IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 01-775

GREGORY MILLS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT

OF THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,

IN AND FOR SEMINOLE COUNTY, STATE OF FLORIDA

INITIAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT

TODD G. SCHER

Litigation Director

Capital Collateral Regional

Counsel-South

101 NE 3d Avenue Suite 400

Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301

 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT

 

i

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ................................... iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE FACTS ..................... 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS .................................. 5

ARGUMENT I

NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WARRANTS A

NEW TRIAL AND/OR ESTABLISHES A FURTHER

REASONABLE BASIS FOR THE JURY'S

RECOMMENDED SENTENCE OF LIFE WHICH

PRECLUDES THE OVERRIDE. ............... 7

1. Ashley's New Version. .................. 8

2. Mr. Mills is Entitled to Relief. ............ 13

ARGUMENT II

NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE REQUIRES THAT

MR. MILLS BE PERMITTED TO AMEND HIS RULE

3.850 MOTION AT THIS TIME AND THAT AN

EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS REQUIRED. ..... 29

ARGUMENT III

THE STATE OF FLORIDA'S RECENT CONCESSION

THAT THE "DURING THE COURSE OF A FELONY"

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE CONSTITUTES

AN AUTOMATIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE

WARRANTS RECONSIDERATION OF THIS ISSUE

AND WARRANTS SENTENCING RELIEF. ..... 42

iii

ARGUMENT IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR.

MILLS' REQUESTS FOR PUBLIC RECORDS

PURSUANT TO RULE 3.852. ................ 51

CONCLUSION ............................................... 57

CERTIFICATE OF FONT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

iv

 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

 

Apprendi v. New Jersey,

120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000) ....................................... 4

Arave v. Creech,

507 U.S. 463, 474 (1993) ................................... 45

Blanco v. State,

706 So. 2d 7, 12 (Fla. 1998) ................................. 46

Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83 (1963) ........................................ 30

Buenoano v. State,

708 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1998) .................................. 53

Card v. State,

652 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1995) .................................. 34

Chambers v. Mississippi,

410 U.S. 284 (1973) ....................................... 39

Elam v. State,

636 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1994) ................................. 47

Engberg v. Meyer,

820 P.2d 70, 89 (Wyo. 1991) ................................ 50

Fiore v. White,

121 S.Ct. 712 (2001) ........................................ 4

Garcia v. State,

622 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1993) ................................. 39

Glock v. Moore,

776 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 2001) .................................. 35

v

Green v. Georgia,

442 U.S. 95 (1979) ........................................ 39

Hildwin v. Dugger,

654 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1995) .................................. 25

Huff v. State,

622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993) ............................. 5, 31, 35

Huff v. State,

622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993) ................................... *

Huff v. State,

622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993) ................................... *

Johnson v. Butterworth,

713 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 1998) .................................. 37

Jones v. State,

591 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1992) .................................. 23

Jones v. State,

591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991) ............................... 14

Keen v. State,

775 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2000) ................................ 4, 28

Keen v. State,

775 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2000) ................................... *

Kyles v. Whitley,

514 U.S. 419 (1995) ....................................... 37

Lightbourne v. Dugger,

549 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1989) ................................. 34

Lightbourne v. State,

vi

549 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1989) ................................. 54

Lockhart v. Fretwell,

506 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1993) ................................. 24

Mendyk v. State,

592 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 1992) ................................. 51

Mills v. Dugger,

559 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1990) ................................... 2

Mills v. Moore,

No. SC01-338 (Fla. April 12, 2001) ............................. 4

Mills v. Singletary,

161 F. 3d 1273 (11th Cir. 1998) ................................ 4

Mills v. Singletary,

161 F.3d 1273, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 1998) ........................ 43

Mills v. Singletary,

606 So. 2d 622, 623 (Fla. 1992) ............................. 3, 43

Mills v. Singletary,

606 So. 2d 622, 623 (Fla. 1992) ................................ *

Mills v. State,

476 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1985),

cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986) .............................. 1

Mills v. State,

603 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1992) ................................... 3

Mills v. State,

603 So. 2d 482, 486 (Fla. 1992) ............................... 28

Muehleman v. Dugger,

vii

634 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1993) .................................. 51

viii

Patton v. State,

2000 WL 142526 (Fla. Sept. 28, 2000) .......................... 35

Pentecost v. State,

545 So.2d 861, 863 (Fla. 1989) ............................... 28

Porter v. Singletary,

49 F. 3d 1483 (11th Cir. 1995) ................................ 54

Porter v. State,

653 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1995) .................................. 51

Porter v. State,

653 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1995),

cert. denied 115 S.Ct. 1816 (1995) ......................... *

Porter v. State,

No. 85,410 (Fla. March 28, 1995) ............................. 51

Porter v. Wainwright,

805 F.2d 930, 936 (11th Cir. 1986) ............................ 23

Provenzano v. Dugger,

561 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1990) .................................. 51

Provenzano v. State,

616 So. 2d 428, 430 (Fla. 1993) ............................... 32

Roberts v. Butterworth,

668 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1996) .................................. 37

Rogers v. State,

630 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1994) .................................. 35

Rose v. State,

601 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1992) ............................... 5, 35

x

Rose v. State,

601 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1992) .................................. *

Scott v. Dugger,

604 So. 2d 465, 468 (Fla. 1992) ............................... 22

Scott v. Dugger,

604 So. 2d 465, 469 (Fla. 1992) ............................... 28

Scott v. State,

657 So. 2d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 1995) ............................. 25

Scull v. State,

569 So. 2d 1251, 1252 (Fla. 1990) ............................. 35

Sims v. State,

754 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2000) .................................. 39

Smith v. State,

708 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1998) ............................... 31, 36

Smith v. State,

708 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1998) ................................... *

Sochor v. Florida,

504 U.S. 527 (1992) ..................................... 3, 43

Sochor v. Florida,

504 U.S. 527 (1992) ........................................ *

State v. Cherry,

298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551, 567 (N.C. 1979) .................... 49

State v. Kokal,

562 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1990) ............................... 36, 51

State v. Kokal,

xi

562 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1990) ................................... *

State v. Lewis,

656 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1994) ................................. 54

State v. Middlebrooks,

840 S.W.2d 317, 341-46 (Tenn. 1992) .......................... 49

State v. Riechmann,

777 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 2000) .................................. 33

Stevens v. State,

552 So. 2d 1082, 1086 (Fla. 1989) ............................. 25

Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) ................................... 24

Strickler v. Greene,

527 U.S. 263 (1999) ....................................... 37

Stringer v. Black,

112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992) ..................................... 45

Stringer v. Black,

503 U.S. 222 (1992) ..................................... 3, 42

Stringer v. Black,

503 U.S. 222 (1992) ........................................ *

Stringer v. Black,

503 U.S. 222, 235 (1992) ................................... 48

Suarez v. Dugger,

527 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1988) ............................... 32, 35

Suarez v. Dugger,

527 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1988) ................................... *

xii

Swafford v. State,

636 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1994) ................................. 31

Tedder v. State,

322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975) .................................. 27

Thompson v. State,

731 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 1998) .................................. 5

Thompson v. State,

731 So. 2d 1235, 1236 (Fla. 1998) ........................28, 29, 41

Thompson v. State,

731 So. 2d 1235, 1236 (Fla. 1998) .............................. *

Thompson v. State,

731 So. 2d 1235, 1236 (Fla. 1998). ............................. *

Tuilaepa v. California,

512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994) ................................... 45

Ventura v. State,

673 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1996) .................................. 51

Ventura v. State,

673 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1996) ................................... *

Walton v. Dugger,

634 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1993) ................................. 51

Witt v. State,

387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980) ................................... 3

Woodson v. North Carolina,

428 U.S. 305 (1976) ....................................... 44

Zant v. Stephens,

xiii

462 U.S. 862 (1983) ....................................... 46

Zant v. Stephens,

462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) ................................... 45

 

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

 

This proceeding involves the appeal of an order denying Mr. Mills' second Rule

3.850 motion following an evidentiary hearing. The following symbols will be

used to designate references to the record in this appeal:

"R" -- record on direct appeal to this Court;

"PC-R" -- record on instant appeal to this Court;

"T" -- transcript of the proceedings below.

All other citations will be self explanatory.

1 The jury found Mr. Mills guilt of felony murder, aggravated battery, and

burglary.

 

2 The trial judge's sentencing order stated: "there are sufficient aggravating

circumstances as specified in 921.141 and insufficient mitigating circumstances

therein that a sentence of death is justified" (R. 642).

1

 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE FACTS

 

Mr. Mills was indicted in the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, Seminole County,

Florida, for first-degree felony murder and related offenses, and pled not guilty.

Trial commenced before Circuit Judge J. William Woodson on Thursday,

August 16, 1979, and the jury returned guilty verdicts the next day.1 After a penalty

phase, the jury recommended that Mr. Mills be sentenced to life imprisonment without

the possibility of parole for at least twenty-five (25) years. On April 18, 1980, the trial

court overrode the jury's life recommendation and sentenced Mr. Mills to death,

finding six (6) aggravating circumstances: (1) under sentence of imprisonment; (2)

previous conviction of violent felony; (3) great risk of death to many persons; (4)

felony murder; (5) pecuniary gain; and (6) heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Addressing

only statutory mitigating factors,2 the court found that no mitigating circumstances had

been established.

The conviction for first-degree felony murder and sentence of death were

affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court in a 5-2 decision. Mills v. State, 476 So. 2d

3 In his state habeas petition, Mr. Mills challenged, inter alia, the constitutionality

of the Florida Supreme Court's purported harmless error analysis on direct appeal.

2

172 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986). The Court, however, vacated the

aggravated battery conviction because "we do not believe it proper to convict a person

for aggravated battery and simultaneously for homicide as a result of one shotgun

blast." Id. at 177. The Court also struck three (3) of the aggravating circumstances

found by the trial court. The "great risk of death to many persons" aggravating factor

was struck because "[t]he finding that Mills knowingly created a great risk of death to

many persons was, as the state conceded, erroneous." Id. at 178. The pecuniary gain

factor was struck due to improper doubling with the felony murder aggravating factor.

Id. Lastly, the Florida Supreme Court struck the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel"

aggravator as inapplicable to the facts of the case. Id.

Following the signing of a death warrant, a postconviction motion pursuant to

Fla. R. Crim P. 3.850 was filed and summarily denied. On appeal, the Florida

Supreme Court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing "in regards to counsel's

failure to develop and present evidence that would tend to establish statutory or

nonstatutory mental health mitigating circumstances." Mills v. Dugger, 559 So. 2d

578, 579 (Fla. 1990). The Court also denied a request for state habeas corpus relief.

Id.3

Justice Barkett would have granted habeas relief on this issue. Mills, 559 So. 2d at

579 (Barkett, J., concurring specially).

3

Following the evidentiary hearing and the lower court's order denying relief, the

Florida Supreme Court, in a sharply divided vote, affirmed. Mills v. State, 603 So. 2d

482 (Fla. 1992).

Subsequent to the decisions in Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992), and

Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 (1992), Mr. Mills sought habeas corpus relief in the

Florida Supreme Court challenging both the adequacy of that Court's harmless error

analysis in his case as well as the application of the "during the course of a felony"

aggravating circumstance. The Florida Supreme Court held that Sochor was not new

law under Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980), and therefore the claim, raised for

the second time, was procedurally barred. Mills v. Singletary, 606 So. 2d 622, 623

(Fla. 1992). The Court ruled in the alternative that "[w]e . . . applied, and applied

correctly, a harmless error analysis in Mills' direct appeal." Id. at 623. Regarding the

claim that the felony-murder aggravating factor is an unconstitutional automatic

aggravating circumstance, the Court held: "We considered and rejected the substance

of this claim on direct appeal." Id.

Mr. Mills sought habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Florida. During the pendency of the petition, the district court

4

entered an order requesting supplemental briefing on the jury override issues presented

in the petition. Following the submission of briefs, the district court entered judgment

against Mr. Mills, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Mills v.

Singletary, 161 F. 3d 1273 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 804 (2000).

Following the decisions by the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000), and Fiore v. White, 121 S.Ct. 712 (2001), as well

as the decision by the Florida Supreme Court in Keen v. State, 775 So. 2d 263 (Fla.

2000), Mr. Mills sought habeas corpus relief in the Florida Supreme Court. While the

petition was pending, Mr. Mills' death warrant was signed. Oral argument was

conducted on April 2, 2001, and a sharply-divided decision denying relief was issued

in the late afternoon of April 12, 2001. Mills v. Moore, No. SC01-338 (Fla. April 12,

2001).

On April 16, 2001, Mr. Mills filed a second rule 3.850 motion. A Huff hearing

was conducted that same day, and the lower court granted an evidentiary hearing on

Claim I. The evidentiary hearing occurred in the afternoon of April 17, 2001. The

lower court entered an order denying relief in an order emailed to counsel in the

afternoon of April 18, 2001. The lower court's order also indicated that it was being

treated as a notice of appeal (thus obviating the ability of Mr. Mills to seek rehearing).

This appeal follows.

6

 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

 

1. Newly discovered evidence establishes that Mr. Mills is entitled to a new

trial; in the alternative, this new evidence establishes a reasonable basis for the jury's

life recommendation. The lower court erred in analyzing Mr. Mills' claim and applied

an erroneous legal standard, particularly as to the sentencing issue. The test is not a

subjective one, that is, whether or not, in light of what the lower court knows about the

sentencing judge, this new evidence would have changed the sentencing judge's mind.

Rather, the test is an objective one, that is, whether this new information, in

conjunction with the previous mitigation, would preclude a reasonable judge following

the law from overriding the jury's life recommendation. This standard has clearly been

met in Mr. Mills' case.

2. Newly discovered evidence in the form of an affidavit indicating that

Vincent Ashley confessed to shooting the victim warrants relief either in the form of

an evidentiary hearing or a new sentencing proceeding pursuant to Thompson v. State,

731 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 1998). Moreover, just-disclosed documents reveal that the

original order summarily denying Mr. Mills' first 3.850 motion was drafted by the State

on an ex parte basis. This requires relief pursuant to Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982

(Fla. 1993), and Rose v. State, 601 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1992). The State had the duty

to disclose this to Mr. Mills' previous collateral counsel. Had counsel been aware, he

7

would have sought to disqualify Judge Woodson from presiding over Mr. Mills'

evidentiary hearing. Due to the fact that the State failed to disclose this until now, Mr.

Mills must be put back in a position where he should have been in 1989 when the ex

parte communications occurred resulting in the drafting of the order.

3. The State's concession before this Court during oral argument that the

"during the course of a felony" aggravating circumstance is an automatic aggravating

circumstance requires Mr. Mills' previous claim on this issue to be revisited. The

"automatic" aggravating circumstance in this case violates the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments.

4. The lower court erred in denying many of Mr. Mills' requests for public

records pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852.

4 Ashley was released shortly after testifying at Mr. Mills' trial. On May 25, 1980,

the individual whom the State cut loose on a string of robberies and burglaries, not to

mention the Wright burglary and murder, was re-arrested for destruction of property,

disorderly conduct, resisting arrest with violence, and aggravated assault/strongarm

8

 

ARGUMENT I

NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WARRANTS A

NEW TRIAL AND/OR ESTABLISHES A FURTHER

REASONABLE BASIS FOR THE JURY'S

RECOMMENDED SENTENCE OF LIFE WHICH

PRECLUDES THE OVERRIDE.

 

In his Rule 3.850 motion, Mr. Mills alleged that newly-discovered evidence

established that the co-defendant in this case, Vincent Ashley, had provided Mr. Mills'

counsel with a completely different version of the events of May 25, 1974, and that this

new version completely eviscerated Ashley's credibility, thereby providing a newly-discovered

reasonable basis for the jury's recommendation of life. The lower court

granted an evidentiary hearing, and Ashley was transported from South Bay

Correctional Institution, where he is now serving a life sentence for a 1985 armed

robbery. As explained below, Ashley refused to testify even in the face of the threat

of contempt by the lower court. The State then suggested that the parties speak to

Ashley about his concerns over testifying. During that conference, Ashley indicated

that things would get "complicated" for him if he answered Mr. Mills' questions; in

fact, he disclosed that he might testify that he was the shooter.4

battery on a police officer. He was convicted of the resisting with violence and

aggravated assault charges, and sentenced to five (5) years state prison. According

to the rap sheet provided by FDLE on April 13, 2001, Ashley was apparently released

on January 20, 1984. On October 29, 1986, Ashley was again arrested and charged

with armed robbery; he was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. Moreover,

Ashley's DOC records, disclosed to Mr. Mills' counsel on April 18, 2001, show

numerous violent episodes resulting in disciplinary sanctions.

9

Despite finding that "[t]he version of events contained in Claim I differs from

Ashley's testimony at the trial in certain details," the lower court concluded that

"showing the jury that the witness had credibility problems through another

inconsistent statement would not have mattered" (PCR. 542). As to the effects on the

sentencing in terms of the jury's recommendation, the lower court, acknowledging that

this was "the most troubling aspect of this case" (Id.), nonetheless concluded that the

new evidence would not have made a difference "to the judge who imposed the

sentence" (PCR. 542-43). Mr. Mills submits that the lower court erroneously analyzed

the evidence and applied an incorrect legal standard as to the affect of this newly-discovered

evidence on the outcome of the sentencing proceedings.

 

1. Ashley's New Version.

 

After the clerk attempted to swear Ashley in, Ashley's response was: "I swear

the testimony I'm gonna give is gonna be nothing" (T. 44). The Court then attempted

to administer the oath, but Ashley stated "I'm not going to testify to nothing period"

10

(Id.). He then stated that "I'm protecting my right and protecting my soul" (Id. at 45).

Mr. Mills' counsel then inquired about Ashley's trial testimony, to which Ashley cut off

counsel:

MR. ASHLEY: No. We're gonna stop that right there

'cause I ain't no sucker, man. I'm not gonna get rebellious

or anything like that, but I ain't no fool, I ain't no sucker. I

told you what I'm gonna do, that's what I'm gonna do. I'm

straight. But I ain't -- I repeat, I ain't no fool and I ain't no

sucker.

(Id. at 46).

The court then instructed Ashley to either answer the questions posed to him

or be held in contempt of court:

THE COURT: Well, I'm here in a motion to determine

whether or not the questions that you answer today are

going to be any different from the questions that you

answered back then [at trial]. Because I've been asked to

make a judgment as to whether or not this man sitting over

here should be subject to living or dying. That's a pretty

important question about this man's life. And you are the

only person so far that I can tell on this earth that his lawyer

believes is a person that might be able to testify about this

event that would help him. So, it's pretty serious, and you

have to decide whether you want to remain with us under

contempt citation or if you want to testify.

(Id. at 48). Mr. Mills' counsel then inquired again whether Ashley would answer

questions, and the following ensued:

MR. SCHER: After having heard that, Mr. Ashley, is your

11

opinion still the same about answering my questions?

MR. ASHLEY: Look in my eyes.

MR. SCHER: I would like you to answer my question, Mr.

Ashley. Are you gonna refuse to testify?

MR. ASHLEY: Look in my eyes.

MR. SCHER: That's not an answer Mr. Ashley. Will you

refuse to testify about these matters here today?

MR. ASHLEY: I'm not gonna keep going over the same

thing, man. I'm not gonna keep repeating myself. I ain't --

I'm not crazy, I'm no fool.

(Id.). Thereupon the court had Ashley removed from the courtroom (Id.).

At this point, counsel requested to proffer what Ashley had told him during

interviews the previous week; initially the State agreed, and wanted counsel to have his

investigator testify (the investigator was present during one of the two interviews

conducted by counsel with Ashley) (Id. at 49). Just as the investigator was beginning

his testimony, the State decided that perhaps a discussion with Ashley would be

beneficial to "reassure[] him that he has nothing to fear from the authorities if he

testifies truthfully here today" (Id. at 52). Mr. Mills' counsel responded that the

allegations were that Ashley had lied at trial, and thus "I don't know that the Attorney

General can be in a position of assuring him, unless they're gonna give him immunity

as to anything arising from his testimony here today" (Id. at 54). In response, the

12

Attorney General stated that he and the prosecutor "can take care of ourselves, Judge"

(Id.).

Thereupon, the parties went into the jury room and Ashley was brought in. Mr.

Nunelley asked Ashley about his concerns over testifying, to which Ashley responded:

MR. ASHLEY: 'Cause I don't feel comfortable. I mean,

you know, back in the days, you know and all of that, you

know, and I did what I did. Whatever happened happened,

you know, but now that, from within, I just don't feel

comfortable, you know, not saying something, you

know, that, you know, that could but a man to death or

whatever, you know. 'Cause Greg is no . . . he's no

enemy of mine. I say I was just a fool, we were just fools,

ah, and I did what I did, I done what I done, you know.

May God forgive me for all of that, and he have, you know.

I'm not gonna make something anew, afresh. I can't do it.

My soul can't live with that.

MR. NUNNELLEY: So are you telling me, sir, Mr.

Ashley, that your testimony at trial was the truth?

 

MR. ASHLEY: See, that's the thing. I don't even --

Man, you know, I don't even want to say nothing. I

don't want to give or take, you know, 'cause if I . . .

I'm frustrated about it, you know. If I say anything,

it's gonna complicate the matter.

 

MR. CARTER: What do you mean by complicate the

matter?

 

MR. ASHLEY: I might tell you anything now. I might

tell you I pulled the trigger.

13

MR. CARTER: And what would be your purpose of

stating that?

MR. ASHLEY: To keep from answering question after

question, question after question. Because human can ask

any question and I'm not gonna answer every question. But

I'll say ... I'll say this. No, I'm not even gonna say that.

 

You know, I did what I did , you know, you do what

you do. You know, 'cause I'm not gonna, you know,

have an extra chip on my shoulder, no other burden.

 

MR. CARTER: Just to understand, make sure, your refusal

to testify is based on your soul can't handle it as opposed

to you're afraid you're gonna get in trouble for it? 'Cause as

you said, you did what you did and you've done what you

done. The State did what it did and the State's done what

its' done, and so therefore, we entered into an agreement

with you, and that agreement is still binding, meaning we

cannot prosecute you for the homicide or the robbery or

the burglary that you were given immunity for way back

when.

MR. ASHLEY: It has nothing to do with that, none of that.

MR. CARTER: Okay.

MR. NUNNELLEY: He's not gonna testify. Okay.

(Id. at 56-58).

Upon returning to the Court, Mr. Mills orally amended his motion to include

Ashley's statements; there was no objection to the oral amendment. Moreover, the

State stipulated to the facts as alleged in Mr. Mills' 3.850 regarding Ashley's new

version, which provided:

14

According to what Ashley told the undersigned, when he

and Mr. Mills decided that the Wright home looked like a

good place to enter because it was dark and appeared

vacant, he and Mr. Mills parked their bicycles and went up

to the window. As he did indicate at trial, Ashley had the

gun while Mr. Mills crawled inside the window into the

house. However, Ashley adamantly denied ever going into

the Wright residence. He stated that he remained outside

the window while Mr. Mills entered the home. Ashley said

he could see inside the house into the Wright's bedroom

from where he remained outside, and that after he heard the

shuffling of feet like someone was putting on shoes or

slides, he moved off to the side so he could not be seen

looking into the window. Then, Ashley said, he heard a

shot. After the shot, he ran away from the house toward

the sidewalk near the tree where the bicycles were. Mr.

Mills came out the front door of the house and ran toward

where Ashley was running, and they both then ran to a

nearby ditch where they hid out for a while. Mr. Mills had

the gun with him as they ran to the ditch. Ashley and Mr.

Mills remained in the ditch for a few minutes while they

gathered their thoughts, then they went back to the house,

walking along the sidewalk, until they reached the tree where

their bicycles were. At some point between arriving at the

ditch and walking back to the Wright house, Ashley no

longer saw the gun. They both got on their bicycles and

went their separate ways. Ashley said that his trial

testimony about having actually been inside the Wright

house and having seen what he testified to was a lie.

 

(PCR. 385) (emphasis added).

 

2. Mr. Mills is Entitled to Relief.

 

Mr. Mills is entitled to a new trial, as the newly discovered evidence would

probably produce an acquittal on retrial. Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla.

5 In exchange for his testimony, Ashley was the beneficiary of an extensive

immunity deal:

IT IS HEREBY agreed between the State of Florida,

by and through the undersigned Assistant State Attorney,

and Vincent LeRoy Ashley, hereafter referred to as

"witness," that witness shall henceforth be granted immunity

from prosecution for all his acts arising out of the following:

1. Burglary to the Wright residence, Sanford,

Florida, on May 25, 1979, and subsequent shooting death

of James A. Wright.

2. Burglary to residence of John Fox, Sanford,

Florida, on May 8, 1979.

15

1991). The lower court did not analyze this issue as to the effect on the guilt phase,

other than to summarily conclude that it "would not have mattered." That is not a

correct legal analysis. Rather, the lower court was required to

consider all newly discovered evidence which would be

admissible and determine whether such evidence, had it

been introduced at the trial, would have probably resulted

in an acquittal. In reaching this conclusion, the judge will

necessarily have to evaluate the weight of both the newly

discovered evidence and the evidence which was

introduced at the trial.

Id. at 916. Here, the lower court failed to conduct the proper Jones analysis and failed

to conduct any analysis as to the probability of an acquittal in light of the record as it

now stands.

It is beyond dispute that Ashley was the State's key witness against Mr. Mills.5

3. Robbery of Lanny Lockner, and other related

charges of May 9, 1979.

4. Any and all other robberies between May 8,

1979, and this date occurring in Seminole County, Florida,

and about which witness is called upon by the State to

testify fully and truthfully to.

In exchange for the aforementioned grants of

immunity, witness agrees and shall testify fully and truthfully

before the State Attorney of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit

of Florida, his assistants or any Grand Jury in said Circuit;

shall submit to polygraph examination if requested by State

Attorney or his assistants and shall personally appear

without necessity of service of process at any and all

proceedings, hearings, or trial requested by said prosecutor

or his assistants.

Said immunity shall be complete, both use and

transactional, and shall be conferred upon witness upon

testimony under oath, truthfully and fully, on behalf of State

of Florida in the aforementioned matters alleged above. It

is further agreed that witness shall remain in custody of

Sheriff of Seminole County until such time as he has

testified in each of the above matters. Upon completion of

all testimony the State of Florida will recommend that the

Court dismiss the Violation of Probation in Seminole

County Case Number 74-186-CFA and the State will further

recommend that the witness be restored to probationary

status in Case Number 74-186-CFA.

Dated this 8th day of August, 1979.

(R. 609).

16

As the prosecutor candidly acknowledged in his closing argument: "Vincent Ashley

17

knows things about what went on in that house that only a person who was there could

possibly know" (R. 428). At trial, Ashley testified that on the night in question, he

went to Mr. Mills' house around 2-2:30 AM, where he stayed about 45 minutes before

he and Mr. Mills left on their bicycles (R. 241). According to Ashley, Mr. Mills had

a shotgun, which he had put on the handlebars of his bicycle as they were driving

around into the white section of town (R. 243). Their plan was "[t]o rob someplace

or either break in somebody's house" (R. 244). After coming upon the house

belonging to the Wrights, Ashley testified that it looked like everyone was asleep "and

wouldn't be too much trouble" (R. 246). Mr. Mills and Ashley then laid their bicycles

down by a nearby tree and crept up to the house (R. 246-47). They approached a

window, which "was up but had a screen on it" (R. 247). Mr. Mills took the screen

down, and Ashley was holding the gun (Id.). After Mr. Mills took the screen down,

he climbed in the window "while I had the gun" (Id.). After Mr. Mills was inside,

Ashley passed the gun to him, after which time Ashley testified that he "[g]ot in after

him" (R. 243). Both of them then "stood for a little while, you know, looking around"

and then Mr. Mills went into the living room while carrying the gun (R. 248). As Mr.

Mills was in the other room, Ashley "[l]looked around in the other rooms to see what

could I find" (R. 249). At some point, Ashley quickly went back out the window after

he saw "[t]he old guy was getting up out of the bed" (Id.). According to Ashley, he

18

could see into the bedroom from the room he was standing in (R. 250). Ashley did

not have time to say anything to Mr. Mills "because I didn't know whether the guy had

a gun or whatever, you know, and I didn't have time to go in the other room and tell

Greg" (R. 250). After he went back out the window, Ashley "was gonna run" but

"then I stopped . . . because Greg was still in the house" (Id.). After he was about 25

or 30 yards from the house, Ashley heard a shot and then ran back to the house

"because I didn't know who had got shot" (R. 251). When he ran back up to the

house, Ashley testified that he "saw the old man" in the room "that I got in" and he

was "[o]n the floor" (Id.). According to Ashley, "[t]he old guy was cursing like, you

know, cursing in a mumbling manner" (R. 252). Ashley then started to run again, and

saw Mr. Mills about halfway between the house and the tree where the bicycles were;

at that point, they "[g]ot on their bicycles and left" and went their separate ways (R.

253). The next time Ashley saw Mr. Mills was in a police car at the Sheriff's Office

(R. 254). The last time he saw him was a couple of days later, when Ashley asked Mr.

Mills what he did with the gun; according to Ashley, Mr. Mills said that a man from the

City had found it and turned it in, and "I asked him did he get the fingerprints off it.

He said yes" (R. 255).

On cross-examination, Mr. Mills counsel specifically accused Ashley of being

the triggerman:

19

Q Isn't it true, Mr. Ashley, that after you were

cruising down Elliott Street looking for a house to break

into, you drove your bike right up to the tree; isn't that true?

A No.

Q You went into Mr. Wright's house and you

shot him; isn't that true?

A No.

Q And after you shot him, you drove your bike

away from the tree, went out and hid the gun; isn't that true?

A No.

Q Isn't it true the only reason you're blaming all

this on Greg Mills is because you don't want to go to

prison?

A No.

(R. 285).

It is important to note that Mr. Mills' defense at trial was that Ashley was the

shooter, a defense supported by other evidence. For example, Margaret Wright, the

victim's wife, testified at trial that after she heard the gunshot, she looked out the

window and "saw somebody run. . . I saw a bicycle under the oak tree, and then I

turned to my husband" (Trial T. 6-7). On cross examination, she re-emphasized that

she saw only one figure and only one bicycle by the tree (Id. at 11-12). See also T.

15 (Yes, that's correct. I saw one bicycle"). Based on a description given by Mrs.

20

Wright, the police dispatched information to be on the lookout for "a black male riding

a bicycle wearing something light in color on top and that . . . slender and tall" (T. 39).

Ashley was subsequently stopped by police, who reported that Ashley was wearing

a "light colored" long sleeve sweat jacket, a "light colored hat," and his clothing was

"damp, it was wet" (T. 33). Upon a review of the crime scene, the police noted that

"there was dew on the ground" around the house; police also noted one set of bicycle

tracks leading from the tree in a northerly direction, and another set to the south of the

tree (T. 35-36). Upon initial questioning by police, Ashley denied any involvement in

the burglary or homicide.

In light of the new information as alleged in the 3.850 motion as well as Ashley's

statements during the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Mills submits that there is more than a

reasonable probability of an acquittal on retrial. Ashley was the star witness and the

only eyewitness to the events in question. It was Ashley, and Ashley alone, who

placed Mr. Mills at the scene. To the extent that the State relies on the testimony of

Sylvester Davis, his testimony must be viewed in light of the context in which it arose.

Both Davis and his girlfriend, Viola Mae Stafford, were accomplices (although

Stafford never testified at trial). Davis and Stafford were spending the evening at Mr.

Mills' apartment on the evening in question. When the police returned Mr. Mills home

after he was released, the police specifically requested that Mr. Davis contact them if

21

he had any information about the case; Davis never did so (T. 127-28). After Stafford

was arrested a few days later (she was shoplifting from a store at which Mr. Mills'

sister-in-law worked and Mr. Mill's sister-in-law contacted police), "the idea came up

that she would give them some information for, you know, the dropping of her

charges" (T. 117). At that time, Davis and Stafford took the police to where they had

hidden the shells from the gun (T. 118). However, they did not at that time say

anything else about Mr. Mills' involvement (Id.). About two weeks later, Davis was

arrested for burglary, and was taken to the police station (T. 118-19). At that time,

Davis testified that "[m]e and the police department made a deal" that "they'd drop my

charges, the charges they had on me for burglary" (T. 119-20). It was only then that

Davis told the police his story about having seen Mr. Mills take a rifle on the night of

the Wright homicide, and that Mr. Mills later that evening had told him "about he had

shot some cracker or something." That the testimony of Davis and Ashley was critical

to the State's case is evidenced by the fact that the jury, during deliberations, requested

a read back of the testimony of Ashley and Davis (R. 473).

Mr. Mills submits that the new evidence elicited from Ashley, as well as his new

"version" of events, establishes that relief is warranted under Jones. Imagine if, when

Ashley is directly questioned by trial counsel, about whether he was the shooter, and

he responded as he did on April 17, 2001: "I might tell you anything now. I might tell

6 As the prosecutor told the jury in closing argument, "Mr. Ashley is an eyewitness.

I did the burglary. He participated in the burglary, but he didn't pull the trigger on that

22

you I pulled the trigger." This alone calls into question the reliability of the State's case

against Mr. Mills. Moreover, in assessing the likelihood of an acquittal on retrial, the

Court should consider that Ashley would refuse to testify, as he did during the

evidentiary hearing. The lower court did not consider this fact in assessing the impact

of this new evidence. Ashley was bound by contractual immunity to testify and testify

truthfully about what he knew about this case. As established below, he now refuses

to do so. If Ashley would refuse to testify at a new trial, the State has no case. This

is a critical fact that must be analyzed in assessing whether Mr. Mills has met his

burden under the Jones test. He submits that he has in light of the evidence and

proceedings below, alone and in conjunction with the evidence adduced at trial.

It is insufficient to conclude, as the lower court did, that this new information

"would not have mattered" because the jury already knew that Ashley had originally

lied about his involvement in the murder. However, the State did not take the position

that Ashley was lying or had credibility problems; the State strenuously argued that

Ashley was telling the truth. And notwithstanding this "knowledge" by the jury that

Ashley had credibility problems, the jury convicted Mr. Mills. Ashley provided not

only an "eyewitness" account and pointed the finger at Mr. Mills as the shooter,6 but

shotgun that killed that man. Mr. Mills did" (R. 436).

23

also provided graphic testimony about having seen Mr. Wright after he was shot. See

R. 252 ("[t]he old guy was cursing like, you know, cursing in a mumbling manner").

According to the stipulated facts from the 3.850, this testimony about being in the

house and seeing what he testified to seeing was a lie. Whatever concerns the jury had

about Ashley's testimony at the guilt phase, clearly those concerns were resolved in

Ashley's favor (particularly after the read back of his testimony), and against Mr. Mills.

Just because the jury knew that Mr. Ashley had "credibility problems" as the lower

court wrote, does not establish that this new information would not have completely

eviscerated his testimony, particularly his admission now that "I might tell you I pulled

the trigger." Mr. Mills submits that he is entitled to relief in the form of a new trial.

Mr. Mills also submits that he is entitled to a life sentence based on this newly-discovered

evidence. Although the Jones standard does apply to sentencing issues

as well, see Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465, 468 (Fla. 1992), the Court has not yet

articulated how the Jones standard applies to sentencing when a jury has

recommended life. Mr. Mills submits that the issue is whether there is a reasonable

probability of a different outcome, "the outcome being the trial judge's decision to

reject the jury recommendation." Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930, 936 (11th Cir.

7 Moreover, Judge Woodson's previous written remarks in Mr. Mills' case establish

that nothing would have changed his mind. In his order summarily denying Mr. Mills'

first 3.850 motion (an order which we know now may have been drafted by the State),

Judge Woodson wrote that he would not have been persuaded not to impose the death

penalty for any reason, no matter what additional mitigation counsel failed to present

at the time of trial or sentencing. This is why imposing a burden on Mr. Mills to

24

1986). In fact, the State below agreed that the test was whether there was a reasonable

probability of a different result, the result being whether Mr. Mills' jury

recommendation would be overridden today in light of this new evidence (T. 79-80).

Despite acknowledging that "the most troubling aspect of this case" is the effect

of this information on the sentencing issue in light of the jury's life recommendation,

the lower court concluded that no relief was warranted, writing:

The court is now being called upon to determine if the

"newly discovered evidence" would have made a difference

to the judge who imposed the sentence. The court

concludes that it would not have made a difference. See

Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1992).

Mr. Mills submits that the lower court employed an erroneous legal analysis.

The test is not whether Judge Eaton believes that this evidence "would have made a

difference" to the sentencing judge, Judge Woodson. To impose on Mr. Mills a

burden of establishing what is in Judge Woodson's mind and what he might have done

is an impossible one to meet.7 Rather, it was Judge Eaton who should have put

establish that he would have changed Judge Woodson's mind is an impossible one to

meet and cannot be the legal standard.

25

himself in Judge Woodson's shoes and conducted his own analysis of whether, in

light of the record as it now stands and in light of this new information, there is a

reasonable probability that Mr. Mills' jury recommendation can be legally overridden

and/or whether such an override would be allowed on appeal under current standards.

The standard that applies to Mr. Mills' claim "should proceed on the assumption that

the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the

standards that govern the decision. It should not depend on the idiosyncracies of the

particular decisionmaker, such as unusual propensities toward harshness or leniency."

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984). Accord Lockhart v. Fretwell,

506 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1993). Just as "[a] defendant has no entitlement to the luck of

a lawless decisionmaker," Strickland, 466 So. 2d at 695, the opposite is also true.

"[E]vidence about the actual process of decision, if not part of the record of the

proceeding under review, and evidence about, for example, a particular judge's

sentencing practices, should not be considered. . . ." Id.

In other words, "the overriding question today is whether Mr. [Ashley's]

culpability vis-a-vis that of Mr. [Mills] might be judged differently" in light of this new

version of events as disclosed by Ashley[,] Scott v. State, 657 So. 2d 1129, 1132

26

(Fla. 1995) (Kogan, J., concurring), and whether this information could support a

reasonable basis for the jury's life recommendation. Porter. See also Stevens v. State,

552 So. 2d 1082, 1086 (Fla. 1989) ("the presentation of this mitigating evidence may

have persuaded the trial judge that an override was unreasonable under the

circumstances. . . [I]f the trial judge views the case as one without any mitigating

circumstances when in fact those circumstances exist, then confidence in the trial

judge's decision to reject the jury's recommendation is undermined").

This Court was faced with an analogous situation in Hildwin v. Dugger, 654 So.

2d 107 (Fla. 1995). In Hildwin, the judge presiding over Mr. Hildwin's collateral

ineffective assistance of counsel issues was not the trial judge. Following an

evidentiary hearing, the court concluded that Hildwin had failed to establish prejudice

in part because the postconviction judge concluded that there was no evidence that

could have been presented to the trial judge which would have changed the trial judge's

mind about sentencing Mr. Hildwin to death. Hildwin, 654 So. 2d at 111 (Anstead, J.,

specially concurring). "In other words, a substantial basis for the trial judge's denial

of relief here was the candid belief that the sentencing judge was so predisposed to

imposing death that there was virtually nothing that counsel could have done to change

the outcome." Id. This analysis "alone undermines confidence in the integrity of the

prior sentencing proceeding." Id. at 112. Justice Anstead concluded:

27

When trial judges take an oath to uphold the law, that

includes taking on the responsibility for sentencing in capital

cases, including the potential imposition of the death penalty

in those cases where the circumstances mandate its

application in accord with legislative policy and judicial

restraints. However, such a decision is controlled by the

circumstances of each particular case, and cannot be made

until those circumstances are developed though the detailed

sentencing process required in capital cases. The

constitutional validity of the death sentence rests a rigid and

good faith adherence to this process. Confidence is

undermined if the sentencing judge is already biased in favor

of imposing the death penalty where there is "any" basis for

doing so. Such a mindset is the antithesis of the proper

posture of a judge in any sentencing proceeding.

Id.

Likewise, in Mr. Mills' case, Judge Eaton's clear conclusion is that this new

information would not have made a difference to Judge Woodson. This conclusion

has as its underlying assumption that Judge Woodson would not have followed the law

irrespective of any evidence in the record which would support the jury's

recommendation of life. In fact, Judge Eaton noted below "I know [Judge Woodson]

and you don't" (T. 79). This is correct; Mr. Mills' counsel does not know Judge

Woodson. For that precise reason, the burden cannot possibly be that Mr. Mills has

to persuade one judge that another judge would have changed his mind. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 695. A correct analysis must presume that the sentencing judge would

have an open mind, be impartial, and follow the law to determine whether this new

8 In fact, before the Court is an affidavit from an individual to whom Ashley did

confess. See Argument II.

28

information, in conjunction with the other mitigation, would have precluded an override

of the jury's life recommendation. Here, that burden is clearly satisfied. The new

evidence from Ashley is not simply more of what was already known. Rather, there

is a clear indication that Ashley might testify that he was the shooter.8 Thus the issue

goes beyond disparate treatment, but rather to the level of culpability between Mr.

Mills and Ashley because, there is evidence now in this record that Ashley could have

been the triggerman. In fact, this was the precise focus of Justice McDonald's dissent

on direct appeal. See Mills, 476 So. 2d at 180 (McDonald, J., dissenting, in which

Overton, J., concurred) ("The jury could also have concluded that Mills and Ashley

were being treated so disparately when their involvement was substantially the same

 

that any such doubt should be weighed in Mills' favor"). If this new evidence "could

have raised in the jurors' minds the question of who actually [shot] the victim,"

Pentecost v. State, 545 So.2d 861, 863 (Fla. 1989), then Mr. Mills is entitled to relief,

as the judge would have been precluded from overriding in light of this new evidence.

Keen v. State, 775 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2000).

Moreover, had the record as it now stands in Mr. Mills' case been the record

before this Court on direct appeal, there can be no question that the override would

9 See Mills, 476 So. 2d at 180 (McDonald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).

 

10 See Mills, 603 So. 2d at 486 (Barkett, J., dissenting); id. at 487 (Kogan, J.,

dissenting).

27

have been reversed. See Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465, 469 (Fla. 1992) ("Based

upon this record, this Court probably would have found Scott's death sentence

inappropriate had Robinson's life sentence been factored into our review on direct

appeal"). Indeed, a (bare) majority of this Court found in 1992 that while the override

might not be sustained at that time, it was the "law of the case." Mills v. State, 603 So.

2d 482, 486 (Fla. 1992). In light of this new evidence, in conjunction with the other

mitigation in this record from both the original penalty phase 9 as well as that evidence

presented in postconviction,10 there can be no question that this override can stand

under a proper analysis pursuant to Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975), and

Keen, supra. As the majority of the Court recently held in Mr. Mills' case, the Keen

analysis is simply "an application of out long-standing Tedder analysis." Mills v.

Moore, No. SC01-338, slip op. at 16 (Fla. April 12, 2001). That being the case, this

record as it now stands would clearly require reversal under Keen.

Based on the foregoing, alone and in conjunction with the arguments set forth

in Argument II, "in this case it would be [] appropriate to simply reverse for a

resentencing before the trial judge." Thompson v. State, 731 So. 2d 1235, 1236 (Fla.

28

1998).

11 The issues in this claim were first raised in a Motion to Relinquish and for

Clarification filed with the Court on April 19, 2001. The Court denied the motion.

Thus, without further clarification or a relinquishment, Mr. Mills has no choice but to

raise these issues in this brief. Because the State has opposed relinquishment, Mr.

Mills submits that it is disentitled from challenging factual assertions either as to

diligence or the merits, and as a result, "it would be more appropriate to simply reverse

for a resentencing before the trial judge." Thompson v. State, 731 So. 2d 1235, 1236

(Fla. 1998).

 

12 Of course, the repository was also handling on an expedited basis the records it

had received in the Wayne Tompkins case.

29

 

ARGUMENT II

NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE REQUIRES

THAT MR. MILLS BE PERMITTED TO AMEND

HIS RULE 3.850 MOTION AT THIS TIME AND

THAT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS

REQUIRED.

1. New Evidence of Ex Parte Communication.11

 

On March 29, 2001, Mr. Mills requested records from, inter alia, the State

Attorney's Office in Seminole County pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852 (h)(3). The

State responded by indicating that it was forwarding records in its possession

generated after Mr. Mills' initial request in 1989 to the repository, as is required by Fla.

R. Crim. P. 3.852 (PCR. 151). Mr. Mills was in contact numerous times with the

repository, urging it to process the records as quickly as possible and forward them

to Mr. Mills (PCR. 398).12 Mr. Mills eventually sought to compel the Repository to

13 The repository no longer makes hard copies of records; rather, it scans them

onto a CD disc and the disc is what is received by CCRC. CCRC then must

download the disc and print the documents.

30

provide the records to Mr. Mills as soon as possible.

The State Attorney's Office sent its records to the repository on April 6, 2001.

However, they were not received by Mr. Mills' office until April 17, 2001, when they

were thereupon downloaded and printed.13 When Mr. Mills' counsel returned in the

evening of April 18, 2001, from the Tompkins evidentiary hearing in Hillsborough

County, he began to review the records. He discovered information not previously

known to counsel and not previously disclosed to counsel by the State pursuant to its

obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

Upon review of the records from the State Attorney's Office of the Eighteenth

Judicial Circuit (records which had been generated following Mr. Mills' first request

for records in 1989), counsel discovered that unsigned drafts of the order summarily

denying Mr. Mills' first Rule 3.850 motion were contained in the State's files. Mr.

Mills' counsel also discovered a handwritten note dated from 1989 (the actual dates

are illegible), which reads:

To: Sandy Masak

Sanford SAO

Here is the paperwork on D Gregory Mills that I copied

14 Steve Plotnik was one of the prosecutors working on Mr. Mills' first

postconviction proceedings.

31

from Judge Woodson's file. For Steve Plotnik.[14 ]

s/ Donna

Melb. SAO

Based on the discovery of this information, Mr. Mills submits that a claim now

exists as to the State's preparation on an ex parte basis of the order summarily denying

Mr. Mills' first 3.850 motion in 1989. This claim requires factual development. See

Smith v. State, 708 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1998) (appeal relinquished for evidentiary hearing

on whether ex parte communication occurred regarding drafting of order); Swafford

v. State, 636 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1994) (same). There is no other explanation for these

unsigned orders being in the State's files.

This is the same situation addressed by the Court in Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d

982 (Fla. 1993), where the Court found a due process violation when collateral counsel

was not provided adequate opportunity to review and/or object to the State's

proposed order denying relief. Mr. Mills' case is even more egregious, as there is no

indication that collateral counsel even knew that the judge had asked the State to

prepare the order, much less that collateral counsel had inadequate opportunity to

respond.

15 The undersigned is attempting to secure an affidavit from Mr. Nolas, who is

currently practicing law in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Mr. Mills will supplement the

record with Mr. Nolas' affidavit as soon as it can be executed and forwarded to

counsel.

32

Mr. Mills' current counsel has spoken with Billy Nolas, who represented Mr.

Mills in his previous 3.850 proceedings. Mr. Nolas indicated to the undersigned that

he had not been aware that the State had drafted the order summarily denying the first

3.850 motion. Had he known, he would have filed a motion to disqualify Judge

Woodson on that basis.15 However, because this was not previously known, Judge

Woodson then proceeded to preside over the evidentiary hearing ordered by this

Court and made factual findings which have been relied on ever since by this Court

and the federal courts as to Mr. Mills' ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Given

this situation and if Mr. Mills were to prevail on this issue, he would be entitled to be

put back in a position he should have been in 1990 and have an evidentiary hearing

before a new judge. Suarez v. Dugger, 527 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1988). See also

Provenzano v. State, 616 So. 2d 428, 430 (Fla. 1993) ("Our remand after

Provenzano's initial 3.850 motion was designed to put Provenzano in the same position

he would have been in if the files had been disclosed when first requested. Given that

Provenzano's ineffectiveness claims have arisen as a result of the disclosure of the file,

we find that they are timely raised"). The original ex parte communication taints and

33

vitiates the remainder of the proceedings. Suarez; Smith.

In its pleading filed on April 19, 2001, opposing Mr. Mills' motion for

relinquishment and/or clarification, the State asserted that the existence of the unsigned

order "is far too slender a reed upon which to predicate any action at all" (Response

at 1). Mr. Mills would note that in the Wayne Tompkins' case, he alleged that the State

Attorney had drafted the sentencing order in Mr. Tompkins' case based on what had

occurred in the Holton case, where the State had conceded the error based on, among

other things, the existence of a draft sentencing order disclosed to Holton's collateral

counsel. In asserting that Mr. Tompkins' claim was based on speculation, the State

wrote in its response to Mr. Tompkins Rule 3.850 motion that "the claim for relief in

Holton which was agreed to by the state attorney's office was premised on the fact

that an unsigned, draft sentencing order had been discovered in the

prosecutor's file during postconviction investigation. No such obvious proof has

been identified by Tompkins." (State's Response to Motion to Vacate, Et. Al,

Tompkins v. State, at p.39) (emphasis added). Thus, in Tompkins, the State asserted

that evidence of draft orders in the prosecutors files is "obvious proof" warranting

further investigation, yet in Mr. Mills' case, the State argues that the draft orders on Mr.

Mills' first 3.850 motion is not enough. The State's position is meritless. See also

16 The State argues that "unsigned orders were given to counsel on April 17 and

April 18, 2001" in this case. As for the April 18 order, it was unsigned because it was

sent via email from Judge Eaton with notice. As for the April 17 order, that too was

distributed in open court to the parties; however, Judge Eaton had indicated that it had

some corrections that might need to be fixed (T. 40). The State's analogy to the

instant situation is belied by the fact there appear to have been no hearings at all in Mr.

Mills' case before the entry of the summary denial, and further by the fact that the draft

versions of the order at issue is not the same as the order eventually signed by Judge

Woodson.

34

State v. Riechmann, 777 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 2000). Moreover, Mr. Mills' allegation is not

only premised on the draft order, but also on the handwritten note establishing that

members of the State Attorney's Office were copying "paperwork" from Judge

Woodson's file.

The State also asserts that "the reasonable conclusion is that the drafts were

prepared by Judge Woodson" (Response at 1). This is a factual assertion that

warrants evidentiary development. There is nothing in the record to conclusively refute

Mr. Mills' allegation.16 Because the State is not conceding the necessity for a

relinquishment or for an evidentiary hearing, Mr. Mills' allegations must be accepted

as true. Lightbourne v. Dugger, 549 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1989). The same holds true for

the State's assertions regarding diligence. If the State is contesting diligence, then such

must be tested during an adversarial evidentiary hearing. Card v. State, 652 So. 2d 344

(Fla. 1995).

35

The State argues that because Judge Woodson's summary denial order was

reversed when this Court granted an evidentiary hearing, "there is no error" (Response

at 3). The State completely misses the point. The "error" here is a violation of due

process resulting from the lack of notice and the ex parte communication. See Huff

v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993); Rose v. State, 601 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1992).

"The essence of due process is that fair notice and a reasonable opportunity to be

heard must be given to interested parties before judgment is rendered." Scull v. State,

569 So. 2d 1251, 1252 (Fla. 1990). This is not a situation as addressed in either Glock

v. Moore, 776 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 2001), or Patton v. State, 2000 WL 142526 (Fla. Sept.

28, 2000), two cases on which the State relies. Glock and Patton addressed situations

where, over defense objections, a court signed the State's proposed orders. In both

case, notice was afforded to the defense that the State had proposed an order and the

defense was provided an opportunity to object. This is not the situation that Mr. Mills

alleges, which involves an ex parte communication about the order denying Mr. Mills

relief. This situation is exactly like, and in fact is more egregious, than that addressed

in Huff. Had Mr. Mills collateral counsel known of this situation, a motion to

disqualify would have been filed and would have to have been granted. Thus, Mr.

Mills' evidentiary hearing would have been presided over by a different judge who

might have ruled differently and made different factfindings. Suarez v. Dugger, 527

36

So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1988) (following evidentiary hearing, Court decides that judge should

have disqualified himself, and reversed for a new evidentiary hearing); Rogers v. State,

630 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1994) (same); Smith v. State, 708 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1998) (same).

Finally, the State argues that "the documents at issue could have been

discovered in 1989 through the exercise of due diligence. Chapter 119 was available

at that time, and the documents referred to by Mills could have been discovered then"

(Response at 3). The State's diligence argument is curious; if the documents are

merely a "slender reed" upon which to predicate any claim, then the State's argument

that Mr. Mills should have known about the documents is disingenuous. The State

cannot have it both ways. Moreover, the State's diligence argument is meritless. Mr.

Mills did make a Chapter 119 request in 1989; these documents, however, were

generated after the original request. See PCR. 286-87 ("the remaining documents not

in existence and in this office's file at the time of the previous requests have been

indexed and forwarded to the records repository of the Florida Secretary of State").

Mr. Mills knows, as does the State and as does this Court, that if Mr. Mills had made

a demand for public records made after this Court remanded for an evidentiary

hearing, the State, after making its predictable vituperative allegations about CCR's

"vexatious" Chapter 119 requests, would have claimed an exemption because Mr.

17 In fact, the Attorney General's Office in the instant proceedings objected to Mr.

Mills' demand for records on this basis: "to the extent that any of the files in the

possession of the Office of the Attorney General could be considered to fall within the

scope of Mills' request, no disclosure is required when litigation involving the Attorney

General is ongoing" (PCR. ) (citing Kokal).

37

Mills' case was in active litigation. See State v. Kokal, 562 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1990).17

 

It is simply ludicrous for the State to suggest that Mr. Mills should have made the

request in 1990, for the State cannot with any good faith establish that it would have

honored the request. That being the case, Mr. Mills cannot be faulted for not

undertaking a fruitless effort.

In addition, the State's diligence argument is a not-so-subtle way of shifting its

own obligations onto Mr. Mills. It is the State that has the ongoing duty to disclose

exculpatory material during the postconviction process. See Johnson v. Butterworth,

713 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 1998); Roberts v. Butterworth, 668 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1996). The

State has a duty to learn of evidence that might be favorable to Mr. Mills which could

form the basis for relief. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); Strickler v. Greene,

527 U.S. 263 (1999). This information was in the State's possession, and at no time

was it disclosed to Mr. Mills.

 

2. New Evidence that Ashley was the Triggerman.

 

On April 18, 2001, a witness who counsel's investigator interviewed, provided

38

a sworn affidavit that Mr. Mills' codefendant, Vincent Ashley, had confessed to him

that he, not Mr. Mills, was the shooter:

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN H. ANDERSON

DATED APRIL 18, 2000

My name is John H. Anderson and this is my sworn

statement:

I am an inmate at Polk Correctional Institute in Polk

Co., Florida

I was a resident of Seminole County Jail in 1979

during which time I met Vincent Ashley. As we were

walking in the prison yard one day, Vincent talked about the

crime that both he and Greg had committed against the

Wright family in Sanford, Florida.

Vince Ashley stated that he had shot Mr. Wright "the

dude" because he though the dude was going to shoot him

first. At that time, Greg Mills, his partner, was on the porch

and had no gun, that Vince had possession of the gun.

Since that time, no attorney or investigator has ever

approached me and no one has ever asked any questions

about the crime in question, Vincent Ashley or Greg Mills

until I first met with Nicholas Atkinson on Thursday April

12, 2001.

s/John H. Anderson

(Attachment A).

This information requires evidentiary development, particularly in light of

Ashley's statements to the court at the April 17 proceeding. See Argument I.

39

However, the State has opposed relinquishment, arguing first that the evidence was

known "as long ago as April 12, 2001 (Response at 4). This is not correct. Mr.

Anderson was interviewed on two occasions, first on April 12, when he indicated a

desire to think about whether he wanted to come forward with this information; Mr.

Anderson was then re-interviewed on April 18, 2001, when he disclosed the

information contained in the affidavit executed on that date. Thus, the undersigned's

investigator nor the undersigned did not know about the substance of what Mr.

Anderson would say until April 18, the day of the affidavit.

The State also argued that this evidence is "functionally identical" to that

addressed in Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2000). The definition of "functionally

identical" is not set forth by the State. Of course, in Sims, an evidentiary hearing was

held on the claims of newly discovered evidence. Ashley's confession would not be

hearsay, or double hearsay, as was the case in Sims. Sims, 754 SO. 2d at 660.

Ashley is the co-defendant, who made a confession to a third party. As such, it

clearly qualifies as a statement against interest. § 90.804 (2), Fla. Stat. (1999). Here,

Ashley's confession is clearly against interest; moreover, it is corroborated by his

performance at the evidentiary hearing of April 17, 2001. See Argument I. Even if it

were hearsay, Ashley's confession would also be admissible under Chambers v.

Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). Finally, Ashley's confession would be admissible

40

at Mr. Mills' penalty phase. Garcia v. State, 622 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1993); Green v.

Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979). The State also argues that Ashley's confession "in no

way effects the testimony of Sylvester Davis, which was consistent with, but

independent of, that of Ashley" (Response at 6). This assertion flies in the face of the

State's disavowment of Ashley's credibility below at the evidentiary hearing when it

stipulated to Mr. Mills' allegations in the 3.850 motion that Ashley said he lied at Mr.

Mills' trial. Furthermore, Davis' testimony was not "consistent" with Ashley's in the

sense that they did not testify to the same events. Davis' testimony must be viewed

in light of the context in which it arose. Both Davis and his girlfriend, Viola Mae

Stafford, were accomplices (although Stafford never testified at trial). Davis and

Stafford were spending the evening at Mr. Mills' apartment on the evening in question.

When the police returned Mr. Mills home after he was released, the police specifically

requested that Mr. Davis contact them if he had any information about the case; Davis

never did so (T. 127-28). After Stafford was arrested a few days later (she was

shoplifting from a store at which Mr. Mills' sister-in-law worked and Mr. Mill's sister-in-

law contacted police), "the idea came up that she would give them some information

for, you know, the dropping of her charges" (T. 117). At that time, Davis and

Stafford took the police to where they had hidden the shells from the gun (T. 118).

However, they did not at that time say anything else about Mr. Mills' involvement (Id.).

41

About two weeks later, Davis was arrested for burglary, and was taken to the police

station (T. 118-19). At that time, Davis testified that "[m]e and the police department

made a deal" that "they'd drop my charges, the charges they had on me for burglary"

(T. 119-20). It was only then that Davis told the police his story about having seen

Mr. Mills take a rifle on the night of the Wright homicide, and that Mr. Mills later that

evening had told him "about he had shot some cracker or something." That the State

must resort to this testimony from Davis demonstrates its desperation to find anything

that can salvage a weak case.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that relief is warranted. Mr. Mills submits that

an evidentiary hearing is warranted. However, he also submits that in light of the

posture of this case and the arguments contained in this brief, "it would be more

appropriate to simply reverse for a resentencing before the trial judge." Thompson v.

State, 731 So. 2d 1235, 1236 (Fla. 1998).

18 Mr. Mills was convicted of first-degree felony murder.

42

 

ARGUMENT III

THE STATE OF FLORIDA'S RECENT

CONCESSION THAT THE "DURING THE

COURSE OF A FELONY" AGGRAVATING

CIRCUMSTANCE CONSTITUTES AN

AUTOMATIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE

WARRANTS RECONSIDERATION OF THIS

ISSUE AND WARRANTS SENTENCING RELIEF.

 

Since his direct appeal, Mr. Mills has been challenging the "during the course

of a felony" aggravating circumstance as an "automatic aggravating circumstance" in

violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.18 The issue was raised on direct

appeal and rejected by the Court:

Mills argues that the factor of the murder having been

committed in the course of a burglary should not have been

considered in his case since it was submitted to the jury on

the theory of felony murder. He contends that to submit

this aggravating circumstance to the jury in a felony-murder

case renders a finding of aggravation automatic. This, he

argues, violates eighth amendment principles of

proportionality because under this practice a person found

guilty of felony murder is more likely to receive a death

sentence than a person found guilty of premeditated

murder. This contention is without merit. The legislative

determination that a first-degree murder that occurs in the

course of a felony is an aggravated capital felony is

reasonable.

Mills v. State, 476 So. 2d 172, 178 (Fla. 1985) (citations omitted).

43

Subsequent to the decisions in Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992), and

Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 (1992), Mr. Mills sought habeas corpus relief

challenging both the adequacy of the Court's harmless error analysis in his case as well

as the application of the "during the course of a felony" aggravating circumstance.

Regarding the claim that the felony-murder aggravating factor is an unconstitutional

automatic aggravating circumstance, the Court held: "We considered and rejected the

substance of this claim on direct appeal." Mills v. Singletary, 606 So. 2d 622, 623

(Fla. 1992).

In his federal habeas corpus petition, Mr. Mills again challenged the felony

murder aggravating circumstance as an "automatic aggravator" in violation of the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and again the claim was rejected by the federal

courts. See Mills v. Singletary, 161 F.3d 1273, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 1998).

Thus, since 1980, Mr. Mills has been arguing that the felony murder aggravator

constituted an impermissible automatic aggravator. Since 1980, the State has been

arguing that Mr. Mills is wrong. Since 1980, the courts of Florida and the federal

courts have agreed with the State. However, in 2001, the State of Florida announced

before this Court that its position on whether Mr. Mills was automatically subject to

the death penalty upon his conviction for first-degree felony murder had changed and

that it now agreed with Mr. Mills' argument:

19 If Mr. Mills had been convicted of premeditated murder, he would not have been

automatically eligible for death, as the level of premeditation sufficient to support the

existence beyond a reasonable doubt of the "cold, calculated, and premeditated"

aggravating circumstance is more than is required to support a finding at the guilt

phase of premeditated murder. See Jackson v. State, 575 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1996).

44

 

First of all, it is very significant that Mr. Mills was

convicted on a felony murder theory. This is not a

case where there is a general verdict. This is a case

where it went to the jury on felony murder and they

convicted on a felony murder theory. At that point,

there is absolutely no question that an aggravating

circumstance had been proven beyond a reasonable

doubt.

 

(Transcript of Oral Argument, April 2, 2001) (emphasis added).

In light of the State's concession before this Court, this claim cannot be

procedurally barred, and Mr. Mills' argument must be revisited and relief must be

granted at this time. Mr. Mills was convicted of one count of felony murder, with

burglary being the underlying felony. Upon his conviction, the State has conceded that

there is "absolutely no question that an aggravating circumstance had been proven

beyond a reasonable doubt." The death penalty in this case was predicated upon

unreliable automatic findings of a statutory aggravating circumstance -- the very felony

murder finding that formed the basis for the conviction.19 Since under Florida law a

death sentence is proper upon the finding of a single aggravating circumstance, the

State's concession translates into a mandatory death sentence for Mr. Mills, which is

20 In fact, depending on the felony, some felony murder defendants go into the

sentencing phase with two aggravating circumstances. For example, if the underlying

felony is robbery or burglary, the pecuniary gain factor would, under the State's

concession, also automatically apply, whereas it would not if the underlying felony

were kidnapping or arson, for example.

45

patently unconstitutional. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 305 (1976). If

an aggravating circumstance "applies to every defendant eligible for the death penalty,

the circumstance is constitutionally infirm." Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474

(1993).

A state cannot use aggravating "factors which as a practical matter fail to guide

the sentencer's discretion." Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992). Moreover, "it

is not enough for an aggravating circumstance, as construed by the state courts, to be

determinate. Our precedents make clear that a State's capital sentencing scheme also

must `genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.'" Arave,

507 U.S. at 474 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983)). To be

constitutionally sound, an aggravating factor "may not apply to every defendant

convicted of murder; it must apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of

murder." Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994). However, in Mr. Mills'

case, the State has conceded to the Florida Supreme Court that every defendant

convicted of felony murder has at least one aggravating factor 20 against him before he

46

even enters the sentencing phase. This is unconstitutional under Florida's capital

sentencing scheme as interpreted by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Recently, Justice Anstead, joined by then-Chief Justice Kogan, wrote that the

felony murder aggravating circumstance "may well be unconstitutional when applied

to a defendant convicted of felony murder." Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7, 12 (Fla.

1998) (Anstead, J., specially concurring). As Justice Anstead wrote:

[] I write separately to express my disagreement with the

reasoning of the majority opinion. This aggravator, as

contained in section 921.141 (5)(d), Florida Statutes (1995),

may well be unconstitutional when applied to a defendant

convicted of felony murder. When the same felony used to

establish guilt of first-degree felony murder is again used as

an aggravator to justify to imposition of the death penalty,

Florida's felony murder aggravator may well fail to meet the

U.S. Supreme Court's mandate that aggravating

circumstances in a state's death penalty scheme must

"genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death

penalty" and "reasonably justify the imposition of a more

severe sentence compared to others found guilty of

murder." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).

The concept of narrowing requires that once it has

been established that a defendant is guilty of first-degree

murder the sentencer may properly consider only additional

factors, termed aggravators, that genuinely narrow the class

of convicted murderers who may be eligible for the death

penalty. For example, if a person is guilty of premeditated

murder and is shown to have been guilty of additional

aggravating misconduct, then he becomes part of a

narrower, less numerous class of persons eligible for the

death penalty. But a person convicted of felony murder

47

who then has the same felony used against her as an

aggravator does not become a member of a smaller group.

Rather, the felony aggravator used there would make the

entire larger group of felony murderers automatically eligible

for the death penalty without proof of any additional

aggravating misconduct. Hence, the felony aggravator

serves no legitimate narrowing function in such a case.

* * *

Under Florida's death penalty scheme, a convicted

defendant cannot qualify for the death sentence unless one

or more statutory aggravators are found to exist in addition

to the conviction for first-degree murder. See Elam v.

State, 636 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1994). Hence, a defendant

convicted of intentional premeditated murder will not be

eligible for the death penalty unless some additional

aggravating circumstance, in addition to the premeditated

murder, is found to exist. On the other hand, a person

found guilty of felony murder automatically becomes

eligible for a death sentence. By reason of the felony

murder aggravator, the underlying felony is used not only as

a legal substitute for premeditation to support a first-degree

murder conviction; but is also used as a statutory

aggravator to immediately make the defendant eligible for

the death sentence. In other words, Florida's felony murder

aggravator permits a defendant convicted of felony murder

to be sentenced to death by virtue of his conviction for

felony murder alone.

Common sense alone tells us the scheme described

above is patently inconsistent with the United States

Supreme Court's strict requirements in Zant v. Stephens for

a rational and narrowing scheme for selecting those who will

be subject to the death penalty. Recently, the U.S.

Supreme Court reiterated the requisite narrowing function

that must be served by proper aggravating factors,

48

explaining again that where a weighing state, like Florida,

uses aggravating factors to determine who is eligible for the

death penalty, "it cannot use factors which as a practical

matter fail to guide the sentencer's discretion." Stringer v.

Black, 503 U.S. 222, 235 (1992). By making a defendant

convicted of felony murder automatically eligible for the

death penalty based upon the same felony that was used to

establish the defendant's conviction for murder, this scheme

simply does not narrow the class of persons who become

eligible for the death penalty. Rather, if anything, it clearly

enlarges the eligible class in an irrational way.

Blanco, 706 So. 2d at 12-14.

Other states have determined that the "felony murder" aggravating circumstance

violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. For example, the Tennessee

Supreme Court struck the felony murder aggravator from its sentencing statute which,

like Florida's, is a weighing scheme:

In Zant v. Stephens, the United States Supreme Court said

that in order to comply with the Eighth Amendment,

aggravating circumstances must `genuinely narrow the class

of persons eligible for the death penalty and must

reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence

on the defendant compared to others found guilty of

murder.' It seems obvious that Tennessee's statute fails to

narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty

because:

Automatically instructing the sentencing body

on the underlying felony in a felony-murder

case does nothing to aid the jury in its task of

distinguishing between first-degree homicides

and defendants for the purpose of imposing

49

the death penalty. Relevant distinctions dim,

since all participants in a felony-murder,

regardless of varying degrees of culpability,

enter the sentencing stage with at least one

aggravating factor against them.

A comparison of the sentencing treatments

afforded first-degree murder defendants

further highlights the impropriety of using the

underlying felony to aggravate felony murder.

The felony murderer, in contrast to the

premeditated murderer, enters the sentencing

stage with one aggravating circumstance

automatically charged against him. This

disparity in sentencing treatment bears no

relationship to legitimate distinguishing features

upon which the death penalty might

constitutionally rest.

State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 341-46 (Tenn. 1992) (quoting Engberg v.

State, 686 P.2d 541, 560 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, J., dissenting)).

Similarly, the North Carolina Supreme Court has prohibited the felony murder

statutory aggravating circumstance:

A defendant convicted of felony murder, nothing else

appearing, will have one aggravating circumstance `pending'

for no other reason than the nature of the conviction. On

the other hand, a defendant convicted of a premeditated and

deliberate killing, nothing else appearing, enters the

sentencing phase with no strikes against him. This is highly

incongruous, particularly in light of the fact that the felony

murder may have been unintentional, whereas, a

premeditated murder is, by definition, intentional and

preconceived.

50

State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551, 567 (N.C. 1979).

And the State of Wyoming has also echoed the holdings of North Carolina and

Tennessee as to this aggravating circumstance:

In this case, the enhancing effect of the underlying felony

(robbery) provided two of the aggravating circumstances

which led to Engberg's death sentence: (1) murder during

commission of a felony, and (2) murder for pecuniary gain.

As a result, the underlying robbery was not used once but

three times to convict and then enhance the seriousness of

Engberg's crime to a death sentence. All felony murders

involving robbery, by definition, contain at least the two

aggravating circumstances detailed above. This places the

felony murder defendant in a worse position than the

defendant convicted of premeditated murder, simply

because his crime was committed in conjunction with

another felony. This is an arbitrary and capricious

classification, in violation of the Furman/Gregg narrowing

requirement.

Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 89 (Wyo. 1991).

In light of the State's concession to the Florida Supreme Court, Mr. Mills

submits that this issue should be revisited and that relief should issue.

51

 

ARGUMENT IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR.

MILLS' REQUESTS FOR PUBLIC RECORDS

PURSUANT TO RULE 3.852.

 

Mr. Mills sought public records pursuant to Fla. Stat. Ch. 119 and Fla. R. Crim.

P. 3.852 (h)(3) and (i). See Ventura v. State, 673 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1996); Muehleman

v. Dugger, 634 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1993); Walton v. Dugger, 634 So. 2d 1059 (Fla.

1993); Mendyk v. State, 592 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 1992); State v. Kokal, 562 So. 2d 324

(Fla. 1990); Provenzano v. Dugger, 561 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1990). Counsel for Mr. Mills

has the duty to seek and obtain every public record in existence in this case. Porter

v. State, 653 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied 115 S.Ct. 1816 (1995).

This Court has ruled that collateral counsel must obtain every public record in

existence regarding a capital case or else a procedural default will be assessed against

the defendant. Porter v. State, 653 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1995). However, a concomitant

obligation under relevant case law as well as Chapter 119 rests with the State to furnish

the requested materials. Ventura v. State, 673 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1996). When the

State's inaction in failing to disclose public records results in a capital post conviction

litigant's inability to fully plead claims for relief, the State is estopped from claiming

that the post conviction motion should be denied or dismissed. Id. ("The State cannot

fail to furnish relevant information and then argue that the claim need not be heard on

52

its merits because of an asserted procedural default that was caused by the State's

failure to act").

Effective legal representation has been denied Mr. Mills because the circuit court

denied access to public records from the following agencies: Florida Department of

Law Enforcement; Orlando Police Department; Florida Parole Commission/Office of

Executive Clemency; Department of State, Division of Elections; Office of the State

Attorney, Eighteenth Judicial Circuit. Without these records, it is impossible for

counsel to prepare a complete Rule 3.850 motion for Mr. Mills.

On April 10, 2001, Mr. Mills filed a motion to compel production of public

records from all agencies who had not complied with Mr. Mills's previous demands.

The aforementioned agencies filed objections to Mr. Mills' demands for additional

public records.

The circuit court held a hearing on April 12, 2001 for the purpose of resolving

all pending public records matters, including any outstanding objections and/or

motions which had been filed in response to Mr. Mills' demands. At that time, the

court denied Mr. Mills access to the records from the aforementioned agencies. These

records are essential to conducting an adequate investigation in Mr. Mills's case.

The demands sent to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the

Office of the State Attorney requested criminal records related to the jurors in Mr.

53

Mills' case. Whether or not any of the jurors had any criminal history and/or

involvement with the criminal justice system, law enforcement or the state is relevant

because it gives rise to a claim for relief if a juror failed to disclose this information to

the court at the time of trial. In Buenoano v. State, 708 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1998), this

Court made it clear that any such claim will be procedurally barred if counsel fails to

exercise due diligence. Unlike the Buenoano case, no juror questionnaires exist in Mr.

Mills case, thus Mr. Mills only means of obtaining this information is through the

current public records demands directed to FDLE and the State Attorney's Office.

The only records sought from the Orlando Police Department regard Mr. Mills

and his codefendant Vincent Ashley. As such, the request was not overly

burdensome. Orlando Police Department conducted the investigation of a prior felony

which was used as an aggravator in the instant case. Mr. Ashley was also the

codefendant in the prior felony and received immunity from prosecution on that felony

as well as immunity in exchange for his testimony against Mr. Mills in the instant case.

Additionally, the Orlando Police Department relied upon hypnotism in order to refresh

the victim's memory regarding the suspect and as a result he was able to identify Mr.

Mills. Because this unusual practice was used, Mr. Mills has requested the personal

notes of the officer who hypnotized the victim, as well as his personnel and internal

affairs files. The State is required to prove aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt,

54

and here the judge found the prior felony aggravator to exist. Certainly, it is counsel's

duty to investigate each of the aggravators presented by the State. The fact that the

victim in the prior felony case could not identify Mr. Mills until she was hypnotized

causes concern of improper suggestion on the part of law enforcement and must be

investigated. Because Mr. Mills has been denied these records, he is unable to

adequately investigate any claim which may stem from the prior felony.

Likewise, the records requested from the Department of State, Division of

Elections were not extensive. The only request made was for records regarding Judge

William Woodson. These records are necessary to investigate a claim whether the trial

judge received contributions from any persons having an interest in Mr. Mills case.

See Lightbourne v. State, 549 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1989); Porter v. Singletary, 49 F. 3d

1483 (11th Cir. 1995). Mr. Mills is prohibited from questioning a judge directly

without first showing good cause. State v. Lewis, 656 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1994); Porter

v. Singletary. As a result, Mr. Mills has no other means of establishing good cause.

Each of the demands sent to the above listed agencies were sent after a

thorough search of the records previously received by Mr. Mills. The information

sought in the demands was limited to only those individuals or information which

directly pertains to the investigation of valid claims for relief. For example, the

individuals who were the focus of the bulk of the demands were Vincent Ashley,

21 Undersigned counsel is not in a portion to know whether the agencies and/or the

repository have provided Mr. Mills with the public records to which he is entitled. For

example, in another CCRC-South case, the repository was specifically requested to

deliver to CCRC-South all records pertaining to that case from the various agencies

who provided the repository with records. Although nine (9) boxes of records were

delivered to CCRC-South, many records that CCRC-South anticipated to be included

were absent. Despite the fact that the repository assured CCRC-South that all records

were delivered, upon further investigation, eleven (11) additional boxes of records

were discovered at the repository which were not previously sent to CCRC-South.

Furthermore, recently in the case of Wayne Tompkins, who is also represented

by undersigned counsel, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement sent additional

records to the repository one day after Mr. Tompkins Rule 3.850 motion was filed,

and six days after an FDLE representative had told the circuit court that all records had

already been sent to the repository. It is an impossibility for undersigned counsel to

identify records that may or may not exist. The history of the repository and CCRC-South's

experiences with the repository and agencies sending records to the repository

bring forth legitimate concerns that records have been withheld.

55

Sylvester Davis and Viola Mae Stafford. These were the key witnesses at trial. Mr.

Mills is being denied the opportunity to thoroughly investigate and prepare a complete

3.850 motion.

Furthermore, there may be yet more records, the existence of which Mr. Mills

is not currently aware, which have not yet been provided to Mr. Mills.21 Therefore, Mr.

Mills does not waive any public records claim that may exist, but that due to

circumstances beyond his control, he does not know about. Mr. Mills should be

allowed to amend once the requested records have been disclosed.

56

 

CONCLUSION

 

Mr. Mills submits that he is entitled to a new trial or a new sentencing

proceeding before the judge. Because the standards of Tedder cannot be met in light

of the newly-discovered information contained herein, alone and in conjunction with

the previously-presented mitigation in the record, the State is precluded from seeking

the death penalty against Mr. Mills. Moreover, as the State has refused to conceded

that the newly-discovered evidence alleged in Argument II warrants no evidentiary

hearing, those allegations must now be accepted as true, and rather than remand for

an evidentiary hearing that the State does not want, Mr. Mills submits that "it would be

more appropriate to simply reverse for a resentencing before the trial judge."

Thompson, 731 So. 2d at 1236.

57

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by

fax transmission to all counsel of record on April 20, 2001.

TODD G. SCHER

Florida Bar No. 0899641

Litigation Director

CCRC South

101 NE 3d Avenue, Suite 400

Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301

(954) 713-1284

Attorney for Defendant

Copies furnished to:

Kenneth Nunnelley, Asst. Attorney General

Office of the Attorney General

444 Seabreeze Boulevard, 5th Floor

Daytona Beach, FL 32118

 

CERTIFICATE OF FONT

 

Counsel hereby certifies that this brief is typed in New Times Roman 14-point

type.

Todd G. Scher, Attorney for Appellant