10/22/92 GREGORY MILLS, v. HARRY K. SINGLETARY, etc.,
[Editor's note: footnotes (if any) trail the opinion]
[1] SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
[2] GREGORY MILLS, Petitioner,
v.
[3] HARRY K. SINGLETARY, etc., Respondent.
[4] No. 80,124
[5] 606 So. 2d 622, 17 Fla. Law W. S 657
BLUE BOOK CITATION FORM: 1992.FL.2519 (http://www.versuslaw.com)
[6] Date Decided: October 22, 1992
[7] Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
[8] APPELLATE PANEL:
[9] BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING,
JJ., concur.
[10] PER CURIAM DECISION
[11] Gregory Mills, a prisoner on death row, petitions this Court for writ
of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section
3(b)(1), (9), Florida Constitution. Because the issues raised are
procedurally barred, we deny the petition.
[12] Mills has been before this Court several times: Mills v. State, 476
So.2d 172 (Fla. 1985) (direct appeal), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031, 89 L.
Ed. 2d 349, 106 S. Ct. 1241 (1986); Mills v. Dugger, 559 So.2d 578 (Fla.
1990) (habeas, postconviction); and Mills v. State, 603 So.2d 482, 1992 Fla.

[13] Habeas corpus cannot "be used 'for obtaining additional appeals of
issues which were raised, or should have been raised, on direct appeal or
which were waived at trial or which could have, should have, or have been
raised in' prior post-conviction filings." Mills v. Dugger, 574 So.2d 63, 65
(Fla. 1990), quoting White v. Dugger, 511 So.2d 554, 555 (Fla. 1987). In an
attempt to overcome this procedural bar Mills argues that Sochor v. Florida,
119 L. Ed. 2d 326, 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992), Stringer v. Black, 117 L. Ed. 2d
367, 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992), and Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 111 S. Ct.
731, 112 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1991), are major changes in the law that should be
applied retroactively under Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1067, 66 L. Ed. 2d 612, 101 S. Ct. 796 (1980), to give
relief in post-conviction proceedings. We disagree.
[14] We have previously held that Stringer and Parker do not meet the Witt
requirements. Kennedy v. Singletary, 599 So.2d 991 (Fla.), cert. denied, 120
L. Ed. 2d 909, 112 S. Ct. 3040 (1992); Routly v. State, 590 So.2d 397 (Fla.
1991). The United States Supreme Court remanded Sochor for our
reconsideration because we had not made a plain statement that we found the
error in Sochor's sentencing to be harmless. Sochor is not a change in the
law that will save Mills' first claim from a procedural bar, and that claim
is barred from consideration. Moreover, in affirming Mills' death sentence
we stated: "Because there were no mitigating circumstances, we find that the
court's erroneous finding of two statutory aggravating circumstances was
harmless and did not impair the sentencing process." 476 So.2d at 179. We,
therefore, applied, and applied correctly, a harmless error analysis in
Mills' direct appeal. Cf. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 958, 77 L. Ed.
2d 1134, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983) ("the Florida Supreme Court does not apply
its harmless-error analysis in an automatic or mechanical fashion, but
rather upholds death sentences on the basis of this analysis only when it
actually finds that the error is harmless"); see White v. Dugger, 565 So.2d
700 (Fla. 1990).
[15] Mills' second claim is also procedurally barred. We considered and
rejected the substance of this claim on direct appeal. 476 So.2d at 178.
Thus, we found the claim procedurally barred in Mills' first habeas corpus
petition. 559 So.2d at 579. Again, Stringer is not a change in the law that
warrants retroactive application, and Mills' second claim is procedurally
barred.
[16] We therefore deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
[17] It is so ordered.
[18] BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING,
JJ., concur.
[19] CASE RESOLUTION
[20] We therefore deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
[Editor's note: Illustrations from the original opinion, if any, are
available in the print version]
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1992.FL.2519