The appellee, the State of Florida, by and through the

undersigned Assistant Attorneys General, hereby moves this Court

for reconsideration of the January 9, 2002, Order remanding this

case to the circuit court for consideration of King’s pro se motion

to dismiss his attorney. This action was taken by the Court

without the opportunity for the State to be heard, and there are

relevant facts with regard to King’s motion which should be

considered.

Through the years, King has filed a number of motions seeking

dismissal of his appointed counsel. A renewed Motion to Dismiss

postconviction appeal before this Court, Florida Supreme Court Case

No. 02-1). Accordingly, on November 29, 2001, Judge Schaeffer held

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a hearing on King’s pending motions (R. V5/829). King appeared at

the hearing and orally moved to withdraw said motions. King also

noted that in light of the signing of the warrant that he wished to

go forward with CCRC representing him in the upcoming proceedings

(R. V5/836-37). The oral motion to withdraw his renewed Motion to

Dismiss Counsel and Appoint Conflict-free Counsel was granted and

CCRC proceeded in filing a Rule 3.850 Motion to Vacate which King

personally verified (R. V5/838).

King affirmatively ratified his satisfaction with CCRC

attorneys Kiley and Haughey throughout the pendency of his recent

is significant that the filing deadline for this motion was

expressly extended so that CCRC could present the motion to King

and personally discuss the contents and address any concerns that

he may have prior to filing (R. V6/1029-32). It is even more

significant that CCRC in fact modified the original motion they

intended to file after meeting with King, including an additional

claim at King’s insistence (see Ex. A, initial motion as received

by the undersigned on December 17, 2001). When Judge Schaeffer

extended the filing deadline to permit CCRC to meet with King, she

instructed CCRC to serve the Attorney General with the motion they

intended to file because the State’s response was due so quickly

after the motion was being filed. After receiving the initial

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proposed motion, the undersigned received a telephone call

indicating that an additional claim was being submitted (Claim

VIII) based on King’s attorneys having met with King on December

17.

To permit a death row inmate scheduled for immediate execution

to manipulate this Court’s docket and case management on these

facts is abusive and offensive. King was clearly satisfied with

Schaeffer on January 1, 2002.

King’s attempt to dismiss current counsel and have other

attorneys appointed at this late date should not be entertained.

Although this Court has remanded the case to the circuit court, it

is not clear what Judge Schaeffer can do. Is the Court suggesting

that, should the trial judge determine that King is not satisfied

with his postconviction motion after it has been denied, she should

grant his motion, dismiss counsel, appoint new counsel, and permit

him to file a new successive motion – simply to appease a defendant

who has not been satisfied with his attorneys in 24 years?

King’s pro se request should not be subject to any further

consideration. He has requested that this Court dismiss his

current attorneys from the Office of the Capital Collateral

Regional Counsel for the Middle Region, Richard Kiley and April

Haughey, and to appoint other attorneys, presumably from CCRC-North

or "outside conflict-free counsel," to assume his representation.

4

In support of his motion, King appears to allege that April Haughey

has failed to pursue certain claims identified by Appellant in the

motion and has been rude to certain unnamed individuals who are

concerned with the progress of Appellant’s case.

The State respectfully submits that King’s pro se motion

should be stricken in accordance with this Court’s opinion in Davis

v. State, 789 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 2001). In Davis, this Court held

that capital defendants may not file pro se motions attacking the

adequacy of counsel on appeal. Although Davis was a direct appeal

case, the reasoning of that opinion applies equally to a

postconviction appeal, particularly since no constitutional right

to counsel exists in postconviction proceedings. See, Lambrix v.

State, 698 So. 2d 247, 248 (Fla. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1122

(1998); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989); Pennsylvania v.

Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). Accordingly, in Martinez v. Court of

Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 152,163-164 (2000), the United

States Supreme Court recognized that it does not violate any

constitutional rights of a defendant to force unwanted counsel

following a conviction. See Davis, 789 So. 2d 980-981.

Even if King’s motion is further considered, no conflict of

interest sufficient to require the removal of the CCRC-Middle

office from this case has been identified in King’s motion. In

support of his request for new counsel, King makes several

unsupported allegations. First, King alleges that counsel failed

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to pursue the following claims: a claim involving a police report

documenting something related to a paring knife that was allegedly

found and discarded; counsel did not pursue DNA testing; King’s

disagreement with the victim work release counselor’s version of

events on the night of the murder; an unnamed doctor would

allegedly discredit testimony related to Dr. Wood’s testimony

concerning King’s bloody crotch on the night of the murder; and

other vague and insufficient claims dealing with a toxicologist

named William M. Rice and a chemist named Marian Hill. Allegedly,

Attorney Haughey also told King that his previous attorney, Joseph

Hobson, erased all his computer records in this case and waived

record production on another possible suspect who wrecked his car

near the victim’s home and whose car had blood in it. Finally,

King complains that counsel has been rude to concerned friends and

has not contacted him in the week prior to the filing of this

motion. None of these allegations warrant any relief. If this

Court is concerned with these allegations going unresolved, you can

permit King to file a pro se habeas petition to which the State can

respond.

As to the suggestion that King has legitimate issues which are

not being investigated, King’s claim is plainly insufficient

because no specific facts in support of said claims have been

identified. General statements of dissatisfaction with counsel are

insufficient to warrant relief. See, Lowe v. State, 650 So. 2d

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969, 975 (Fla. 1994) (merely generalized grievances are

insufficient to warrant dismissal of court appointed counsel);

Wilder v. State, 587 So. 2d 543, 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (thorough

inquiry required where defendant makes a "seemingly substantial

complaint" regarding counsel); see generally, Nelson v. State, 274

So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).

Furthermore, disagreement as to litigation strategy is not

sufficient to demonstrate any conflict of interest. Blanco v.

Wainwright, 507 So. 2d 1377, 1383 (Fla. 1987). Where King admits

that each of the above allegations was presented to counsel either

in discussions with counsel or in King’s pro se motions, the fact

that counsel failed to pursue these claims demonstrates the type of

disagreement with litigation strategy which cannot support a

conflict of interest.

Moreover, this Court has consistently recognized that there is

no constitutional right to choose a particular court-appointed

counsel. Spaziano v. State, 660 So. 2d 1363, 1370 (Fla. 1995),

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1053 (1996); Jones v. State, 612 So. 2d 1370

(Fla. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 112 (1993); Hardwick v. State,

521 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988).

Furthermore, the right to conflict-free counsel cannot be used as

a device to abuse the dignity of the court or to frustrate orderly

proceedings. Cf. Jones v. State, 449 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1984)

(neither exercise of right to self-representation nor to appointed

7

counsel may be used as device to abuse dignity of court or to

frustrate orderly proceedings). In addition, when conflict between

a defendant and counsel is attributable to the defendant’s own

behavior and not to any competing interest of counsel, a defendant

is not denied the right to counsel due to such conflict of

interest. Wike v. State, 698 So. 2d 817, 820 (Fla. 1997);

Waterhouse v. State, 596 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 1992).

King has not attempted to identify any prejudice from the

conflict of interest he asserts. In Gorby v. State, 630 So. 2d 544

(Fla. 1993), this Court considered a claim that defense counsel

harbored a conflict of interest due to his former partner’s prior

representation of a trial witness; this Court noted that, to

prevail on a claim that the right to conflict-free counsel has been

violated, "a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of

interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." 630 So. 2d

at 546 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980)).

On these facts, no legal or ethical conflict has been shown,

and no reasonable basis for further consideration of King’s motion

is presented.

WHEREFORE, the appellee respectfully requests that this

Honorable Court reconsider the decision to remand this case to the

circuit court and summarily DENY the pro se motion to dismiss

counsel filed herein.

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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing

has been furnished by U.S. Regular Mail to Amos Lee King, #036275,

Florida State Prison, P. O. Box 747, Starke, Florida, 32091; and by

FAX to Richard Kiley and April Haughey, Assistant CCRC, Capital

Collateral Regional Counsel - Middle Region, 3801 Corporex Park

Drive, Suite 210, Tampa, Florida 33619, and the Honorable Susan F.

Schaeffer, Circuit Judge, Sixth Judicial Circuit, 545 First Avenue

North, Room 417, St. Petersburg, Florida 33701, and this _____ day

of January, 2002.

____________________________________

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the size and style of type used in

this motion is 12-point Courier New.

___________________________

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE