Atkins). See also

footnote 4, supra. If under the Eighth Amendment a person with mental retardation has the right

not to be executed, then the process that must be provided to protect that right will be defined by

the Court in Atkins. This Court is in the same position with respect to Petitioner’s claim under the

Florida constitution–first define the right, then provide the process.

"The procedures by which the facts of the case are determined assume an importance as

great as the validity of the substantive rule of law to be applied. And the more important the rights

at stake the more important must be the procedural safeguards surrounding those rights." Speiser

v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958). It has shown this understanding through, for example, the

6

care and deliberation that preceded the adoption of Rule 3.851 following this Court’s decision in

Carter v. State, ___ So. 2d ___ (Fla. 1996). Deciding what process will be followed when

determining whether a death sentenced person who may have mental retardation may or may not be

put to death surely calls for deliberation of more than a few days, if arriving at the correct process

to be followed when determining whether someone is competent to proceed in post-conviction

proceedings took years.

This Court has held that a stay of execution is proper when the defendant presents "enough

facts to show . . . that he might be entitled to relief under rule 3.850." State v. Schaeffer, 467 So.

2d 698, 699 (Fla. 1985). This Court has "a valid basis for exercising jurisdiction" and granting a

stay of execution so that the petitioner’s claims may be heard before they are mooted by an

execution. Id.; see also State v. Crews, 477 So. 2d 984, 984-85 (Fla. 1985); State v. Sireci, 502 So.

2d 1221, 1224 (Fla. 1987); O'Callaghan v. State, 461 So. 2d 1354, 1355-56 (Fla. 1984); Lemon

v. State, 498 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1986).

B. Apprendi

In case the grant of a stay in King leaves any doubt as to the potential merit of Mr.

Bottoson’s Apprendi claim, and whether Ring has potential implications for Florida’s capital

sentencing scheme in Mr. Bottoson’s case, consider the following. Justice O'Connor observed in

Apprendi that the Court in Walton reached its conclusion

[r]elying in part on our decisions rejecting challenges to Florida’s capital

sentencing scheme, which also added that "‘the Sixth Amendment does

not require that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the

7

sentence of death be made by the jury.’" Walton, [497 U.S.] at 648

(quoting Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-641 (1989) (per

curiam)).

Indeed, the petitioner in Walton recognized that he had to distinguish the Supreme Court’s

Florida decisions in order to prevail. The Court found he could not do so:

The distinctions Walton attempts to draw between the Florida and

Arizona statutory scheme are not persuasive. It is true that in Florida the

jury recommends a sentence, but it does not make specific factual

findings with regard to the existence or mitigating or aggravating

circumstances and its recommendation is not binding on the trial judge.

A Florida trial court no more has the assistance of a jury’s findings of

fact with respect to sentencing issues than does a trial judge in Arizona.

Walton, 497 U.S. at 648.

Significantly, one of the decisions relied upon in Walton was Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.

447 (1984). Walton, 497 U.S. at 647-48. Justice Stevens, the author of the majority opinion in

Apprendi dissented from the majority opinion upholding Florida’s capital sentencing scheme in

Spaziano. In words that echo in Apprendi, Justice Stevens wrote that

[t]he same consideration that supports a constitutional entitlement to a

trial by a jury rather than a judge at the guilt or innocence state–the right

to have an authentic representative of the community apply its lay

perspective to the determination that must precede a deprivation of

liberty–applies with special force to the determination that must precede

a deprivation of life. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 482-83 (Stevens, J.,

dissenting).

In Mr. Bottoson’s case, none of the Sixth Amendment requirements identified in Apprendi

and Jones were satisfied. The indictment did not give Mr. Bottoson notice of the aggravating

8

circumstances upon which the State would attempt to establish his eligbility for the death penalty.

The judge, and not the jury, made the specific findings authorizing imposition of the death penalty.

There was no unanimous jury finding regarding any aggravating factor. The judge, and not the jury,

was assigned and carried out the responsibility for determining whether an aggravating circumstance

existed. Absent that finding, Mr. Bottoson was ineligible for the death penalty, and the sentence

provided under Florida law was life imprisonment. The jury in Mr. Bottoson’s case were not told

that the existence of any aggravating circumstance had to be agreed upon by all jurors. Their nonbinding

recommendation was not unanimous.

With a stay certain, and such weighty issues pending in this Court and the Supreme Court,

there is no reason to proceed in haste.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner/Appellant LINROY BOTTOSON, through counsel, respectfully

requests that this Court enter an Order staying his execution, and continuing the briefing schedule

and oral argument in this case to allow for more thorough argument and deliberation.

Respectfully submitted,

___________________________

MARK E. OLIVE

Fla. Bar No. 0578533

Law Offices of Mark E. Olive, P.A.

320 West Jefferson Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

850-224-0004

850-224-3331 (facsimile)

Tim Schardl

801 K Street, 10th Floor

Sacramento, California 95822

(916) 498-6666

(916) 498-6656 (facsimile)

9

WILLIAM JENNINGS

CAPITAL COLLATERAL COUNSEL

MIDDLE REGION

______________________________

PETER CANNON

Assistant CCRC

Fla. Bar No. 109710

ERIC PINKARD

Assistant CCRC

Fla. Bar No. 651443

OFFICE OF THE CAPITAL COLLATERAL

REGIONAL COUNSEL

3801 Corporex Park Drive, Suite 201

Tampa, Florida 33619

813-740-3544

813-740-3554 (facsimile)

10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Continue Oral

Argument and Application for Stay of Execution is being furnished by facsimile transmission to

counsel for Respondent, Assistant Attorney General Kenneth Sloane Nunnelley, Office of the

Attorney General 444 Seabreeze Boulevard, Suite 500, Daytona Beach, Florida 32818, this 24th day

of January, 2002.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

This motion was prepared using Times New Roman 14 point font.

____________________________

PETER J. CANNON

ERIC PINKARD